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Abstract 
 
The primary purpose of this interdisciplinary study is to show the value of history in 
investigating asylum policymaking from 1989 to 2008. Chapter 1 provides a short 
summary of asylum before 1989. It focuses especially on the power, influence and 
composition of actors who advocated for generous asylum policies and actors who 
proposed restrictive asylum policies at crucial times throughout the twentieth century. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyse the case studies of Australia, Italy and Ireland. By setting 
traditional emigration countries against a traditional immigration country, EU countries 
against a non-EU country, Catholic countries against a multidenominational country, 
islands against a peninsula, common law states against a civil law state, as well as 
countries where boat people drove asylum debates against one that lacked boat people, 
many divergences and convergences emerged. Every country had, to a certain degree, a 
unique asylum system based on its own history, identity and geography. The 
comparative Chapter 5 reveals that despite inherent national differences, noticeable 
international asylum trends also appeared during this period. In contrast to people who 
applied for asylum during the Cold War, asylum applicants in the 1990s provided 
limited political and economic returns for receiver states. Accordingly, governing 
political parties inclined towards the formation of more restrictive asylum policies. But 
secular and religious NGOs, INGOs and certain opposition political parties loudly 
protested by referencing humanitarian ideals, national commitments to human rights and 
the rule of law. Acknowledging the challenges posed by actors sympathetic to asylum 
seekers, governments in the 2000s attempted to securitize and externalise asylum, 
reduce the influence of the courts, and expedite the deportation of rejected asylum 
seekers. The conclusion suggests that governments in Europe, North America and 
Australasia are likely to build on advances made through the 2000s to restrict asylum 
even further in the next decade, especially in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008-
09.  
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Introduction∗ 
 
During the Cold War, people seeking asylum generally met with a sympathetic and 
compassionate response from western states because of the political kudos associated 
with accepting limited numbers of Soviet defectors. The collapse of communism and the 
globalization of asylum-seeking between 1989 and 2008 led to an enormous rise in 
applications for protection. In contrast to those who applied for asylum during the Cold 
War, applicants after 1989 provided limited political and economic returns for receiver 
states. This thesis seeks to determine how states reacted to such a development.  
Political theorists, philosophers, international relations experts and legal 
authorities have all written extensively on western asylum policies in recent years.1 Yet 
few historians have followed suit. Several historical studies focused on particular 
periods of asylum policymaking or asylum policies in specific countries; but more wide-
ranging historical studies investigating asylum over the longue durée remain absent.2 
The one notable exception that stands out, Michael Marrus’s The Unwanted, dealt with 
events up until the early 1980s.3 But the collapse of communism and the arrival of “jet-
age” refugees from the Developing World sparked a new dawn of asylum seeking after 
1989.  
Too often, discussions of contemporary asylum policy fail to sufficiently 
contextualise asylum trends. By looking solely at one period without first extensively 
setting the scene, scholars often overlook crucial developments. H. Stuart Hughes 
remarked nearly half a century ago that historians who see no incompatibility between 
their different roles in the humanities and social sciences are uniquely equipped to 
                                                
∗
 Speeches given in parliamentary debates or comments cited in newspapers are referenced throughout in 
double quotation marks. Excerpts from archives, books and journals are referenced throughout in single 
quotation marks. 
1
 See, for example, Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004; Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001; Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics. A Perilous Path, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001; and, James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
2
 For specific periods of asylum policymaking, see Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum:  France and the Jewish 
Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. For a concise history of the asylum 
policy of one country, see Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide:  Global, 
National, and Local Perspectives During the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, 1999 or Gérard 
Noiriel, La Tyrannie du National. Le Droit d’Asile en Europe 1793-1993, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991. 
Despite the titles, Kushner and Knox’s book focuses on Britain’s reception of refugees and Noiriel’s deals 
mostly with the history of asylum in France.  
3
 Michael Marrus, The Unwanted. European refugees in the Twentieth Century, Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. 
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illuminate the era in which we live.4 The primary purpose of this dissertation, therefore, 
is to show the value of history in the study of asylum since 1989.  
   
Seeking Asylum after 1989 
Whereas people who sought protection in western democracies after the Second World 
War came to countries with considerable labour shortages, those coming after 1989 
appeared at a time of considerable economic uncertainty. For many European countries 
without established recognisable refugee or asylum systems, economic factors such as 
unemployment rates and economic growth played considerable roles in asylum debates, 
largely due to the fusion of asylum and immigration issues. With asylum seekers 
entitled, in some countries, to relatively generous welfare provisions and housing, 
political, media and public hostility towards asylum seekers began to rise.5 References 
to the large use of taxpayer money and welfare funds by political figures and media 
groups often met with receptive public audiences. Other, more prejudiced attitudes 
towards asylum seekers also developed relating to their perceived cultural and racial 
differences from the host population.6 This development reflected the increasingly 
varied origins of asylum seekers compared to what occurred between the 1950s and 
1970s, when most refugee claimants derived from Soviet Europe. Claims that large 
numbers of asylum seekers submitted erroneous claims often led to a further escalation 
in hostility, especially when allied to allegations that asylum seekers took valuable 
education, health and housing provisions from natives at a time of increased financial 
insecurity. Critics also argued that asylum seekers represented a serious cultural and 
security threat. This became particularly apparent in resistance towards Muslim asylum 
seekers as the 1990s progressed. Opposition intensified further after the September 11th 
attacks in America in 2001. Some actors also noted that certain asylum seeker groups, 
particularly the Roma in certain European countries, assumed a physical threat to 
citizens because of their perceived propensity to engage in criminal activities.  
All of these factors led governments in liberal democratic states to form 
increasingly parsimonious asylum policies by further codifying the legal rules 
                                                
4
 H. Stuart Hughes, History as Art and as Science. Twin Vistas on the Past, New York, Evanston and 
London: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 107. 
5
 This gave rise to what Gibson terms resource-based opposition Rachel Gibson, The Growth of Anti-
Immigrant Parties in Western Europe, New York: Edwin Mellen, 2002, p. 74. Messina, more recently, 
refers to this trend as “objective opposition.” See Anthony Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII 
Migration to Western Europe, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 81-3. 
6
 Gibson terms this identity-based opposition while Messina terms it “subjective opposition.” 
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surrounding the asylum process. Accordingly, most experts have written that western 
states increasingly dismissed the plight of those seeking protection after 1989.7 This 
assumes that governments successfully implemented the restrictive asylum policies they 
formed. Unlike the 1930s, however, several avenues remained open to non-government 
actors to challenge asylum policy reform in the 1990s, most notably national courts, 
meaning a sizeable “gap” remained between asylum policies formed and asylum policies 
implemented.8 To test this hypothesis further, the case studies on Australia, Italy and 
Ireland will be divided into three distinct phases: asylum policy formation, asylum 
policy implementation and asylum policy outcomes.  
Extensive debating between various actors interested in asylum often led to the 
formation of new asylum policies. The implementation of these newly formed policies 
depended on the influence of actors opposed to their substance, as well as the avenues 
available for them to contest the composition of new policies.9 Studying the outcomes of 
the resultant asylum policies will enable this study to conclude whether the creators of 
these instruments accomplished their goals. It will also outline the effects these policies 
had on asylum seekers. Political and public debate on asylum often coincided with 
general elections or perceived asylum crises when the issue of asylum became the 
subject of extensive discussion. While the examination of Australia, Italy and Ireland 
will be quite case-specific, the comparative chapter that follows will highlight 
international trends and national differences in asylum policymaking.  
 
1.1 Competing actors 
In the mid 1990s, Gary Freeman advanced a theory hypothesising that certain actors 
shaped immigration policy.10 This dissertation shares his approach by emphasising the 
influence certain actors played in determining asylum policy. Democratic states consist 
of a number of competing actors. A bargaining process ensues between these competing 
actors when debate takes place on the formation of new policies. As Fritz Scharpf 
                                                
7
 See, for example, Philip Marfleet, Refugees in a Global Era, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
8For more information about the ‘gap hypothesis’ in migration literature, see Wayne Cornelius and 
Takeyuki Tsuda, ‘Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention’, in Wayne Cornelius, 
Philip Martin and James Hollifield (eds.), Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004 (1st ed. published in 1994), pp. 3-50 and especially p. 4-11.  
9
 Of course factors out of the hands of actors forming asylum policy also influenced whether or not it was 
successfully implemented. As will become clear in the case studies, geography, uncompromising sender 
states and unforeseen refugee situations also impacted upon the imposition of asylum policies.  
10
 Gary Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Policies in Liberal Democratic States’, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1995, pp. 881-902. 
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contends, ‘it is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could 
result from the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formulation and policy 
implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate 
actors with separate interests, goals and strategies’.11 
A simple model set out here situates actors involved in contesting asylum policy 
into two broad groups, or, to borrow once more from Scharpf, into two “hypothetical 
coalitions.”12 One group comprises those actors who empathised with the plight of 
asylum seekers. They strove to ensure that asylum seekers received access to certain 
rights and entitlements. Throughout the thesis, this broad group of actors will be referred 
to as the ‘sympathisers’. Stratham and Geddes termed these actors ‘expansionists’ in 
their recent study of asylum policymaking in the UK. This term remains problematic 
because of its demographic connotation, which potentially obscures the real 
humanitarian reasoning behind the views held by these actors. Matthew Gibney uses the 
term ‘impartialists’ to describe political theorists and philosophers who argue for open 
borders and equal rights for citizens and non-citizens. Though this term is accurate for 
his discussion, this study’s empirical focus on asylum debates in three countries rarely 
reveals such advanced views from pro-asylum actors, hence the need for the more 
eclectic term ‘sympathisers’. 13  
The pro-migrant actors Freeman mentions in his 1995 article on economic 
migration diverged significantly from sympathetic actors involved in asylum debates. 
Pro-migrant actors, such as employers in labour-intensive industries, businesses that 
profited from population growth and the family and ethnic relations of those making up 
immigrant flows promoted expansive migration policies mainly because of the benefits 
they stood to gain. By contrast, employers remained indifferent towards asylum seekers 
because of their disorganised arrival and because governments frequently barred the 
employment of asylum seekers. Although the ethnic lobby in settler-societies that 
Freeman refers to as pro-migrant sometimes advocated for generous asylum policies, 
                                                
11
 Fritz Scharpf, ‘Interorganizational Policy Studies: Issues, Concepts and Perspectives’, Kenneth Hanf 
and Fritz Scharpf (eds), Interorganizational Policy Making:Limits to Coordination and Central Control, 
London: Sage, 1978, pp. 345-377, p. 347. Quoted in Michael Hill, Implementing Public Policy: 
Governance in Theory and in Practice, London: Sage, 2002, p. 59. 
12
 As Scharpf explains, creating hypothetical coalitions ‘implies that we divide a given population of 
actors into two potential groups, each of whose members share a common interest in a certain potentially 
salient aspect of the expected outcomes of policy interactions.’ Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play. 
Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder Colorado: Westview, 1997, p. 81. 
13
 See Paul Stratham and Andrew Geddes, ‘Elites and the ‘Organised Public’: Who Drives British 
Immigration Politics and in Which Direction’, West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 248-269 
and Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. 
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certain ethnic groups actually called for restrictive asylum policies because they feared 
an increase in asylum numbers might jeopardise the entry of friends and families under 
organised government schemes.14 Sympathisers in asylum debates, contrastingly, 
promoted generous policies not for any benefit they acquired but because helping 
asylum seekers fitted into the humanitarian, moral and communitarian principles 
inherent in their beliefs and values. International and domestic pro-refugee non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental refugee organisations (IGOs), 
religious groups and certain outspoken opposition political parties supported asylum 
seekers most vociferously. 
In contrast to asylum sympathisers, opposing actors maintained that asylum 
seekers represented potential cultural, physical and economic threats to host societies. 
They repeatedly doubted the veracity of asylum claims and emphasised the potential 
problems increased numbers of asylum seekers would bring to domestic societies. 
Sceptics often worried more about how large numbers of asylum seekers bypassed their 
national immigration systems than whether asylum seekers required protection or not. 
Consequently, they favoured restricting asylum. This broad group of actors will be 
referred to throughout as ‘sceptics’. Stratham and Geddes refer to these actors as 
‘restrictionists’ and Matthew Gibney terms the political theorists that oppose open-
border arguments by referencing communitarian principles as ‘partialists’. Both 
represent accurate depictions of the actors involved but they fail to underline the 
suspicion of asylum seekers’ motives that remains inherent amongst many of these 
actors. Hence, the use of the term ‘sceptics’ throughout, which also provides a more 
mellifluous distinction to its counterpart, ‘sympathisers’.   
Freeman identified only two anti-migrant actors in his article: popular opinion 
and anti-immigrant parties. Furthermore, he maintained that public opinion, although 
‘typically restrictionist’, was ‘not well articulated’ and anti-immigration parties had 
‘little or no chance of participating in or forming governments’ because challenging the 
ethnic composition of immigration might have led to charges of racism.15 Since Freeman 
wrote his article, anti-immigration parties’ popularity rose considerably, leading to 
increased debates over immigration and asylum. To offset the loss of potential stray 
                                                
14
 In Australia, for example, a newspaper article from December 1994 recorded how ‘Ethnic leaders 
yesterday warned the Federal Government had to act urgently and decisively to stop the influx of boat 
people from China, fearing the explosion of illegal immigrants w[ould] jeopardise legitimate migration 
programs.’ See ‘Ethnic leaders call for action as more boat people arrive’, Australian, 28 Dec 1994. 
15
 Gary Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Policies in Liberal Democratic States’, p. 884. 
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voters, many mainstream political parties began to espouse arguments made by anti-
immigration parties; although they tended to use more refined language. Instead, the 
media often employed more abrasive lexicology. Mainstream political parties and 
popular media outlets focused particularly on asylum seekers, who they understood to 
represent more legitimate targets for criticism than economic migrants because they 
often required state aid, offered little by way of visible economic benefits to the host 
state, and arrived uninvited. Sizeable majorities of public opinion also tended to regard 
the arrival of asylum seekers negatively.  
 
Sympathisers v Sceptics 
People who applied for protection in western countries after 1989 had mixed 
backgrounds: some fled political persecution, some escaped potential or actual 
humanitarian crises, and some used the asylum system to bypass immigration 
restrictions. Persecuted asylum seekers fled their countries to escape further 
maltreatment. Exposed to serious threat of harm, they frequently had little control over 
the transition from their home country to their host one.16 According to Hannah Arendt, 
these people lost the ‘entire social texture into which they were born and in which they 
established for themselves a distinct place in the world’ when they fled their homes.17 
Asylum seekers fleeing potential or actual humanitarian disasters, caused by natural 
disasters, indiscriminate fighting or abject poverty, often fled to avoid death. As Zetter 
notes, ‘In complex emergencies many people are caught up in conflict and flee, though 
they are not persecuted’.18 They faced a situation whereby their state remained incapable 
of providing them with the basic needs to ensure their survival.19 Other asylum seekers 
claimed refugee status to circumnavigate migration restrictions that otherwise would 
have denied their entry or stay in their host country. The prospect of attaining a better 
standard of living in the host state compared to their home state pulled them towards 
liberal democratic states.20  
                                                
16
 Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
(2nd ed.) 1996, p. 169. 
17
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schoken, 2004 (1st publ. in 1951), p. 372. 
18
 Roger Zetter, ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2007, pp. 172-192, p. 176. 
19
 See Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke & Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence. Conflict and the Refugee 
Crisis in the Developing World, York and London: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 33 and p. v.  
20
 John Harris & Michael Todorovo, ‘Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two Sector 
Analysis’, American Economic Review, Vol. 60.1, 1970, pp. 126-142, p. 126. See also George Borjas, 
‘Economic Theory and International Migration’, International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1989, 
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The problem with these three categories related to their relationship with the 
definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, 
which made up the central fulcrum of most governments’ refugee determination systems 
after 1989.21 The convention emphasised persecution as the primary factor in asylum 
claims by terming a refugee as someone, who: 
 
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.22 
 
As Michael Teitelbaum notes, this definition meant that a person fleeing a natural 
disaster or war failed to qualify as a refugee unless they experienced persecution or felt 
“a well-founded fear of persecution.”23 Many sympathisers felt this definition unfairly 
restricted asylum seekers’ access to refugee status. Instead, they supported more 
generous proposals that advocated refugee status for people whose state failed to 
provide the basic safety and subsistence needs necessary to survive; views advocated by 
several experts writing on political asylum, such as Shacknove, Zolberg and Gibney. 
According to Andrew Shacknove, refugees represented ‘persons whose basic 
needs are unprotected by their country of origin, who have no remaining recourse other 
than to seek international restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that 
international assistance is possible.’24 Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo 
agreed: refugees moved abroad ‘in order to survive, either because their own state is the 
cause of their predicament or because it is unable to meet these basic requirements’.25 
Matthew Gibney concurs but specifies further. For him, refugees required ‘a new state 
of residence, either temporarily or permanently, because if forced to return home or 
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 457-485, p. 460. 
21
 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951. Referred to throughout as the ‘Refugee 
Convention’. 
22
 Article 1, United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. 
23
 See Michael Teitelbaum, ‘Political Asylum in Theory and Practice’ Public Interest, Vol. 76, Summer 
1984, pp. 74-86, p. 75. 
24
 Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’, Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 2 , Jan. 1985, pp. 274-284 , p. 277. 
25
 Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence. Conflict and the Refugee 
Crisis in the Developing World, p. 33. 
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remain where they are they would – as a result of either the brutality or inadequacy of 
the state – be persecuted or seriously jeopardise their physical security or vital 
subsistence needs.’26 Some sympathisers also advocated refugee status for certain 
economic asylum seekers. Michael Dummett, for instance, claimed that ‘all conditions 
that deny someone the ability to live where he is in minimal conditions for a decent 
human life ought to be grounds for claiming refuge elsewhere’. Although not as 
renowned as the others cited, Ambalavaner Sivanandan showed that some sympathisers 
also believed that ‘resistance to economic immiseration is inseparable from resistance to 
political persecution’, meaning that the ‘economic migrant is also the political 
refugee’.27  
Sceptics rarely agreed with such expansive conceptions. Instead, they sought to 
interpret the Refugee Convention’s definition considerably more narrowly than 
sympathisers. Rather than restricting asylum because they agreed with Matthew Price’s 
recent synopsis that calls for states to adopt a more political conception of asylum that 
would underline the problems facing political dissenters in certain countries, sceptics 
wanted to confine asylum because they felt asylum seekers represented a danger to their 
economic wellbeing, their nation’s sovereignty and their national identity.28 It is likely 
that if all those who managed to apply for asylum in developed countries over the last 
twenty years had actually experienced persecution, many sceptics would still call for a 
large reduction in applications because of the supposed physical, cultural and economic 
threat they brought to national societies, as evidenced by what occurred in Australia 
from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s.  
Bobo and Kluegel indicated that resistance to non-citizens stemmed from 
‘[c]ategory membership and identification with a group and a sense of shared fate’, 
which in turn led to ‘group-based assessments of self-interest’.29 When asylum seekers 
received state welfare and housing, for instance, sceptics wondered what effect this 
would have on nationals’ welfare. Michael Walzer’s view – that ‘communities must 
have boundaries: and however these are determined with regard to territory and 
resources, they depend with regard to population on a sense of relatedness and 
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mutuality’ appeared to complement the opinions of many sceptics who regarded asylum 
seekers as a threat to state control of migration. For Walzer and many sceptics, ‘the right 
to restrain the flow remain[ed] a feature of communal self-determination.’30 Others felt 
concern for ‘the preservation of a particular national identity (or identities) and widely 
shared values’, which asylum seekers potentially threatened, according to some 
sceptics.31  
 
Outline 
In an attempt to situate what occurred between 1989 and 2008 in an historical 
perspective, the first chapter will provide a short summary of asylum in the twentieth 
century before 1989. Particular attention will focus on the makeup and influence of 
sympathisers and sceptics during this period. The chapter will focus most explicitly on 
developments from the 1920s onwards. The Inter-War period produced a number of 
instruments that, while not successful at protecting the asylum seekers of the epoch, 
would later provide the cornerstone for the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Because 
asylum policy since 1989 frequently revolved around this convention, its formation and 
development will be described from the late 1940s until 1967, when the UNHCR 
produced the protocol to the convention, which led to the lifting of geographical and 
time restrictions. The shifting nature of liberal democratic states' asylum policies from 
the 1970s onwards, as well as the changing face of those in need of protection in western 
states, will dominate the latter part of this chapter in order to set the scene for the 
subsequent empirical chapters. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will provide case studies of how asylum policy developed 
since 1989 in Australia, Italy and Ireland. Because one of the principal questions of this 
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study relates to the effect a country’s migration history had on its more recent handling 
of asylum seekers, examining each country’s migration past will form the introductory 
part of each case study. Other salient factors, apart from a country’s history and 
traditions, affected a country’s reaction to the arrival of asylum seekers after 1989, 
however. Therefore, each empirical chapter will devote considerable attention to 
explaining what political, economic, and social factors shaped asylum policies after 
1989 by recounting, chronologically, the evolution of asylum policy under the three 
different headings already mentioned: policy formation, policy implementation and 
policy effects. ‘Policy formation’ will comprise the political and public debates that 
surrounded asylum and often led to policy reform. Views countenanced through 
parliamentary and media debates will illustrate what asylum policies competing actors 
desired. Furthermore, they will show whose view won out in the end and why. 
Discussions under the ‘policy implementation’ rubric will try to demonstrate whether 
new legislation achieved its stated intentions. Actors unhappy with the composition of 
new policies, for example, often used various tools to challenge their opponents, as the 
frequent references to certain court cases contained in this section of each empirical 
chapter will testify. The third heading, ‘policy effects’, will assess the consequences of 
policy changes by analysing asylum statistics and the treatment of asylum seekers 
themselves. Statistics will be provided by state and non-state actors whilst various 
studies by state, NGO and academic groups will provide information on asylum seekers’ 
welfare in the wake of new asylum policies. 
The examination of the empirical chapters will be quite country specific. By 
contrast, the comparative chapter that follows the case studies will, because of the three 
countries’ relevant similarities and dissimilarities, highlight international trends and 
national differences in asylum policymaking. It will also seek to develop, using 
empirical evidence generated from the three case studies, exploratory theories and 
hypothesises about asylum.  
By comparing and contrasting Australia, Italy and Ireland, critical convergences 
and divergences in asylum policymaking will become more evident. The contrasting 
role of migration histories in all three countries, for instance, will demonstrate how 
memories can promote or restrict the movement of people and affect their exclusion or 
inclusion into the host society. Ireland and Italy, for instance, both represented 
traditional sender societies before the relatively recent arrival of significant populations 
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of non-EU labour migrants and asylum seekers. Australia by contrast, is a country with a 
long history of immigration. Critical variations will transpire relating to states’ 
dissimilar legal systems based on common and civil traditions. Similarly, the role of the 
EU will also become apparent when comparing governments’ reactions to rising asylum 
figures, as will Australia and Ireland’s isolated geographical positions when compared 
to Italy’s representation as a bridge into Europe for many people hailing from 
Developing countries.  
Chapter 2 concentrates on Australia. Debate in Australia regularly focused on 
asylum seekers arriving by boat rather than asylum seekers who originally came into the 
country on a valid visa and then applied for asylum, even though the latter tended to 
greatly outnumber the former. Sceptics frequently remarked that boat people 
undermined Australia’s immigration and refugee policy. They maintained that 
implementing rigorous asylum policies to stem the flow of undesired boat people 
represented the only way to uphold Australia’s long history of selecting migrants. The 
effect of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party on mainstream Australian political parties 
at a time of moderate economic difficulty served to strengthen the power of sceptics.32  
Australia developed a policy whereby it automatically detained asylum seekers arriving 
by boat while their applications underwent processing. Sympathisers challenged this 
trend in a number of important court cases in the mid 1990s but the 2001 Tampa crisis 
ultimately countered this movement with the implementation of the Pacific Solution. 
This characterised a clear attempt by the Australian government to deny boat people 
access to the Australian legal system by purposely detaining them in centres outside 
national jurisdiction. Boat people granted refugee status also acquired terms and 
conditions measurably worse off than their counterparts who originally arrived in 
Australia on a visa. Crucially, the Australian government provided boat people declared 
refugees with only temporary protection as opposed to the permanent protection offered 
other refugees until the return of Labor to power in late 2007.  
Resembling Australia, much of the debate on asylum in Italy, the subject of 
chapter 3, also concerned asylum seekers arriving by boat. Initially, Italian people and 
political parties responded benevolently when Albanian boat people arrived in spring 
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1991. Yet, the muddled reaction from authorities to the original arrival of Albanians 
served to guarantee a rather divergent reaction to a later upsurge in the summer of 1991. 
The collapse of Italy’s two most popular political parties, the Christian Democrats and 
the Italian Communist Party, in the early 1990s served to bolster the rise of sceptical 
actors, such as the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale, who focused on the perceived 
physical and cultural threats that boat people brought to Italy. Two features prevented 
Italy from implementing an asylum policy as restrictive and as effective as Australia’s, 
however. First, Italy’s historic inability to implement proposed immigration and asylum 
policies because of its geographical position and its ineffective bureaucracy meant that 
large numbers continued to arrive by various forms of transport. Second, sympathetic 
actors, most notably NGOs and the Catholic Church, and their relationship with certain 
mainstream political parties on the right and the left of the political spectrum 
successfully fudged attempts to restrict and repatriate large numbers of asylum seekers. 
Despite the ability of most asylum seekers to remain in Italy, it came at a high cost. 
Italy’s failure to implement immigration reforms meant that asylum seekers received 
little or no support from the Italian state or regional and city councils. This led to many 
asylum seekers leading existences marred by uncertainty over living and working 
conditions.  
Boat people never became a feature of Irish asylum policy – the subject of 
chapter 4 – in the same way as they did in Australia and Italy because of the country’s 
northerly location. Frequent comparisons between asylum seekers and Irish emigrants, 
combined with the absence of an established anti-immigrant party meant that 
sympathisers held a noticeably stronger position in Ireland than in Australia during early 
asylum debates. Though the strength of sceptics increased from the late 1990s onwards, 
Ireland’s economic boom meant that the rhetoric they invoked remained less forceful 
than their Australian and Italian counterparts. Instead, sceptics placed considerable focus 
on imitating other EU countries’ asylum policies, particularly those of the neighbouring 
UK. The ability of sympathisers to exploit various legal loopholes, however, meant that 
asylum seekers continued to bypass many of the restrictive policy changes until 2003. 
The citizenship referendum the following year and subsequent policy developments 
arrested this trend. 
 Chapter 5 will compare and contrast asylum practices in Australia, Italy and 
Ireland since 1989 so as to identify international trends and national differences. In an 
attempt to historicise asylum policymaking somewhat, the comparative chapter is 
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divided into two parts: the 1990s and the 2000s. Certain critical national phenomena, 
such as a country’s economic circumstances, social settings, political processes, and 
histories and memories affected asylum policies in different ways. In other words, 
national tendencies affected asylum policy, as did the political fallout they generated. 
Nonetheless, some noticeable international trends appeared. Despite governments’ 
tendency to side with sceptics, sympathisers in the 1990s consistently managed to 
successfully contest increasingly restrictive asylum policies. Governments used the 
heightened security threat after September 2001 and the growth of public scepticism to 
offset the influence of sympathisers by tackling perceived legal loopholes and 
externalising the asylum process more and more. In addition to summarising the main 
points made throughout the thesis, the conclusion will seek to provide some insights into 
what form asylum policymaking will take in the wake of the 2008-09 economic crisis 
based on the historical lessons learnt from this study. 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the Context for Future Problems: Asylum before 1989 
 
The text of sub-paragraph 2 [Article 1, sub-paragraph 2 of the Refugee Convention] 
obviously did not refer to refugees from natural disasters, for it was difficult to imagine 
that fires, floods, earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, for instance, differentiated between 
their victims on the grounds of race, religion or political opinion. Nor did that text cover 
all man-made events. There was no provision, for example, for refugees fleeing from 
hostilities unless they were otherwise covered by article 1 of the Convention. 
Israeli Representative to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Geneva, 16 July 
1951. 
 
Too often, discussions of recent asylum practices have neglected to discuss what 
occurred in previous decades and centuries. By looking solely at a short, defined period 
without first extensively setting the scene, scholars have often failed to link what 
happened since 1989 with what happened previously. Consequently this chapter, after 
briefly discussing asylum’s etymology, will provide a short history of asylum from the 
Early Modern period until the First World War before focusing more explicitly on 
developments since the 1920s. The Inter-War period produced a number of instruments 
that, while not successful at protecting the asylum seekers of the epoch, later provided 
the cornerstone for the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention. It is 
important to set out how and why this convention exists, as well as to specify who 
created the convention and approved it, since debates on asylum after 1989 frequently 
revolved around different actors’ interpretations of that same convention.  
 
Origins of asylum 
The concept of asylum has a long and intriguing history. Indeed, Luc Legoux has noted 
that the issue of asylum already represented a topic that instigated debate as far back as 
2,500 years ago, when Aeschylus’ oldest play, The Suppliants, discussed whether fifty 
daughters of Danaos should obtain asylum in Argos to escape forced marriages.33 The 
                                                
33See Luc Legoux, ‘Political Pressure’, p. 333. To access the play online, go to 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aeschylus/suppliant.html (27 Aug 2009). For more classical references to asylum, 
see Otto Kirchheimer, ‘Asylum’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1959, pp. 985-
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English term asylum also has its roots in ancient Greece, where it literally meant “an 
inviolable place” or, more simply, “sanctuary.” While people today associate the term 
with the granting of refuge to a persecuted migrant, during the medieval period and 
Middle Ages it retained an overwhelmingly religious connotation in Europe. The right to 
asylum stipulated that common law offenders could take refuge in certain religious 
sanctuaries, which prohibited authorities from entering. Richard Kaeuper records how 
this worked in the case of England in the Middle Ages: 
 
Although the right of asylum may strike modern sensibilities as wonderfully 
picturesque, to medieval law officers hot on the trail of an escaping felon, sanctuary 
must have seemed an omnipresent obstacle. Every consecrated church or chapel, with its 
churchyard, could give asylum to the fugitive. A number of great abbeys and ministers 
provided an even more extensive haven, often extending a league beyond the church, 
with the limits of legitimate pursuit clearly marked by stone crosses. Within certain 
liberties held in secular hands those fleeing the law could live indefinitely. But the more 
common ecclesiastical sanctuary was strictly regulated and limited by provisions of the 
common law.34 
  
Henry VIII attempted to alter the system in the sixteenth century, before James I 
abolished it altogether in 1623.35 The first historical example of what we might 
recognize today as political asylum occurred as a result of the French persecution of the 
Huguenots following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. This symbolised the 
administration of asylum’s transformation under the Westphalian system; once firmly 
the right of religious entities, it slowly became a political tool and accordingly the 
responsibility of states to administer. England alone received approximately 50,000 
Huguenot “refugees,”36 as they became known, between 1680 and 1700. England and 
other countries chose to bestow entry on the Huguenots for several reasons. The 
principle ground for acceptance related to the Huguenots’ religious persecution at the 
hands of the French. Nonetheless, countries also welcomed the Huguenots because of 
the advantages they brought to their new countries through their renowned skill for 
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economic trading and their considerable insight into the secrets of the clothing 
industry.37  
 
1.1 The secularisation of asylum  
According to the historian Gérard Noiriel, the French Revolution signalled the 
secularisation of the concept of asylum. The Constitution of 24 June 1793 stated that the 
French people gave ‘asylum to foreigners banished from their land for the cause of 
liberty’.38 The arrival of over 10,000 mostly well-off Polish political refugees in 1830s 
tested this assurance. A long, mostly supportive, debate on asylum in the public sphere 
and parliament ensued. One of the issues that received most attention centred on what 
people perceived “refugee” to mean. After much deliberation throughout the 1830s, the 
French government defined refugees as foreigners ‘without a passport, without any 
relations to any ambassador who authorised their presence on our territory’.39  
The compassionate debate in Britain on asylum throughout much of the 
nineteenth century resembled that of France. Indeed, Britain operated an open border 
policy from 1823 until 1905.40 Britons, a Times of London editorial from 1853 noted, 
prided themselves on their open asylum policy throughout the nineteenth century: 
‘Every civilised people on the face of the earth must be fully aware that this country is 
the asylum of nations, and that it will defend the asylum to the last ounce of its treasure, 
and the last drop of its blood. There is no point on which we are prouder and more 
resolute.’41 Numbers remained limited throughout the nineteenth century. Furthermore, 
as Kirchheimer notes: 
 
The exile then was a rebel, a Mazzini or a Marx, a Herzen or a Bakunin. Whenever 
exiles appeared in larger numbers, they were survivors of revolutionary battles, like the 
men of 1848 or the participants of the Paris Commune. All had dared to defy the 
established powers with the pen, the revolver, or in armed campaigns … .42 
 
Most poor migrants forced to flee their homelands left during this period for North 
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America, such as poor Russian Jews experiencing widespread anti-Semitism or Irish 
migrants escaping Famine. Nonetheless, many also went to Britain. By the end of the 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, debate in Britain towards 
those in need of shelter had become more hostile. Compelled by international pressure 
to place restrictions on the entry of possible anarchist terrorists and domestic pressure to 
limit the sustained arrival of thousands of mostly poor Jewish migrants fleeing pogroms 
in Russia, Britain began debating the imposition of restrictions on immigration from the 
late nineteenth century onwards. The Conservatives eventually succeeded in instigating 
the 1905 Aliens Act to deflect these destitute refugees. To appease the critical Liberal 
Party, which remained opposed to closing Britain’s borders to potential refugees, the act 
included a provision for those in need of protection: 
 
In the case of an alien immigrant who provides that he is seeking admission to this 
country solely to avoid persecution or punishment on religious grounds or for an offence 
of a political character, or persecution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger to 
life and limb, on account of religious belief, leave to land shall not be refused on the 
ground merely of want of means, or the probability of his becoming a charge on the 
rates.43 
 
Despite the Liberals return to power in 1906, the British government rarely implemented 
its provision on asylum, with one observer recording that authorities only allowed ten 
refugees to enter in 1910.44 
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Source: The Jewish Museum of London. The caption reads: “Britannia: I can no longer offer shelter to 
fugitives. England is not a free country”.  
  
Nonetheless, the British definition of a refugee represented a considerably more detailed 
conception than its French precedent. It also pre-dated the UN Convention’s 
personalisation of asylum and emphasis on ‘persecution’.  
Britain’s move signalled the impending change that attitudes towards 
immigration would undergo in the first half of the twentieth century. Widespread belief 
in economic liberalism in Europe saw controls on foreigners diminish in the second half 
of the nineteenth century but this trend was reversed in the first decades of the twentieth 
century as countries returned to economic and territorial protectionism. As John Torpey 
chronicled, ‘the booming of the guns of August 1914 brought to a sudden close the era 
during which foreigners were relatively free to traverse borders’.45 States reintroduced 
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passport controls with vigour.  
Instead of lifting these bellicose measures after the end of the First World War, 
states reinforced them. Crucially, this included many of the traditional settler-states, 
which had until then presided over a generous and open immigration policy for 
European migrants. The United States, which accepted approximately one million 
immigrants annually in the years immediately preceding 1914, led the way in 
introducing changes. The 1921 and 1924 US Immigration Acts limited arrivals by 
introducing quotas for countries. Ethnic composition also became important, with the 
U.S. preferring northern Europeans to eastern and southern Europeans.46 Almost 
simultaneously, analogous developments took place across Europe, with the possible 
exception of France, whose historic fear of population decline delayed the move to 
restrict immigration immediately.47 Nonetheless, with unemployment and negative 
public opinion growing by the 1930s, France too began to curb immigration.48  
Hobsbawm later termed the Inter-War years the ‘apogee of nationalism’, as 
popular nationalism began to replace its cultural antecedent.49 New approaches to 
nationalism perceived that a named human population shared a common history, 
territory and language. Anyone considered ineligible from sharing these traits, such as 
ethnic minorities or migrants, became conspicuous in the eyes of the public and 
governments. To amplify this even further, the post-war emergence in many western 
countries of modern systems of social organisation – the so-called “welfare state” – led 
to an even greater distinction between citizen and non-citizen.50  
The consequences of increases in passport control, as well as the popular support 
for the ethnic state meant that entry – and stay – became more difficult to attain for 
refugees and economic migrants alike. In contrast to economic migrants, those in search 
of protection risked potential harm or even death if they returned to their origin state.  
 
1.2 Inter-War Refugees  
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Even as states’ “expropriation of the legitimate means of movement”51 gained more 
verisimilitude, people continued to move on a massive scale. Fortunately, most of these 
people transferred to newly formed nation-states that welcomed them. Approximately 
one to two million ethnic Poles migrated to Poland; one million ethnic Germans to 
Germany; 300,000 ethnic Hungarians to Hungary; and the newly formed Balkan states 
welcomed tens of thousands of its ethnic countrymen and women.52  Following the end 
of the Greco-Turkish Wars (1919-22), vast numbers of Turkish, Greek and Bulgarian 
migrants moved en masse; often in opposite directions.53  
Not all ethnic and religious minorities possessed a country they could call their 
own, however. Europe’s Jews and Roma, for example, remained in tentative positions in 
countries where antagonism towards different people began to rise. In an attempt to 
safeguard the wellbeing of these people, the newly formed League of Nations persuaded 
certain countries to sign the Minority Treaties. According to James Hathaway, this 
‘contributed in important ways to the evolution of both international human rights law 
and the refugee rights regime’ by ‘firmly establish[ing] the propriety of international 
legal attention to the human rights of at-risk persons inside sovereign states.’54 
Unfortunately for some ethnic groups in Europe, this represented a long-term goal that 
only developed properly after the horrors of the Second World War. Nonetheless, 
private voluntary organisations took up the fight for minorities and refugees.  
According to Barnett and Weiss, more and more voluntary organisations 
promoting ethical commitments to strangers formed as the nineteenth century advanced. 
Drawing on many of the ideals developed during the Enlightenment and the Christian 
Reform Movement, these organisations began to fight against slavery, to garner charity 
for the poor and to seek certain social rights for workers.55 In the 1860s, Henri Dunant 
founded perhaps the most famous voluntary organisation of all, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The critical situation in Europe during and 
immediately after the First World War led to, in the words of Jorgen Lissner, ‘the end to 
“adhocracy”’ amongst private organisations promoting ethical commitments to strangers 
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and the move towards a more organised response to assisting vulnerable groups.56 This 
unification of resources became particularly evident in private organisations’ response to 
the crisis caused by the huge migration of Russian refugees into Europe in the 1920s.  
 
Russian Refugees 
Unlike the refugee that wandered Europe in the nineteenth century, the refugee in 
twentieth century Europe no longer solely represented people that had ‘dared to defy the 
established powers with the pen, the revolver, or in armed campaigns’.57 Instead they 
often comprised people escaping persecution, wars and humanitarian disasters, as the 
over one million Russian refugees entering Europe after the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
the ensuing civil war and the 1921 famine clearly demonstrated.58 Crucially, private 
voluntary organisations set up to help those in need came to the rescue.  
Statelessness symbolised the plight of the Russians. Following a meeting of 
private voluntary organisations (PVOs) concerned with Russian refugees in February 
1921, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) demanded, on behalf of all 
PVOs, improved conditions for refugees from the recently established League of 
Nations. Gustave Ador, the then President of the ICRC, noted the plight of Russian 
refugees:  
 
These people are without legal protection and without any well-defined legal status. The 
majority of them are without any legal means of subsistence, and one must particularly 
draw attention to the position of the young and the youths amongst them who are 
growing up in an-ever increasing misery. 59 
 
To tackle these afflictions, Ador suggested the ‘possible appointment of a League of 
Nations Commissioner for the Russian refugees’. Defending the suggestion, Ador 
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maintained that ‘it is not so much a humanitarian duty which calls for the generous 
activities of the League of Nations as an obligation of international justice.’60 French 
and British diplomats, who felt responsible for the flight of many White Army 
supporters they had supported and encouraged, also canvassed for the appointment.  
The League of Nations named Fridjhof Nansen as the first High Commissioner 
for Russian Refugees in 1921. Nansen’s background as an accomplished explorer, 
scientist and aid worker, not to mention his successful repatriation of over 400,000 
soldiers after the First World War, ensured the High Commission immediate 
international recognition.61  
When governments unanimously approved Nansen’s September 1921 resolution 
to ‘obtain the collaboration of private relief organisations which hitherto have 
contributed to the relief work in connection with Russian refugees’ and ‘to associate 
them directly with his work’, it symbolised the vital role PVOs would play in the High 
Commission throughout the 1920s.62 To coordinate the work of PVOs and prevent 
overlapping, Nansen oversaw the formation of an Advisory Committee of Private 
Organisations that enabled PVOs to consult regularly with the High Commissioner.63  
The High Commission for Russian refugees, with consistent prompting from 
PVOs, began to tackle the legal limbo that Russian refugees found themselves in (as one 
League official commented, refugees could not ‘travel, marry, be born, or die without 
creating legal problems’64). Nansen set about introducing documentary material that 
entitled the Russian refugees to a certain legal status. What became known as the 
Nansen Passport bestowed the right to travel to certain destinations for a twelve-month 
period and established the holder’s Russian nationality. The Russian refugees benefited 
from several factors. First, the 1920s represented a period of economic growth in 
Europe, particularly after 1924. Second, because of the support for the White Russians 
in their battle with the Bolsheviks, many European countries, most notably France, felt 
obliged to help the Russian refugees stranded outside their home state. Third, France’s 
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desire to increase its population after the deaths of so many of its young males in the 
First World War meant that the 1920s represented a period of substantial immigration 
for the country.65 Fourth, the Soviet Union’s international isolation meant that League of 
Nations members felt that helping these refugees placed relatively little strain on their 
diplomatic policies.  
Governments quickly adopted the Nansen passport system and by 1929 over 50 
governments recognised it. The League later extended the system to include Armenian, 
Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish refugees scattered throughout Europe and the 
Middle East from 1924 onwards.66 But the League excluded Italian refugees fleeing 
Mussolini’s Fascist regime because of Italy’s prominent membership of the League. 
Nonetheless, most Italians fleeing Fascism found refuge in neighbouring countries 
throughout the 1920s. 
 
Defining Refugees 
Establishing a description that defined a refugee and identifying what legal rights 
refugees could attain also became a challenging goal that the High Commission pursued. 
The 1926 League of Nations Arrangement on Russian and Armenian Refugees surmised 
that refugees from these countries had ‘not yet acquired another nationality’ but ‘no 
longer enjoy[ed] the protection’ of the Turkish and Soviet governments.67 This 
resembled the French conception of a refugee conceived nearly one hundred years 
before. But voluntary organisations wanted more definitive rights for refugees. PVOs, 
particularly the Russian and Armenian legal experts representing the Commission 
Centrale pour l’Étude de la Condition des Réfugiés Russes et Arménians, pushed for a 
draft convention on the rights of Russian and Armenian refugees from the late 1920s 
onwards.68 Although Nansen managed to gather states to discuss the proposed 
convention, their reluctance to sign it resulted in the production of the 1928 
Arrangement on Russian and Armenian Refugees, which provided non-binding 
recommendations relating to refugees’ right to work, their right to access the courts and 
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their protection from expulsion.69 Not satisfied with this outcome, PVOs pressed the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees for the League of Nations, which combined 
state delegates sympathetic to the plight of refugees and PVO representatives, to 
summon states together in 1933 once more to discuss the formation of a more definitive 
document.70  
Jacques Rubinstein and Baron Boris Nolde, prominent Russian legal experts 
from the Commission Centrale pour l’Étude de la Condition des Réfugiés Russes et 
Arménians, Lord Robert Cecil, an ex-Conservative British minister who headed the 
British League of Nations Union and a French civil servant (de Navailles) remained to 
the fore of the committee’s activity. Their work led the way to the establishment of the 
1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, which codified many 
of the recommendations set out in the 1928 arrangement.71 It contained a number of 
significant recommendations relating to labour conditions, industrial accidents, and 
welfare and education. But only eight countries ratified the convention – and only then 
with varying reservations.72 The convention required states to treat refugees the same as 
their most favoured migrants. Nevertheless, the unfavourable economic climate 
jettisoned the aims of the convention, with even long established migrants receiving 
hostile treatment. Indeed, many of the outlined stipulations, including non-refoulement, 
remained largely ineffectual as refugees in the 1930s faced a much more perilous 
existence than that of their 1920s predecessors.73  
 
A New Refugee Crisis 
The League of Nations failed to foresee the continuation of Europe’s refugee problem. 
Indeed, Fridjhof Nansen himself repeated the widely held view in 1926 that refugee 
problems remained finite and solvable.74 This coincided with western governments’ 
insistence that the League’s ‘refugee work must be liquidated with the utmost 
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rapidity’.75 The aftermath of Hitler’s accession to power in Germany quickly 
contradicted this view, as people began to leave Nazi Germany in increasing numbers. 
Despite refugees numbering far less in the 1930s, contrasting economic conditions 
emanating from the 1929 Great Crash meant refugees fleeing Nazi persecution received 
more hostile treatment at the hands of European states. Furthermore, these same 
countries’ efforts to appease Germany meant they repeatedly saw refugees as potential 
troublemakers.76 Lamentably for the refugees fleeing the Nazi regime in the 1930s, 
governments strengthened legislative and enforcement mechanisms to facilitate easier 
expulsion measures.   
Approximately 150,000 departed Germany from 1933 through to the start of 
1938,77 although accurate statistical data remains absent.78 Some Jews, noted Yehuda 
Bauer, actually returned to Germany in this period because of the harsh conditions they 
endured in other countries, especially in Romania and Poland, where anti-Semitism 
remained rife.79 To aid new refugees, the League of Nations appointed an autonomous 
High Commissioner responsible for German refugees, the American James MacDonald, 
in October 1933. In contrast to the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, the new 
office had to appropriate all funds privately to appease Germany’s objections to the 
League of Nations.80 
The League of Nations’ attempts to administer more comprehensive definitions 
of states’ obligations to refugees in the 1930s only applied to those already termed 
refugees by the League, such as the Russian and the Armenian refugees. Therefore, 
those fleeing Nazi persecution remained outside the gambit of the agreements on 
refugees already approved by states. James McDonald, Nansen’s successor as head of 
the League of Nations Refugee Committee had noted in 1935 that ‘the daily grace in the 
High Commissioner’s office was “Thank God for Palestine,”’81 on account of its 
absorption of Jewish refugees. But the Arab Revolt of 1936 made the British wary of the 
effects continuing Jewish emigration could have on its ruling of Palestine. In 1937 the 
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Palestinian Royal Commission – set up in the wake of the 1936 Arab revolt – 
recommended that the British government cap Jewish emigration to Palestine at 12,000 
per annum for the following five years; leading to Palestine’s closure as an emergency 
escape route.82 Similarly, the United States, Britain and France began to frown upon 
Jewish emigration to Shanghai, an open city which required no documents to land and 
where 17,000 Jewish refugees had settled by 1939. They feared that increasing numbers 
would upset the delicate balance of interests that allowed their strange relationship with 
Japan over the area to continue.83 
Following just over two years as High Commissioner, MacDonald resigned from 
his post. In a widely publicised letter, MacDonald blamed the growing crisis facing 
Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from Germany on the intransigence of the international 
community: 
 
The efforts of the private organisations and the League organisations for refugees can 
only mitigate a problem of growing gravity and complexity. In the present economic 
conditions ... European states have only a limited power of absorption of refugees. The 
problem must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided.84 
 
He also stipulated that the decision to separate his office from the League of Nations 
fundamentally weakened his position.85 MacDonald’s replacement as High 
Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm, inherited an even less powerful role than his 
predecessor as the League Council ‘carefully circumscribed the new High 
Commissioner’s sphere of activity’ to circumvent the unwelcome attention McDonald’s 
outspoken statements acquired.86 Nonetheless, Malcolm still managed to bring together 
representatives from fifteen countries in late 1936 for a conference focused on the 
German refugee question.  
States, although supportive of potential measures to alleviate the suffering of 
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German refugees within their territories, remained particularly hesitant to commit to 
helping potential future arrivals from Germany. Romania noted that it had already 
reached its capacity for receiving refugees apart from those travelling through the 
country.87 The Netherlands wanted to retain its power to allow or disallow refugees from 
entering its territory. Switzerland repeatedly drew attention to the problem of 
clandestine refugees and underlined the difficulties caused by their continued entry at a 
time of economic depression, stating its preference to ‘aid the refugee coming from 
Germany to settle elsewhere’ rather than allow him settle in its territory.88 Resembling 
recent asylum debates, Belgium thought countries should be allowed to ask refugees to 
return to the country in which they found first asylum.89 Nevertheless, all of these 
countries, with the exception of Romania, adopted the provisional non-binding 
arrangement set out in the conference with various amendments, in addition to the UK, 
France, Norway and Denmark.90 Further efforts by the High Commissioner for German 
Refugees to attain states’ acquiescence to more authoritative rules defining their 
treatment of German refugees proved mostly futile, however. Only two countries, the 
UK and Belgium ratified the later Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming 
from Germany, completed in February 1938 as restrictive measures against rising 
numbers of refugees from Germany and Austria became more widespread.91 
Contrasting sharply with PVOs’ role in representing Russian and Armenian 
refugees in discussions throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, PVOs played a negligible 
role in the session debates for the 1936 and 1938 conferences. The absence of an 
advisory committee of private organisations until after the 1936 conference partly 
explained this distinction. Previously, the Advisory Committee of Private Organisations 
and the PVOs’ involvement in Inter-Governmental discussions had allowed PVOs to 
come together to extract the best outcomes for refugees but PVOs failed to receive these 
opportunities in international debates surrounding refugees escaping from Nazism. 
Despite their lack of international representation, pro-asylum actors did succeed in 
mitigating the severity of restrictive asylum policies in some countries, most notably in 
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France where the Popular Front government slackened immigration restrictions in 1936 
and the UK government repealed its asylum regime after the 1938 Anschluss in 
Austria.92 In the United States, pro-asylum actors focused enough attention on the 
government for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to convene a conference on the subject 
of refugees fleeing Nazism in Evian in the summer of 1938. Indeed, in the months 
leading up to Evian, several prominent Jewish voluntary groups – and Christian 
voluntary groups, to a lesser extent – came together for a conference to discuss the 
refugee issue. Almost simultaneously, two prominent American Jewish politicians, 
Emanuel Celler and Samuel Dickstein, publicly raised the subject in Congress.93 
Dorothy Thompson’s article in the April 1938 edition of Foreign Affairs gave further 
vent to the consternation amongst certain organisations surrounding America’s failure to 
intervene.94  
In July 1938, twenty-nine governments came together in a small French town to 
discuss the problem. Thirty-nine voluntary organisations, including twenty-one Jewish 
groups, attended the conference. Again, they did so in an unofficial capacity, even 
though the conference maintained that all refugees’ welfare would remain the 
responsibility of voluntary organisations rather than states.95 Individual consultations 
between PVOs and government representatives at Evian demonstrated the disjointed 
position of many PVOs. Four different opinions resonated amongst PVOs according to 
the committee made up of various government representatives: (i) to encourage Jews to 
emigrate to Palestine by lifting the contemporary quotas; (ii) to integrate refugees in 
their present environment; (iii) to settle Jewish refugees in an as yet uninhabited 
location; and (iv) to guarantee Jews minority rights in their new countries of asylum.96 
Despite the original initiative, Roosevelt set out defined terms for discussion at 
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the Evian conference so that existing immigration laws remained in place.97 Instead, 
most of the focus concentrated on how the Jewish exodus had ‘become so great that it 
renders racial and religious problems more acute, increases international unrets [sic], 
and may hinder seriously the process of appeasement in international relations’. The 
resolution adapted at Evian also recorded that: 
 
[T]he involuntary emigration of large numbers of people, of different creeds, 
economic conditions, professions and trades ... is disturbing to the general 
economy, since these persons are obliged to seek refuge, either temporarily or 
permanently, in other countries at a time when there is serious unemployment.98 
 
The resolution’s negligible recommendations – the highlight involved setting up 
the ineffective Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees – clearly demonstrated states’ 
reservations in helping refugees escaping Nazi persecution. Mixed motives caused the 
United States to ensure that any proposals concluded at Evian would be non-binding. 
Actors sceptical of the potential effects of accepting larger numbers of refugees 
remained in the ascendancy. Both restrictionist and isolationist actors from both sides in 
Congress loudly voiced their disapproval at the prospect of changing America’s 
immigration policies or in intervening in European politics. Public opinion polls also 
showed overwhelming opposition to refugees from Germany and Austria. At a time of 
rocketing unemployment caused by the 1937 recession, Roosevelt’s priorities rested 
with gaining the majority’s backing for his policies to tackle the economic crisis, which 
explains, in effect, Evian’s failure to genuinely tackle the refugee problem.99  
In Michael Marrus’s words, ‘Evian simply underscored the unwillingness of the 
Western countries to receive Jewish refugees’ with ‘one delegate after another read[ing] 
statements into the record, justifying existing restrictive policies and congratulating 
themselves on how much had already been accomplished for refugees’.100 Soon after the 
Evian conference, Hungary and Yugoslavia closed their frontiers, Italy announced its 
1938 anti-Jewish decrees, and Holland, Belgium and Switzerland reinforced their 
                                                
97
 See Tommie Sjoberg, The Powers and the Persecuted, p. 124. 
98
 Resolution adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee (Evian) on July 14th, 1938. Published in 
League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 19, 1938, pp. 676-677. 
99Tommie Sjoberg, The Powers and the Persecuted, p. 124. 
100
 See Michael Marrus, The Unwanted, pp. 170-2. 
39 
 
borders to restrict the entry of refugees.101 Moreover, the newly established Inter-
Governmental Refugee Committee, which represented Evian’s main achievement, 
lingered in obscurity from October 1939 until 1943.102 
The annexation of Austria in March 1938 and Kristallnacht in Germany in 
November of the same year turned, in the words of Claudena Skran, ‘a manageable 
refugee flow into an uncontrollable flood’.103 To make matters worse, the 1938 Nazi 
laws forbidding Jews fleeing from taking their belongings and savings caused many 
European countries to step up their restrictions against the entry and stay of Jews. 
Previously, Jews brought certain economic advantages to host states because they 
arrived with significant financial resources but from 1938 onwards Jews frequently 
arrived penniless. The almost simultaneous arrival in France of approximately half a 
million Spaniards fleeing civil war hindered the reception of Jews in France even 
further.104 By the outbreak of war in September 1939, the number of those that escaped 
Nazism since 1933 increased to 400,000.105 More would have left except for the 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies of European countries caused by anti-
Semitism, labour shortages and Jews’ destitution. 
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The Refugee’, Felix Nussbaum (1939)106 
 
When stories of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews came to light in December 
1942, sympathisers again placed the American and British governments under severe 
public pressure to act. Critics attacked the British government’s failure to help Jewish 
refugees in the House of Commons whilst prominent figures in the Anglican Church 
spoke out in favour of assisting refugees. In contrast, the Vatican refused to partake in 
the Allied declaration condemning the Nazi extermination of Jews.107 In the United 
States, over 40,000 attended a performance to mark the murder of Europe’s Jews.108 The 
US and UK governments responded by organising a conference on ways of tackling the 
refugee crisis. They chose Bermuda as the location for the conference because of its 
isolation. Resembling Evian, the 1943 Bermuda Conference promised much but 
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produced little. It assuaged dissent somewhat but ultimately saw America maintain its 
immigration restrictions and Britain continue to disallow any increase in Jewish 
settlement to Palestine.109  
 
1.3 The genesis of the Geneva Convention 
The end of the Second World War instigated several crucial developments. Countries 
vowed to make sure the newly formed United Nations would serve the world better than 
its predecessor, the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations, signed in 
1945, insured, cemented and enhanced the role of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in future discussions by stipulating that the UN could ‘make suitable 
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are 
concerned with matters within its competence’.110 Nonetheless, it took several decades 
before NGOs made a real impact.  
The horrors of the Second World War led directly to the development of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and indirectly to the formation of the 
UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. The development of human rights law in the 
late 1940s had an enormous influence on the formation of the convention, as displayed 
in its preamble when it declared that ‘The High Contracting Parties, Considering the 
Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … have affirmed the 
principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination.’ The principle author of the UDHR, René Cassin, also had extensive 
experience of asylum. As a French Jewish refugee during the Second World War, Cassin 
drafted the UDHR with refugees from the previous decades evidently in mind. Article 
14.1 clearly declared: ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution’.111 
In contrast to the lack of activity related to refugee relief for most of the Second 
World War, various states attempted to gain control of handling Europe’s refugees and 
displaced persons towards the end of the war. In addition to the IGCR, the Allies 
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established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 
1943 to maintain and repatriate displaced persons.112 As the war slowly came to an end, 
the United States pointedly favoured the establishment of an institution specifically 
designed to facilitate inter-governmental action on refugees and displaced persons and to 
underscore communism’s flaws.113 In contrast, the Soviet Union favoured refugees’ 
repatriation and hence supported the prolongation of the UNRRA.114 Between the two, 
the International Labor Organization and the newly-formed United Nations promoted 
international co-operation.115  
In 1947, the UN founded the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), which 
eventually replaced both the IGCR and the UNRRA. Under the auspices of the United 
States, which contributed forty-six per cent of the organisation’s operational budget, the 
IRO began its main task of resettling refugees.116 Western European countries remained 
largely incapable of taking sizeable portions of refugees because of their war-torn state; 
therefore, North America and Australia took in large numbers.117 By the late 1940s, 
most of the eleven million displaced persons and refugees leftover from the Second 
World War had found a home, with less than one million remaining.118  
In March 1948, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
requested the UN Secretary-General to undertake a study of the existing situation of the 
protection of refugees and the stateless with a view to making recommendations on how 
best the UN could protect those in question.119 In response to the UN’s study, the 
Economic and Social Council appointed an Ad Hoc Committee comprising 
representatives from thirteen states on 8 August 1949. When delegates from states met 
at Lake Success for the first time in January 1950, the UN presented them with a 
provisional convention which it had drafted in the preceding months.  
Most of the work behind the draft convention on refugees came from several 
leading members of the IRO legal division who had personal experience of asylum. The 
Swiss legal expert, Gustave Kullmann, led these efforts. Kullmann occupied the post of 
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Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in the League of Nations during the Second 
World War. His wife, who later set up the Pushkin foundation in London, had fled 
Russia in the wake of the Russian Revolution. Paul Weis, who represented the IRO at 
discussions in Lake Success in early 1950, also had extensive personal experience of 
refugeehood. He escaped to the UK in 1939 from Austria after spending several months 
imprisoned in a concentration camp. He worked for the World Jewish Congress during 
the war before joining the IRO in September 1947. He also represented the organisation 
at discussions on the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).120 
Kullmann and Weis frequently consulted Jacques Rubinstein, the Russian refugee who 
helped author the 1928 arrangement that provided most of the text for the 1933 refugee 
convention. Kullmann termed the IRO draft a “realistic” refugee convention: 
 
The Draft is “realistic” in the sense that it aims at not going beyond what can reasonably 
be demanded of a liberal democratic State. 
It was appreciated that in contradistinction to previous instruments, the Draft had to be 
framed in such a way as to secure as universal application as possible. It was also 
appreciated that it had not to be designed for one category of refugees alone, but for all 
categories which might come under the mandate of the new High Commissioner.121 
 
After extensive consultation with the Human Rights Division of the United 
Nations in New York in November 1949, whose head, John Humphrey helped draft the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the IRO draft became the template for future 
discussions on the Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, it was submitted as a secretariat 
draft to the Ad Hoc Committee set up to discuss the convention in New York in mid 
January 1950.122 Soon after convening, the Ad Hoc Committee decreased from thirteen 
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to eleven members, as the Soviet Union and Poland left because of the continued 
presence of the [Republic of] China representation.123 The remaining countries partaking 
in the committee comprised Belgium, Brazil, Canada, [Republic of] China, Denmark, 
France, Israel, Turkey, the UK, the United States and Venezuela. Paul Weiss acted as 
the IRO representative. 
After a few days of discussions, Weis wrote to Kullmann in Geneva to inform 
him that three countries, the UK, France and the United States, had each taken a 
different stance regarding the definition of a refugee; a pattern that continued throughout 
subsequent negotiations. The UK favoured a definition that ‘included all unprotected 
persons’; the French proposal gave a wide definition of the term “refugee” ‘based on the 
right of asylum’; while the US suggestions amounted to an ‘historical enumeration of 
the various categories of refugees, based on the Constitution of I.R.O. with certain 
amendments’.124 Following on from discussions over the definitions set out in the draft, 
a working group comprising France, the UK, the US and Israel further analysed the 
meanings attached to the IRO propositions, with Paul Weiss in attendance.125 Their 
tentative conclusions, resembling the US proposals, considerably narrowed the scope of 
                                                                                                                                          
clauses, and re-drafted it paragraph by paragraph with M. Giraud of the Human Rights Division. We then 
went over the same text again with Humphrey himself and his colleagues during a long session on the eve 
of my sailing. 
Save for minor points, the IRO draft was adopted by the Secretariat (both by the Human Rights 
Division and the Legal Division) as a suitable working paper to be submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee. 
At the moment when I left, Humphrey was not prepared as yet to commit himself as to whether 
the Secretary would adopt the draft as a joint draft of both Organisations or not. 
Subsequently, we introduced into our IRO draft a few new points, which we considered of major 
importance. This improved draft was submitted to DG and approved by him after consultation with the 
Heads of interested Departments at Headquarters and with some Legal Advisers in the Field. 
By the time we completed the job, we received the UN Secretariat’s suggestion to make it a joint 
submission. While the single working paper submitted would be clearly a UN Secretariat document, it was 
to be pointed out in the introduction that the draft reflected the broad common views of DG and SG, on 
the basis of material furnished by IRO. On any point where either DG or SG wished to submit to the Ad 
Hoc Committee their divergent views, they would do so in a separate submission. I agreed with DG that 
this was not perhaps politically very happy, as it might lead DG to start a controversy with the SG in front 
of the Committee. We therefore informed Lake Success: 
(a)     that we would refrain from making a formal submission of our improved draft; 
(b)     that we would prefer a less pointed formula in the introduction, vis. some such words as: “this 
working paper has been prepared in consultation with IRO, and with their valuable staff assistance;” 
(c)     that we would prefer not to make a separate submission of our new points, but that we would hope 
that we might evolve a joint addendum with the Secretariat.'  
Taken from Kullmann to Biehle (Operations Officer, IRO Washington), 17 Jan 1950, 
PW/PR/IRO/6. To the surprise of the IRO and the UN Secretariat, France also produced a draft for the Ad 
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the draft by severely restricting the definition of a refugee.126  
In its lengthy description, the Working Group’s draft noted that the convention 
would only apply to those termed refugees before the Second World War, victims of the 
Nazi and Falangist regime, and ‘those persons whose persecution or fear of persecution 
is due to events in Europe after the outbreak of the Second World War and before July 
1, 1950’.127 The IRO’s desires to create a convention that would cover all categories of 
refugees coming under the mandate of the new UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
appeared obsolete. 
Internally, the IRO appeared dismayed, with one official writing to Weis that 
after discussing the Working Group’s definitions with one colleague they ‘were both 
horrified by it’. The main problem, the IRO felt, related to the draft convention’s use of 
the rushed and finite 1947 IRO constitution as a template for its definitions: 
 
The existing I.R.O. Definitions were produced without any detailed knowledge of the 
refugees they were intended to cover. They are not, as you know, easy to apply. It 
would, in our view here [Geneva office], be the gravest possible mistake if new 
Definitions were to be drafted without seeing how they would work out in practice. ... 
We all know that bad cases make bad law; it is equally obvious that no cases make no 
law.128 
 
Weis succeeded in making small changes to the draft declarations after submitting a 
memo to the Working Group detailing the IRO’s input and objections. Nevertheless, the 
IRO remained dismayed at developments, fearing the consequences the Working 
Group’s draft would have on future refugee policy: 
  
I suppose at the most we as an Organisation can do is point out the difficulties as 
cogently as possible and let the Committee stew in its own juice. The less clear, 
however, the Definitions are, the more scope there will be for divergences of 
interpretation ... . I have a dim vision of the chaos that will ensue and I can only hope 
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that the Ad Hoc Committee rather than myself will see it face-to-face.129 
   
The IRO remained especially sceptical of the consequences a specific dateline would 
have, with Kullmann telling Weis that it represented a solution that was ‘not merely 
unjust but also impractical’.130 Jacques Rubinstein too wrote of his disapproval to Weis. 
Rubinstein maintained that governments remained haunted by the idea that history 
began in 1939 and finished in 1944. He implored this narrow-sightedness, telling Weis 
that not all refugees represented people displaced by war.131 But the Ad Hoc Committee, 
led by the United States, believed that a general definition without specific parameters 
‘would be a blank cheque’ and would ‘undertake obligations towards future refugees, 
the origin and number of which would be unknown’.132 Another IRO grievance related 
to the Ad Hoc Committee’s decision to relegate the article stipulating refugees’ ‘right to 
asylum’ to the preamble. In Kullmann’s words, this represented ‘a very poor 
compensation’.133 By the time the convention reached its conclusion, no place existed 
for the ‘right to asylum’ even in the preamble, thereby symbolising sympathetic actors’ 
failure to sufficiently affect the actions of powerful states. 
 Members of the UN’s Special Committee for Refugees and the Stateless met in 
Geneva in August 1950 to approve the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft convention. Talks 
remained cordial and most articles passed without adverse comment. Nonetheless, 
Britain called for a deferment of the draft convention so that a conference of 
plenipotentiaries could include the views of more states. As a consequence, twenty-five 
governments came together, along with representatives from twenty-one NGOs and the 
head of the newly formed UNHCR, in Geneva in July 1951.  
When representatives met in mid 1951, it soon became apparent that France’s 
goals for the draft convention had transformed enormously. After month-long talks in 
New York in early 1950, Paul Weis had written to the head of the IRO underlining 
France’s willingness to compromise: ‘The Committee worked on the whole in a spirit of 
mutual understanding and collaboration, and the French delegation, in particular, 
showed great readiness to reach unanimous solutions.’134 Yet in Geneva in July 1951, 
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France took a markedly different stance; a process that appears to have began when 
Robert Rochefort took over as the French representative in discussions relating to the 
statute of the new UNHCR office.135 Most significantly, it voiced its desire to apply a 
refugee definition only to those coming from Europe, a condition that most members of 
the Special Committee opposed, with the notable exception of the United States. In line 
with the American argument, France had decided by 1951 that this ‘constituted a blank 
cheque’. Taking the situation of the Palestinian refugees as an example, the French 
representative suggested that only Europe ‘was ripe for the treatment of the refugee 
problem on an international scale’.136 The U.S. backed the French stance, 
wholeheartedly recommending that the committee take ‘one constructive step at a 
time’.137 The behaviour of the French representative, M. Rochefort, caused 
consternation for various delegates, with the British representative, Samuel Hoare, 
writing to a colleague in the Home Office that Rochefort ‘behaves fractiously and 
generates so much ill-will’.138 Rochefort’s relationship with the Belgian representative 
remained particularly strained, with the record of one meeting omitting exchanges 
between the two on account of the hostile nature of the interchange.139 
 The French change of heart meant that the Palestinian refugees forced to leave 
their homeland in 1948 and the Jews leaving Arab countries in North Africa and the 
Middle East remained outside the terms of the convention. At the time this measure was 
backed by the Arab states, who felt that their interests and that of the Palestinians would 
be served better by the UN agencies especially set up to deal with the refugees.140 
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Instead, the Egyptian representative settled for an amendment that agreed that the 
Palestinians would be covered by the Convention when they no longer enjoyed other 
UN agencies’ protection.141 Palestinians came under and remained the responsibility of 
the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in 1948, thus 
explaining why Palestinians today still remain largely outside the terms of the 
convention.142 Similarly, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 
assisted those fleeing North Korea and people displaced by the war there. Both of these 
operations contributed to the US goal of stabilising areas deemed under threat of 
communism.143 The millions of Pakistanis and Indians that became displaced after the 
Transfer of Power from Britain to the two newly formed states in August 1947, 
however, failed to come under the terms of another UN agency or the Refugee 
Convention because the region remained outside US and western interests, according to 
Gil Loescher.144 
The French and American views found favour with the South American 
representatives from Venezuela and Columbia. By contrast, most of France’s European 
neighbours – with the notable exception of Italy (participating as an observer) and, 
belatedly, Germany – appeared to favour a broader conception. The UK led the way in 
voicing its support for as broad a definition as possible. After already having made a 
concession regarding the date-line change because ‘the Convention had to be made 
acceptable to a larger number of States than those sharing the UK view’, Britain voiced 
its disquiet about having to make ‘a further limitation’. To counter this, the UK 
representative adopted a remarkably progressive stance:  
 
Even if an eastward movement were to take place, the European countries would be able 
to control it. They would, in fact, in relation to any such movement, become countries of 
immigration in the same way as the countries on the Continent of America were at 
present countries of immigration for European refugees and would enjoy the same 
controls.145 
 
The large group of NGOs present at the conference backed the British stance, with the 
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International Association of Penal Law calling for the implementation of a ‘world-wide 
convention that would become the Magna Carta for the persecuted’.146 Belgium also 
took up the fight, even accusing France of assuming an ‘attitude of self-defence vis-à-vis 
refugees’.147 Iraq and Egypt backed this broad stance. Canada and Switzerland, while 
both willing and able to support a comprehensive definition, pleaded for agreement and 
hence sought to find a balance between the camps that the Israeli representative later 
referred to as the “Europeanists” and the “universalists.” The Vatican came to the rescue 
by successfully proposing to insert the line ‘in Europe, or in Europe and other 
continents’ as specified in a statement to be made by each country when signing the 
convention.148 This won widespread approval.  
Crucially, the Holy See also proposed several other amendments recommending 
the maintenance of the unity of the refugee’s family by extending the rights granted to 
refugees to all members of their families. It also advised representatives to insert 
generous terms and conditions for refugee minors, particularly unaccompanied children 
and girls. Furthermore, the Holy See proposed the inclusion of provisions providing for 
the intervention of non-governmental bodies in refugee affairs.149 In addition, Sweden 
successfully proposed the insertion of another vital condition: ‘members of a particular 
social group’ that faced persecution would also be eligible to attain refugee status.150 On 
25 July 1951, the conference of plenipotentiaries was declared closed except for the 
signing of the convention.151 
 
1.4 The Consequences of the Convention 
The convention’s definition of a refugee borrowed heavily from various definitions of 
refugees formed in the previous one hundred and fifty years. It took in the French 
definition from the 1830s and the League of Nations’ definitions in the 1920s by 
underlining that a refugee was a migrant unable to attain any protection or representation 
from his or her own country. It resembled the British definition of 1905 almost 
identically by conveying the centrality of the term ‘persecution’ and placing an 
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emphasis on the individual. Elsewhere it added the 1933 Convention’s condition of non-
refoulement, by stating: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.’152 
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees legalised many of 
the displaced people leftover after the Second World while apparently closing the door 
to future unwanted guests. This enabled western governments to attain a sense of control 
over newcomers to their lands. It also transferred considerable power back to states after 
the interstate coordination of the immediate post-war years. Nevertheless, the 
convention went on to cause various problems for western states in the longer term, 
albeit rather unwittingly, due to the UNHCR’s success at expanding its role and 
broadening the terms of the convention throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
The convention’s definition of a refugee created confusion over the role of the 
recently formed UNHCR. In addition to aiding those people defined as refugees by the 
convention, the UNHCR’s statute, signed six months before the convention in late 1950, 
asserted that the organisation would also take responsibility for ‘[a]ny other person who 
... has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality 
or political opinion’.153 Significantly, this definition included no time or geographical 
limits; unlike the convention. This meant, as the French representative at the conference 
of plenipotentiaries explained in late 1951, that ‘[t]hose who became refugees as a result 
of events occurring after l January 1951 would be just as much within the competence of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees’ as those fleeing from Europe before 
1951.154  
 
 
1.5 Asylum during the Cold War 
In the early and mid 1950s, this proved largely inconsequential. Western states 
welcomed refugees with open arms because they came overwhelmingly from 
communist Europe. The competition between the UNHCR, the American government 
and the French government over who would provide assistance to these refugees clearly 
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demonstrated their considerable political value. The UNHCR began life as a financially 
and politically weak organisation mainly because of American reluctance to contribute 
to an organisation that functioned outside of its control. American hostility to the 
UNHCR intensified after the election of the Dutch first High Commissioner, Gerrit Jan 
van Heuven Goedhart, ahead of the American candidate and president of the IRO at the 
time, Donald Kingsley. When Goedhart appointed an American Deputy Commissioner, 
it caused the UNHCR to lose France’s support because its candidate, the Chef de 
Cabinet of the French Foreign Minister and representative at the conference of 
plenipotentiaries Robert Rochefort, failed to receive the post.155 While the IRO, the 
UNRWA and the UNKRA received enormous contributions from the US in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the UNHCR received nothing.156 Indeed, the UNHCR initially 
received an annual budget of only $300,000 even though it became responsible for 
400,000 refugees when conceived. Furthermore, the UNHCR had to battle with a 
number of new refugee agencies, formed outside the UN remit, for control of refugees in 
Europe: the American-inspired Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 
(ICEM) and the United States Escapee Program (USEP), as well as the French-inspired 
European Refugee Service attached to the Council of Europe.  
 To counteract this competition, Goedhart, the first High Commissioner, 
attempted to attain a much larger budget for the UNHCR. He gained permission from 
the UN General Assembly in February 1952 'to issue an appeal for funds for the purpose 
of enabling emergency aid to be given to the most needy groups among refugees within 
his mandate.'157 The UNHCR, in collaboration with four large NGOs, The World 
Council of Churches, War Relief Services, the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee and the Lutheran World Federation, immediately appealed to the Ford 
Foundation to contribute to this appeal. This underlined the UNHCR and NGOs' 
different approach to the American-inspired refugee agencies by emphasising the human 
needs required by refugees as opposed to the political benefits they produced:  
  
 New refugees today often feel they are without a friend in the world; especially the type 
of a friend who is concerned not only with their politics but with their well-being. 
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Assistance, immediately given to such new refugees may be the difference to their 
beginning their new life in their new world as a friend and believer in the democracy 
which they are seeking by their escape to the democratic world, instead of a 
disillusioned refugee in a seemingly uncaring world.158  
  
When discussions between the four NGOs, the UNHCR and representatives from the 
Ford Foundation took place in late March 1952, much of the focus inevitably centred on 
the identifiable differences between the goals and policies of the parties concerned and 
the US government. The Ford Foundation made clear its desire to 'participate in 
programs only where it could be sure to make “a single impact.”'159 Consequently, the 
NGOs and the UNHCR outlined the downsides that accompanied the obvious political 
undertones of the US policies. One NGO representative told of the disadvantages 
inherent in the US approach:  
  
 Many of the refugees do not want to accept help from such an Agency as they had just 
escaped from situations where they had been subjected to too much propaganda 
pressure, and although they were definitely pro-Western in their point of view, they did 
not want to be subjected immediately to a similar kind of pressure.160  
 
Another maintained that 'too much attention was being paid to assisting either those who 
are able-bodied or those with special technical qualifications'.161  
The UNHCR and the NGOs succeeded in attaining $3.1million from the Ford 
Foundation to assimilate those left behind by US resettlement schemes.162 This provided 
the UNHCR with a welcome opportunity to display the value of its work, which led to 
the reception of large donations from other government and non-governmental actors.163 
The political expediency that states gained from welcoming Communist defectors meant 
substantial state funding to the UNHCR followed, causing the organisation to grow in 
prominence as the decade advanced. The US also began to donate to the UNHCR in 
1954, in an attempt to stem the flow of refugees voluntarily returning to their homes in 
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Soviet Europe, thereby confirming the UNHCR's emergence as an essential international 
player in refugee management. The 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis saw the UNHCR 
named as the lead agency to coordinate assistance. 
Apart from the large exodus into West Germany in the early 1950s and the 
200,000 that fled Hungary in 1956, numbers remained relatively small and politically 
convenient, leading these people to be ‘endowed with protection and assistance that 
went far beyond the international obligations imposed on receiving states’.164 
Throughout the 1960s, and especially in the wake of the appearance of the Berlin Wall, 
escape from Eastern Europe became more difficult. As a consequence, numbers 
decreased steadily; a trend broken only by occasional spurts, such as the exodus that 
followed 1968 Prague Spring.  
Most refugees in the 1960s originated from Africa and fled to neighbouring 
African countries. The time and geographical limits imposed by the 1951 UN 
Convention on Refugees limited the UNHCR's ability to assist refugees in Africa. 
Nonetheless, reacting to the outflows of people from the Algerian war for independence, 
the UN General Assembly asserted in 1961 that in addition to helping refugees within its 
mandate, the UNHCR could also assist those outside of its competence.165 The UN 
General Assembly extended this further in 1965 by requesting the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees to provide protection and permanent solutions to all groups 
within his competence.166 But as the number of refugees rose in Africa throughout the 
1960s, the pressures on the UNHCR magnified.  
Colonial struggles in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, internal 
strife in Zaire, Sudan and Eritrea, and ethnic conflicts and political instability in Rwanda 
and Biafra meant refugee numbers increased from 400,000 in 1964 to approximately one 
million in 1969.167 Similar problems also began to arise in Asia, where tens of thousands 
of refugees from Laos and Tibet fled into Cambodia and India respectively in the early 
1960s.168 Consequently, the UNHCR sought to address the discrepancy existing between 
its wide role dedicated to refugees globally, as set out in its statute, and the limited time 
and geographic restraints that applied in the Refugee Convention.  
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Article 8 (a) of the UNHCR statute allowed the High Commissioner to propose 
amendments providing for protection of refugees falling under his mandate.169 Availing 
of this instrument, the High Commissioner drew up plans to address the convention's 
oversights by convening a colloquium of various international legal experts to debate 
'whether any – and if so what – measures can be taken to adapt international law relating 
to refugees to present conditions'.170 Funding came from the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the Swiss government and the conference took place at the 
Rockefeller villa in Bellagio, Italy, in April 1965. The High Commissioner's idea for the 
colloquium became clear in his address on the first day: 
  
 If considered exclusively from the point of view of legal technique, the problem of the 
dateline could be relatively easily solved. It would only be to envisage an appropriate 
legal instrument removing the dateline from the Convention, thereby  extending its 
provisions to all refugee situations both present and future.171 
 
In addition to approaching the subject of the removal of the dateline, the High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Felix Schnyder, recommended the colloquium consider 
whether specific regional approaches should be adopted for refugee problems in certain 
areas and whether any legal instrument should include a 'right to asylum'.  
  The colloquium believed a new convention would be too time-consuming and 
laborious to speedily achieve the immediate goals at stake.  Therefore, it decided that a 
protocol to the convention would provide the best solution.172 Regional actions, the 
colloquium recorded, might be beneficial but they had to take place under the 
international framework of the UN. The 'right to asylum', it adjudged, would be too 
controversial and complicated to insert in this protocol because it might give rise to 
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serious political implications.173 All countries – that is those that already signed the 
convention and those that had yet to sign – would have the option of subscribing to the 
protocol that would remove geographical and time constraints: 
 
[The colloquium] noted that it was now increasingly recognized that the refugee 
problem was universal in nature and of indefinite duration and that, in this respect, the 
Convention was no longer adequate. ... The members of the Colloquium therefore 
considered that it was urgent for humanitarian reasons that refugees at present not 
covered by the Convention should be granted similar rights by means of an international 
instrument.174 
 
Moreover, new signatories would, on ratification, be bound to the conditions of the 1951 
convention, as modified by the protocol.175 
 Ten African countries,176 as well as Pakistan, tabled a draft resolution to the UN 
General Assembly in late 1966 pressing for the protocol’s acceptance. Thereafter, it 
entered into force in October 1967 when Sweden became the sixth country, following 
the Holy See, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gambia and Senegal, to sign up 
to the protocol.177 Other states quickly followed and, fortunately for the UNHCR, 
numerous countries that never signed up to the original Refugee Convention, such as the 
United States, signed the protocol enabling the UNHCR to expand its operations 
globally.  
The eagerness of western governments to sign the protocol was, according to Gil 
Loescher, at least partly motivated by the attempts of the African Union’s precursor to 
conceptualise a more sympathetic definition of a refugee that included those fleeing 
from colonial and post-colonial conflicts. The prospect of this competing with the 
already familiar UN model encouraged western countries to sign the protocol.178 Its 
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favourable acquiescence also derived from the relatively small and politically 
convenient number of people that had applied for protection in liberal democratic states 
up until that point. Indeed, this had allowed the UNHCR to dictate states’ asylum 
policies throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s, thereby facilitating improved social 
and legal conditions for refugees and asylum seekers.179  
Significant developments involving non-state actors also took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s, as the number of NGOs and intergovernmental organisation (IGOs) involved 
in advocating for better human rights and better treatment of those in search of asylum 
began to expand, particularly in Europe. In 1961, the British lawyer, Peter Benenson, 
founded Amnesty International to combat human rights abuses. Ten years later, a group 
of French doctors founded Médecins Sans Frontières after experiencing at first-hand the 
horrendous suffering caused by the Nigerian civil war in the Biafra area. The increasing 
spotlight placed on humanitarian disasters by a more globalised media communicating 
to audiences through the visual medium of television also marked a key development. 
The peace marches against American involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia, for 
example, received significant backing after media reports showed shocking images of 
the suffering caused by American bombing. America’s foreign policy in South America 
also led to increased non-state activity, as did the later Watergate scandal, which led 
people to turn their backs on the more traditional political system. 
Most significantly in the 1970s, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) became fully international covenants. Crucially, this meant that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ aspirations, which until then had remained 
non-binding, finally became inserted into international law.180 This led to the birth of the 
UN Human Rights Committee and coincided with the Ford Foundation’s decision to 
dedicate millions of dollars in funding to human rights groups.181 Almost concurrently, 
                                                                                                                                          
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of origin or nationality’, Article 1, The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa 1969. See also, Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity, p. 80. 
179
 Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, pp. 176-7. 
180
 David Jacobson, Rights across Borders. Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, 
Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 77. 
181
 See Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization of international human rights into domestic 
practices: introduction’, Thomas Risse Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of 
Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Changes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, pp. 1-38, p. 21 and Claude E. Welch Jr., ‘Introduction’, Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), NGOs and 
Human Rights: Promies and Performance, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, pp. 1-
57 
 
there was a significant increase in the number of NGOs involved in human rights and 
refugee issues. Figures from the Union of International Associations’ online database, 
for example, show that the number of NGOs working with refugees almost doubled 
from 1966 to 1981 (see graph below).   
 
 
Figures: Union of International Associations online database, 2009. 
 
This number rose further from the late 1970s onwards as various organisations, both 
secular and religious in nature, sprung up to cater for new asylum seekers and refugees. 
Europe underwent a marked transformation from a continent that transited refugees to a 
destination of first asylum.  
 
1.6 The Age of the Asylum Seeker 
Refugee figures continued to grow in the 1970s because of dictatorial regimes in 
Uganda, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, religious and ethnic conflicts in Burundi and 
Chad, and independence movements in the Western Sahara and Bangladesh. Cold War 
conflicts also produced large numbers of refugees, none more so than from Indochina. 
Indeed refugees arriving by boat from Indochina sparked a noticeable change in many 
western states' refugee systems. To counter the sustained flows of boat people, western 
states devised a quota system to resettle a certain number of refugees every year. The 
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UN’s Refugee and Humanitarian Programme, which commenced in 1979, undertook to 
take in an annual quota of refugees and migrants in need of humanitarian help. It often 
allowed people not officially classified as refugees per se, such as those fleeing civil 
wars, to resettle. Critics soon pointed out, however, that countries operating the scheme 
‘skimmed the cream and left the aged, crippled, psychologically disturbed, ill, and 
illiterate as a problem for … countries with the least economic capability of handling 
them’.182 This inevitably caused poorer countries of first asylum to resent resettlement 
countries for leaving the unwanted behind. The main countries within the scheme 
included the United States, Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries. 
 The late 1970s not only gave birth to what David Martin calls “quota refugees” 
but also to “spontaneous refugees.”183 In a significant break from the past, non-
Europeans began to arrive in North America, Europe and Australia in search of asylum. 
Western states never intended to provide non-Europeans, especially those hailing from 
non-communist regimes, with the privileges granted to communist defectors from Soviet 
Europe. Their arrival consequently caused various degrees of confusion and anxiety 
amongst western states. To check such a development, states began to set up the first 
signs of a recognisable “asylum” system to decide whether to confer these new people 
with refugee status, as well as all the rights that came with it. While awaiting the 
outcome of these deliberations, states increasingly termed these people as “asylum 
seekers” rather than “spontaneous refugees” because, for the first time since 1951, 
governments cast doubt over whether these people deserved the tag of refugees.184  
 The number of people seeking asylum in the West began to rise just as labour 
migration became restricted. The availability of commercial transport also meant global 
migration became more accessible. West Germany presented a typical example of the 
changing character and profile of people applying for protection from the 1970s 
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onwards. Numbers rose from 16,000 in 1977 to 108,000 in 1980.185 This increase 
included Turks, who had previously gained access to Germany as part of the 
Gastarbeiter programme that ceased soon after the 1973 Oil Crisis. It also comprised 
large numbers of Ethiopians fleeing their homeland.186 Before, these Ethiopians might 
have fled to neighbouring countries but now well-off refugees sought sanctuary in more 
developed countries.  
 Increasing uncertainty and conflict in the Developing World led to a massive 
increase in refugee numbers worldwide during this period. Susanne Schmeidl records 
that in 1975, 2.5 million refugees existed globally. By 1980 this figure rose to six 
million and by 1990 the number had climbed again to 17 million. Similarly, the number 
of refugee-producing countries went from twenty-five to fifty between 1970 and 
1990.187  
 
 
Figures: UNHCR, The State of the world's refugees, 1997-1998: A Humanitarian Agenda, Geneva: 
UNHCR, 1998, p. 54 and Barry York (on behalf of the Department of the Parliamentary Library), 
Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Source, p. 138.  
 
Nonetheless, David Martin speculated that something else occurred in this period to 
spark the enormous turnaround in numbers. In his opinion, the welcome given to 
Vietnamese boat people in the late 1970s by Canada, the United States and Australia, 
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and the extensive media cover it generated, caused other people in similar situations to 
search for asylum further afield than past refugees.188  
  Conflict and political uncertainty in Haiti, Cuba, Angola, Sri Lanka, Iran and 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Poland led to further rises in asylum 
applications throughout the 1980s. Reacting to local developments, Central American 
countries took measures to extend asylum to those fleeing their homes because of 
'foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order' by founding the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration.189 Western states, by contrast, took measures to stem the flow of 
those seeking protection. As Gil Loescher surmised, governments came to the 
conclusion that the most effective method of reducing the flow of asylum seekers was to 
prevent them from arriving in the first place – a philosophy that still exists today.190 The 
United States introduced detention, denial of due process and interdiction, most notably 
against Haitian boat people, in an attempt to stem the flow of asylum seekers. Germany 
denied asylum seekers work permits and attempted to speed up processing of 
applications. The UK brought in carrier sanctions for travel companies transporting 
asylum seekers without the necessary documentation in 1987 and began to restrict visas 
for nationals of countries with high application rates. Canada too established restrictive 
legislation in 1989, although the country infrequently utilised the new law.191  
 Nonetheless, the upsurge continued, causing the UNHCR High Commissioner at 
the time to describe the arrivals as “jet-age refugees” because of their commercially 
facilitated entrance.192  During the 1980s, asylum applications in Europe, North America 
and Australia, increased by more than nine-fold.193 Significantly, sixty per cent of the 
1.3 million asylum applicants made in Western Europe between 1983 and 1989 came 
from the Developing World.194  
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Asylum seekers after 1989  
The conclusion of the Cold War sparked a mass movement of people from East to West 
Europe. In 1989, 1.3 million people left Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for 
Western Europe; in 1990, 923,000; in 1991, 800,000.195 Many of the initial migrants 
comprised ethnic Germans, Bulgarian Turks, and Soviet Union Jews. The figures also 
included a large number of asylum applicants. Nonetheless, by 1992, most people 
seeking asylum in Western Europe came from the brutal civil war that erupted in 
Yugoslavia in 1991. By late 1992, over 2.5 million people had become displaced as 
fighting in the Balkans spread.196 Political instability in other European former 
communist states and intensified violence in Africa, Central America and the Middle 
East added further to the demand for asylum. Emphasizing this shift in asylum, certain 
western countries came face-to-face with asylum seekers for the first time, such as 
Ireland and Italy, which never had experienced extensive immigration flows in their 
modern history until the late twentieth century. Traditional English-speaking settler 
societies, such as Canada, the US and Australia also received larger numbers of 
applicants than ever before, complicating their structured refugee and humanitarian 
resettlement schemes in the process. EU countries, especially Germany, experienced a 
huge growth in the receipt of asylum applications in the early 1990s.  
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Figures: UNHCR, Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980-1999, UNHCR: Geneva, 
November 2001. 
  
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, liberal democratic states faced 
a situation where large numbers of people, who provided limited political and economic 
returns for receiver states, sought sanctuary in their countries. In effect, the upsurge in 
asylum applications after 1989 challenged Western Europe’s dormant declarations on 
asylum for the first time since the establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The 
aim of this thesis is to reveal how states reacted to this phenomenon. Did they react as 
they had done repeatedly in the 1930s by ignoring these people’s pleas? Did they 
respond with sympathy and compassion, thus reflecting the dawn of a new, 
humanitarian age?  
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Chapter 2 
  
Asylum in Australia and the Politics of Control 
 
We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they 
come.     
John Howard, Liberal election pamphlet, 2001 
  
Australian Janus-faced asylum policy between 1989 and 2008 consisted of remarkably 
contrasting conditions. People who applied for protection in Australia whilst on a 
tourist, student or temporary visa went through a largely hospitable and sympathetic 
asylum procedure. They received the right to certain entitlements and, often, the right to 
work. In stark contrast, people who sought asylum in Australia after arriving by boat 
without any visa had to endure a parsimonious and antipathetic procedure whereby they 
remained in detention for the duration of their application. From the late 1990s onwards, 
even if defined as refugees, boat people only received temporary protection, as opposed 
to their luckier counterparts who received permanent protection and all the 
accompanying rights if deemed refugees. The former process transpired largely in 
private; the latter essentially in public. This chapter contends that successive Australian 
governments formed punitive asylum policies to deal with boat people to offset criticism 
of the country’s migration policy more generally.  
As occurred in various EU countries, where governments focused attention on 
certain voiceless migrants considered acceptable targets for criticism, such as asylum 
seekers, successive Australian governments chose to concentrate on boat people seeking 
asylum in order to offset criticism of more general immigration policies. In Australia’s 
case it distracted voters unhappy with the country’s migration policy by giving the 
impression that the government remained in control of who entered the country and 
under what conditions. Second, it avoided taking on the powerful actors involved in 
promoting economic and family migration who had comprehensively overwhelmed 
previous critics of Australian immigration policies in the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, 
the Australian governments’ efforts to impose restrictive measures against boat people 
met with muted success as sympathisers consistently challenged Australian 
governments’ asylum policy through the courts. Furthermore, Pauline Hanson’s rise to 
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prominence in 1996 demonstrated continued popular dissatisfaction with Australian 
migration policy. Divergently, the 2000s saw a demise in the influence and effectiveness 
of sympathisers to successfully contest government asylum policy changes. The Liberal-
National coalition’s tough stance on boat people in the 2000s also allayed support for 
renegade anti-immigration parties, which had by then largely self-capitulated. This 
allowed the government to substantially increase economic migrant numbers while 
simultaneously retaining the veneer of control that Australians appeared to desire. 
  This chapter will first set out Australia’s migration and asylum history in order to 
set the context for what occurred after 1989, particularly in relation to the emphasis that 
successive governments placed on control. Following on from this, the chapter will be 
divided into three distinctive time periods that marked important junctures in asylum 
debates: 1989-1996, 1996-2001 and 2001-2008. The first will encompass the Australian 
Labor Party’s time in government, whereas the latter two will be dominated by the 
Liberal-National coalition that stayed in power from 1996 until late 2007.  
 
2.1 Asylum in Australia before 1989 
Ironically, critics of Australia’s immigration policy in the 1980s refrained from targeting 
the country’s refugee and humanitarian policy because many Australians felt that 
‘helping refugees is part of Australians’ view of themselves’.197  Indeed, the country had 
an extensive history of giving asylum to those in need since the end of the Second 
World War. Before 1945, Australia presided over a hostile asylum policy comparable to 
most other westerns states; with a racist tinge emanating from its White Australia 
immigration Policy. Australia displayed this trait at the 1938 Evian Conference by 
firmly stating ‘we have no racial problem [and] we are not desirous of importing one by 
encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration’.198 Following the Second 
World War, however, Australia wholeheartedly changed its approach to people seeking 
asylum from Europe, with the country welcoming large numbers of displaced war 
victims from Eastern and Central Europe. They came to Australia for specific reasons: 
to boost the country’s population and workforce. Although Australia deserves credit for 
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presiding over such an expansive post-War humanitarian and refugee policy in which 
approximately 300,000 arrived between the late 1940s and mid 1970s,199 the country’s 
implementation of this programme became a target for criticism. In the late 1940s, for 
instance, the International Refugee Organisation condemned Australia for being ‘less 
interested in helping the unfortunate than in finding healthy and industrious “factory 
fodder” for its population and development programmes’.200 By the 1950s, Europe’s 
post-war problems with displaced people had albeit ceased to exist, but Australia 
continued to take in people fleeing the Soviet regime. The 1954 Petrov case, in which 
Australian security agents seized the wife of a Russian defector from Soviet secret 
police as their plane refuelled in Darwin on its way out of the country, clearly showed 
the ideological advantages Cold War refugees could have on federal elections.201 
Nonetheless, numbers remained relatively small from 1957 onwards, with arrivals 
averaging only 2,500 per annum between then and 1967. This followed more general 
trends in the West.  
Whilst Australia accepted extensive numbers of displaced persons and refugees 
between 1947 and 1975, it had never had a specific refugee and humanitarian policy 
during this time. Newcomers often had to partake in a state labour programme for a 
specific period of time before given a chance to seek Australian citizenship. This 
changed somewhat from the mid 1970s onwards, when Australia began to receive a 
number of “boat people” who fled Vietnam in the wake of the American and Australian 
withdrawal from Indochina. Although the number of boat people that actually made 
their way to Australia remained relatively insignificant (roughly 3,000 arrived between 
1976 and 1981, the majority of whom – approximately 2,000 – came in 1977 and 
1978),202 the issue became prominent enough for Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal-National 
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Government to adopt Australia’s first explicit refugee and humanitarian policy. To stem 
the flow of boat people, Australia agreed to accept large numbers of Vietnamese living 
in neighbouring Asian countries’ refugee camps. In return, those same countries’ vowed 
to halt boats coming south.203 This occurred shortly after a remarkable transformation in 
Australia’s immigration policy.  
From its birth as a nation in 1901 until the mid 1960s, Australia principally 
identified itself as a bastion of the British race, using its White Australia immigration 
policy as ‘a nationalist doctrine which reflected Australia’s desire to maintain itself as a 
white, British nation’.204 From the mid-to late-1960s onwards, however, Australia 
slowly began to open its intake to include non-Europeans. Gough Whitlam’s radical 
Labor government of 1972-5 confirmed this transition by declaring Australia a 
multicultural state that would oversee a multicultural immigration policy. Maintaining 
an immigration policy with racist overtones had become unacceptable to a post-colonial 
Asia contributing more and more to Australia’s economy.205 Nonetheless, Whitlam 
radically reduced immigration during his time in office because of the economic 
downturn after the oil crises. Whitlam’s successor as Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, 
increased immigration rates to nearly pre-oil crisis levels in the late 1970s and early 
1980s – unlike European countries, which used the crisis as an excuse to cut migration 
indefinitely, according to Laurens.206 Asian migrants represented between 22 per cent 
and 38 per cent of the intake between 1979 and 1986.207 A large component of this 
Asian intake comprised Indochinese refugees, with Australia accepting nearly 100,000 
between 1975 and 1985.208 
Australia remained content to accept comparatively large numbers of refugees 
from camps dotted throughout South-East Asia so as to safeguard the ordered “points” 
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immigration system it established in the late 1970s, which separated labour migrants 
from refugee and humanitarian migrants. The latter part of the programme pledged to 
accept an annual quota of refugees and people facing drastic humanitarian conditions. 
Australia’s adoption of such a policy represented an enormous achievement. During the 
early post-war decades, Australian governments justified their acceptance of refugees by 
highlighting the gaps refugees filled in the country’s labour markets, the boost they gave 
to a population considered dangerously low, and the ideological victories accepting 
Soviet defectors scored during the Cold War. The 1980s required a different rationale to 
endorse the reception of refugees and humanitarian migrants because of the 
establishment of the country’s skilled immigration policy in the interim and the 
diminished importance of the Cold War in Australian politics. Furthermore, the 
noticeable opposition from certain sections of Australian society that greeted the arrival 
of refugees and humanitarian entrants from the Vietnamese war, which represented the 
largest bloc of Asian migrants in the country since the dismantlement of the White 
Australia policy, meant the change in policy required different justification than that 
utilised in the past. Some critics, such as Geoffrey Blainey (discussed further below), 
highlighted the cultural threat of these newcomers whilst others lamented the character 
of people stemming from Pol Pot’s Cambodia.209 In response, the government correlated 
the acceptance of these people with the maintenance of cordial relations with the 
country’s Asian neighbours and used the country’s refugee intake to demonstrate 
Australia’s considerable humanitarian values to the rest of the world.  
People seeking asylum in Australia during the 1980s mostly arrived in the 
country on valid travel visas. Annual numbers remained in the lower hundreds and the 
issue rarely came up for public debate. The Determination of Refugee Status Committee 
(DORS), formed in the late 1970s as part of the country’s shifting immigration policy, 
assessed all asylum applications. The committee comprised representatives of the 
Departments of Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and the Attorney General, 
when applying for asylum.  
From 1983 to 1991, Bob Hawke’s Labor government presided over an annual 
average intake of 97,400 migrants, marking a return to the boom days of the late 
1960s.210  
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Figures: Barry York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002, pp. 139-140. Numbers include refugee and 
humanitarian migrants also.  
 
Nevertheless, a number of academic studies have demonstrated that Australian public 
opinion failed to replicate Labor’s enthusiasm for consistently raising the annual 
intake.211 The policy of political bipartisanship on the issue of migration adopted by 
Australia’s established parties after the Second World War had, until then, ensured that 
political debate on the issue had always remained remarkably positive. As Ian McAlister 
outlined, this ensured that successive governments continued to implement sometimes 
unpopular policies.212 Speaking at the launch of the book that included McAllister’s 
views, Bob Hawke, the Australian Labor Prime Minister until 1991, explained the 
uniqueness of this arrangement: “There are no other issues on which the major political 
parties had been prepared to act in this [bipartisan] way … to advance the national 
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interest ahead of where they believed the electorate to be.”213 When certain individuals 
challenged Australia’s immigration policy during the 1980s, it led to controversy and 
ultimately, resignation for those who propounded such views. Political bipartisanship 
and the prominent intellectual preference for multiculturalism in the 1980s countered 
these outbursts by successfully isolating the protagonists.214  
In 1984, Geoffrey Blainey, an eminent Australian historian, publicly questioned 
the dramatic change in immigration policy by doubting the ability of Asian immigrants 
to integrate into Australian society.215 In his view, public opinion opposed the advanced 
multicultural dimension introduced to Australia’s immigration policy from the mid 
1970s onwards. In the ensuing debate, fellow University of Melbourne historians 
accused Blainey of potentially inciting racial intolerance towards Asians: 
  
Raising such issues in racial terms (however much it is couched in the language of 
reason) becomes an invitation to less responsible groups to incite racial hatred. Framing 
debate in such racial terms can become a potent weapon to rouse public fears and 
prejudices and to direct hostility to certain groups in our society.216 
 
As a result of the tension his comments produced, Blainey resigned his chair at 
the university in 1988. That same year, John Howard, then leader of the opposition 
Liberal Party, called for a reduction of Asian immigration because of its threat to social 
cohesion. Predictably, this led to another highly controversial debate. Serious internal 
disharmony in Liberal circles ended only with Howard’s resignation as leader. Howard, 
resembling Blainey, would have to bear the brunt of what he said for many years to 
come.217 
Despite attacks on the country’s immigration policy in the 1980s proving 
unsuccessful, they met with much resonance among significant sections of the 
Australian public, with one opinion poll recording that 51 per cent agreed and 26 per 
cent partly agreed with John Howard’s statement calling for a reduction of Asian 
                                                
213
 ‘Pact with Libs dictated policy, says Hawke’, Australian, 26 May 1993. 
214
 Katherine Betts, Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987. 
215
 This started with Blainey’s talk to the Warrnambool Rotary Club. His views were then put forward 
more thoroughly in his book that came out later that year. For more information on his position, see 
Geoffrey Blainey, All for Australia, North Ryde: Meuthen Hayes, 1984. 
216Letter to the Age, 19 May 1984 signed by 24 historians from the University of Melbourne. Quoted in 
Frank Devine, ‘A conversation with Geoffrey Blainey’, Quadrant, Vol. L, No. 10, Oct 2006.  
217
 In late 1994, John Howard, when discussing what occurred several years earlier, commented that “I 
think that was one of the more clumsy remarks that I’ve made in my political career.” Quoted in ‘Howard 
needs to kill his 1988 Asian migrants albatross’, Australian, 30 Nov 1994. 
70 
 
immigration in October 1988, leading Goot to remark that ‘since the mid-1980s the size 
of the migrant intake has failed to secure majority support’. 218 Significantly, Bob 
Hawke’s successor as Labor leader and Prime Minister, Paul Keating, proceeded to 
markedly reduce the annual intake after taking office at the end of 1991.  
Despite the build-up of notable public hostility to immigration intake levels in 
the 1980s, which represented a decade of economic stagnation for Australia, the public 
continued to sympathise with the plight of those brought to the country under the 
Special Humanitarian Programme. This sympathetic attitude, however, failed to 
crossover to boat people when they began to arrive on Australia’s shorelines from 1989 
onwards. Similarly, politicians immediately differentiated between boat people and 
other asylum seekers because the former failed to enter the country with valid visas; 
unlike the latter. Indeed, this distinction became a feature of debate after 1989.  
 
***** 
 
Between 1989 and 1996, Australia experienced the reappearance of boat people for the 
first time in approximately a decade. This coincided with successive Labor governments 
under the leadership of Bob Hawke and then Paul Keating. Most boat people during this 
time came from South-East Asia. Although numbers remained low, the issue became a 
source of considerable political and public debate. Labor surprisingly won the 1990 and 
1993 elections, first under Hawke, and then under Keating. According to Geoffrey 
Bolton, Labor’s promotion of privatisation and international competition stole the centre 
ground from a Liberal Party that went through five leaders between 1989 and 1995: 
‘Labor repudiat[ed] socialism so convincingly it was hard for the Liberal-National Party 
coalition to form distinctive policies’.219 But an extended period of Liberal-National 
government followed from 1996 until late 2007, when Labor returned.  
In the mid 1990s, debate over boat people seeking asylum diminished in line 
with falling numbers. This changed by the late 1990s, when the number of boat people 
began to increase. Nonetheless, the unprecedented reaction of John Howard’s 
government to the Tampa boat incident in late August 2001 proved remarkable for the 
level of debate it sparked. The attacks of 9-11, in conjunction with the changing origin 
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of boat people – they came predominantly from South-East Asia in the early and mid 
1990s and from the Middle East from the late 1990s onwards – added a terrorist 
component to debates and policy initiatives. After Tampa, Australia’s asylum laws 
underwent serious modification, resulting in drastically decreased asylum applications. 
These three specified time periods will be examined by analysing the formation, 
implementation and effects these asylum policy changes had on asylum applications and 
asylum seekers themselves.  
 
2.2 The Return of Boat People to Australia, 1989-1996 
 
Representing the first boat people Australia received in almost a decade, a boatful of 
Cambodians arrived in northern Australia in late 1989. Boats continued to arrive 
regularly until 1996. Most of these boat people came from China and Cambodia. They 
arrived at a period of economic difficulties for Australia. Towards the end of 1990, the 
country’s Finance Minister declared the country in recession. Reflecting this state of 
affairs, the rate of unemployment rose to over eleven per cent; the highest level since the 
1930s Economic Depression. Nonetheless, in-migration continued to occur, albeit on a 
notably reduced level. Furthermore, a significant shift occurred in Australian 
immigration policy whereby the focus of immigration became firmly linked to the 
contributions migrants could make to Australian economy in terms of skills and 
capital.220 As a consequence, family reunion and refugee and humanitarian migrants 
took a backseat in developments. Notwithstanding these moves, popular opinion 
towards immigration policy continued to grow. The Labor government reacted by 
focusing much of its attention on the remarkably small number of boat people arriving 
in search of asylum. When compared to the numbers accessing Australia through its 
organised migration programmes, the amount of boat people appeared minuscule – 224 
compared to 121,320 in 1990. When contrasted with asylum applications more 
generally, boat people still represented a tiny minority of claims, comprising only 1.5 
per cent of the backlog of asylum seekers by mid 1992 (see graph).221  Yet, they became, 
for much of this period, the focal point of public and political disquiet with immigration.  
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Source: Barry York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official 
Sources, pp. 140-1.  
 
Formation 
It appeared irrelevant that boat people were twice as likely to attain refugee status as 
those that applied after entering on valid visas.222 Similarly, Cambodian boat people’s 
inability to apply for visas because of the absence of an Australian visa issuing facility 
in Cambodia until December 1991 rarely figured in debates.223 Instead, deliberations 
concentrated on the significant threat to the integrity of Australia’s immigration system 
boat people posed. The Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, characterised this fear best 
in June 1990:  
 
Say 200 people have come, they’ve encountered some difficulties. All right, they get 
here. What if it’s 200,000, two million? It’s got nothing to do with whether they are 
Cambodians, whether they are Irish, Greek, Italian. The fact is that I am making it quite 
clear as far as this Government is concerned, that we, as a sovereign country, will 
determine our immigration policy and its content, its size.224 
 
Suddenly, he went from discussing 200 boatpeople to 2 million. And he was not 
the only one who partook in this massive inflation of numbers. Northern Territory Chief 
Minister, Marshall Perron, expressed fears that an “enormous avalanche of people” 
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might arrive on Australia’s northern shore.225 When contrasted with the numbers 
languishing in South East Asian refugee camps however, the number of boat people 
arriving in Australia looked tiny. Hong Kong hosted 54,000 boat people while Indonesia 
sheltered 11,000.226 Instead, the emphasis always remained on the potential flood, rather 
than the genuine trickle that “jumped the queue.” 
Australia expected all newcomers to adapt to its cultural habit of queuing. 
Unfortunately for boat people, this also extended to the asylum process. Australians saw 
boat people as ‘queue-jumpers’ skipping in front of the many thousand people patiently 
awaiting the outcomes of their applications to come to Australia as part of its organised 
programmes. In many cases, it did not matter if these people turned out to be genuine 
refugees or not, they had unacceptably jumped the queue, as Bob Hawke confirmed: 
“Risk their lives or not, I mean, we have an orderly immigration program.”227 The 
Melbourne Age editorial assured its readers that this practice was ‘unfair, at least in 
terms of Australian cultural values’.228 For Australia, a country that prided itself on the 
structured nature of its immigration policy, it seemed essential to regain control over 
this queue.229  
Surprisingly, given what later occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s when 
the Liberals came to power, the opposition Liberal Party initially defended the plight of 
boat people. John Hewson, the Liberal leader at the time, strongly criticised Bob 
Hawke’s statement regarding the veracity of the Cambodians’ plea for asylum. It led to 
inconsistency and unfairness, he claimed, “by making blanket judgements about 
categories of people applying for refugee status.”230 Similarly, Philip Ruddock, the 
Liberal spokesman on immigration and the man who later presided over the formation of 
the most restrictive Australian immigration laws since the demise of the White Australia 
policy, originally defended the Cambodians: “I have spent some time in Cambodia and I 
know many of them have legitimate fears about their safety.”231 As the 1990s wore on, 
however, the views of Ruddock and the Liberals changed dramatically from empathy to 
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enmity.  
To counteract the slow assessment of asylum applications which had resulted in 
an extended backlog, the government established the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) 
to replace the Refugee Status Review Committee in 1992. In the whole of 1990, the 
RSRC only determined 295 applications to the primary stage. The RSRC had contained 
one official each from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of 
Immigration, the Department of the Attorney General, as well as a member of the 
Refugee Council of Australia and someone from the UNHCR, who acted as a neutral 
observer.232 The RRT, contrastingly, comprised a large number of independent part-time 
and full-time members, chosen by the Governor-General, on behalf of the minister for 
immigration. It reviewed appeals from those already rejected by the immigration 
department. The Immigration Minister, Gerry Hand, classified the new system as ‘a 
credible and independent determinate system, which should help keep to a minimum 
appeals to the courts.’233  
To further demonstrate its toughness on unsanctioned arrivals, the government 
drew on the 1958 Migration Act to detain boat people during the processing of their 
asylum applications. As stipulated under the act, ‘an unlawful citizen … must be kept in 
immigration detention until he or she is: (a) removed from Australia … (b) deported … 
(c) granted a visa’.234 The 1992 Migration Reform Act proposed to clarify the 
government’s position on boat people. Announced to parliament on 5 May 1992, it 
predetermined that ‘a court is not to order the release from custody of a designated 
person’. Gerry Hand, the Labor Immigration Minister at the time, explained to 
parliament the rationale behind such modifications: 
 
It is crucial that all persons who come to Australia without prior authorisation not be 
released into the community. Their release would undermine the Government’s strategy 
for determining their refugee status or entry claims … The Government is determined 
that a clear signal be sent that migration to Australia may not be achieved by simply 
arriving in this country and expecting to be allowed into the community.235 
 
Implementation 
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The 1977 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act enabled rejected asylum 
seekers in the 1980s to appeal to the Australian justice system against deportation 
orders.236 Frequently, the Australian courts took a more liberal approach to asylum 
applications than Australian state officials. In the 1989 the Chan Yee Kin v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs case concerning a Chinese asylum seeker, the Federal 
Court implemented a more lenient interpretation of a “well-founded fear of persecution” 
than the formula used heretofore by department officials.237 Notably, this led to a rise in 
successful applications for asylum.238 Three female Cambodian asylum seekers, in Lim v 
Minister for Immigration, challenged the veracity of their detention by pointing to 
legislation that ruled the state could only detain boat people until the boat they arrived 
on had departed from Australia. Because the Department had burnt and destroyed many 
of the boats, judges ruled in favour of Lim and ordered the government to free the 
applications and pay compensation for their unlawful detention. To ensure Cambodian 
boatpeople failed to gain comprehensive compensation, however, legislation introduced 
immediately after the court case ensured that the courts could grant the boat people no 
more than $1 a day for every day spent unlawfully in detention.239  
  Sympathetic actors representing boat people caught the government out again 
in the same year when ten Chinese boat people landed on Australia’s coastline 
undetected and walked through what local north-western police described as ‘the worst 
country in Australia’ for ten days without being discovered.240 By doing so, they 
bypassed Australia’s laws, which maintained that all boat people detained at the border 
remained on the international side of the border and had not yet officially entered the 
country.241 The Labor government responded rapidly to protect its measures against boat 
people from lawyers representing asylum seekers, whose work Hand described as an 
“unnecessary use of taxpayers’ money.”242 He believed that these lawyers purposely 
manipulated the asylum process: a practice he determined to stop. He promised there 
would be no more than “seventeen months by lawyers manipulating the system to lodge 
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an application,” as he “hated rorting and if someone is rorting this system we’ve got to 
stop it.”243  
In addition to establishing the administrative Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in 
1992, the Australian Labor government proposed measures to reduce the amount of 
appeals entering the state’s court system from rejected asylum seekers by narrowing the 
options for judicial review. The Labor government delayed the implementation of its 
1992 Migration Reform Act to facilitate these further amendments, culminating in the 
1994 Migration Legislation Amendment Act. One of the measures intended to limit the 
grounds for legal review to the Federal Court only to cases where wrongful applications 
of the law took place. The amendments also served to remove the legal fiction that boat 
people had yet to land in Australia by distinguishing between all those that had come 
with a valid visa and those who arrived without. For boat people this meant mandatory 
detention; for those people who originally arrived in the country on valid visas and 
subsequently applied for asylum it meant the right to work and receive certain benefits. 
Asylum seekers that applied after the expiration of their visas qualified for the latter 
category because the government understood that they had passed immigration control; 
in contrast to boat people.244  
The Joint Standing Committee on Migration, set up ‘following increased public 
concern and criticism relating to Australia’s policy of mandatory detention’ in 1994 
studied these policy changes. The Committee, made up of various members of 
parliament, found that the government correctly imposed mandatory detention (apart 
from one Green senator’s dissension).245 Furthermore, the committee declared its 
support for further measures to dissuade the intervention of the courts into asylum 
decisions if proposed changes did not reduce the amount of appeals brought before the 
courts. One alternative, they suggested, would be to restrict asylum claims to a two tier 
administrative process, thereby closing off access to review and appeal in the higher 
courts; apart from the right of access to the High Court, which the Australian 
Constitution guaranteed.246 Its only stipulation of note related to its suggestion that 
‘there should be a capacity to consider release where the period of detention exceeds six 
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months’.247  
Shortly after this change entered into force in September 1994, it became 
obvious that the new legislation failed to achieve its goal as the nature of appeals 
diversified. Most applications for judicial review claimed officials failed to consider 
whether asylum applicants faced a “real chance” of persecution or not. When this 
avenue became closed with the Wu Shan Liang reversal by the High Court, new appeals 
arose claiming that the RRT contravened the “substantial justice” principle enshrined in 
the Migration Act.248 Similarly, when the High Court rejected this approach, appeals on 
other diminutive details began to appear. The result was that the number of appeals 
brought before the Federal Court continued to rise. In 1993/94 appeals numbered 320 
but by 1996/97 they figure grew to 673. In percentage terms, immigration cases went 
from comprising 55 per cent to 68 per cent of the Federal Court’s administrative 
caseload in these years.249 Furthermore, rejected asylum seekers’ inability to challenge 
asylum decisions (the Federal Court could only ask the department of immigration to 
review the case, according to the 1994 changes) led to a sizeable increase in appeals 
brought before the High Court, which remained accessible as a constitutional right. A 
number of court cases threatened these modifications in asylum policy.   
 
Effects 
The effects of mandatory detention on boat people became more apparent as the 1990s 
progressed. Whereas most of the boat people that arrived in 1989 and 1990 stayed in 
hostel type accommodation in Springvale, on the outskirts of Melbourne, their 
successors had to remain in remote detention centres whilst awaiting the outcome of 
their asylum requests. While security did exist in the former, it became much more 
visible and prevalent in the latter.250 After one year’s detention in the more comfortable 
environment of Springvale, some Cambodian boat people reported feeling suicidal and 
depressed.251 Inevitably, when the government began to detain boat people in more 
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isolated outposts, such as Port Hedland in Western Australia, their mental state 
deteriorated further as their form of accommodation became more obviously prison-like. 
Fewer visits from outsiders – because of the detention centres isolated locations – 
resulted in boat people maintaining less contact with the outside world, which in turn led 
to less knowledge and more frustration relating to their circumstances. To protest against 
such treatment, boat people launched a hunger strike at Port Hedland in March 1992.252 
Further negative publicity from various studies and reports researching the effects of 
detention led to a noticeable increase in the volume of criticism from actors sympathetic 
to boat people’s plight, such as religious leaders, NGOs and authoritative public figures.  
In April 1992, the Anglican Archbishop of Perth, Dr Peter Carnley, attacked the 
government’s policy of detaining boat people: “We hear of boat people scandalously 
encaged behind cyclone wire in Port Hedland and kept waiting for two years not 
knowing their ultimate fate. … It’s like a concentration camp.”253 In August 1993, the 
Red Cross published a damning report of the harmful effects of detention. It focused 
particularly on the damage detention inflicted on children and families, stating that 
‘within the Port Hedland facility children from two to six years of age displayed 
retarded fine-motor skills and an outlook which can be described as apathetic.’ In further 
outlining how detention harmed normal family cohesion, the report highlighted the 
inability of parents ‘to provide for even the most basic needs of one’s child … to 
provide security, guidance, food, hope or even a simple toy that a child can call its own.’ 
It went on to state that parents’ ‘lack of interest in their own children and the children’s 
disorientated perspective of their parents’ role is regularly witnessed at Port Hedland. 
Their actual and perceived roles are progressively deteriorating, as is their feeling of 
self-worth.’254 The report explained the reasons and methods boat people took to express 
their discontent with detention: ‘There have been and will continue to be, attempts at 
self-harm and suicide. These responses should not be seen as a response to a negative 
outcome but for what they are: a result of a long-term detention and its concomitant 
effects on personality and behaviour. The feeling of being denied justice is further 
exacerbated when it is apparent that only people who arrive by boat are automatically 
placed in detention.’255  
The Chief Justice of the Family Court, Alastair Nicholson, accused the 
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government of treating boat people like “caged beasts” in 1995, highlighting the 
ongoing detention of 282 children to justify his condemnation.256 Malcolm Fraser, the 
ex-Liberal Prime Minister who allowed over 2,000 Vietnamese boat people to stay in 
Australia in the late 1970s, also hit out. In his opinion, it was “quite wrong” to locate the 
detention centres so far away from Australia’s major cities because it acted as a 
“deterrent to the media to go and see what was happening.”257 Australia also began to 
receive international criticism of the policies it reserved for boat people. In June 1993, 
one German diplomat castigated Australia’s treatment of its boat people when he 
compared Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers with Germany’s: “We have half a 
million asylum seekers in Germany and Australia keeps one or two thousand asylum 
seekers in places like concentration camps.”258 In early 1995, the Clinton administration 
followed this by citing Australia’s treatment of boat people in its annual report on 
human rights’ abuses around the world.259  
Nonetheless, the majority of Australians advocated the heavy-handed treatment 
of boat people. Indeed, many citizens polled appeared to favour taking a tougher stand 
on the issue. One 1993 opinion poll asked Australians, ‘Do you think people who 
attempt to become migrants in this way [by boat] should be: sent straight back where 
they came from, despite what they say may happen to them; assessed with all other 
migrant applicants, and held in detention in the meantime; or allowed to stay as migrants 
in Australia?’ 44 per cent chose the first option, 46 per cent the second option and 7 per 
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cent the last option.260 As the opposition spokesman on immigration, Jim Short, 
remarked in 1993: “There’s a feeling out there that detention is second best: first best 
would be turn them around and send them back.” Former Immigration Minister Clyde 
Holding concurred, commenting: “As far as most Australians are concerned, they 
wouldn’t care less if you sunk the boats. Anti-detention groups have made little impact 
on public opinion: in a period of high unemployment there’s not much sympathy around 
for boat people.”  
 
Figures: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, under the section entitled 
'Labour' 
 
Many Australians throughout the 1990s began to feel less and less comfortable 
with their country’s immigration system. A Saulwick Poll in June 1990 demonstrated 
that 46 per cent of those polled believed the annual immigration intake remained too 
high. By June 1996, in spite of a reduction in the annual intake by 40,000, the number of 
respondents holding such views had risen to 65 per cent.261 Politicians tried to dilute this 
criticism by focusing on the issue of boat people because voicing explicit concerns over 
Australia’s immigration system led to the possibility of accusations of racism or 
xenophobia. They achieved limited success, as the subsequent rise of Pauline Hanson 
swiftly confirmed. Hanson went on to challenge Australian political bipartisanship on 
immigration like no other critic had managed previously. 
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2.3 Between Waves 
Boat people figured only intermittently in mid 1990s because of decreasing numbers. 
Enormous changes in local Australian politics during this period would have significant 
consequences on later boat peoples debates, however. In 1993, the Labor senator Jim 
McKiernan, when discussing boat people, commented: “There’s very little interest from 
commercial TV or the tabloids. That’s good. When the tabloids get interested that’s 
when you get problems.”262 As the 1990s progressed, these fears became real, as the 
issue of immigration, and subsequently the issue of boat people, gained more and more 
prominence in the public sphere.  
Despite Australian governments reducing annual immigration in the mid 1990s, 
voters remained dissatisfied. Yet, when John Howard questioned immigration in the late 
1980s it resulted in years of political isolation. Howard only returned after a long, 
painstaking public rehabilitation,263 and Labor politicians still attacked him for his 
comments several years later.264 Nonetheless, the potential benefits to be reaped from 
tapping into this previously untouched voter base meant that someone was bound to take 
advantage.  
In an indication of the potential opposition to immigration, Australians Against 
Further Immigration (AAFI), a small party only formed in 1989, polled strongly in four 
by-elections in March 1994, gaining between 6.9 per cent and 13.7 per cent of votes. A 
Canberra Times editorial noted its disappointment: ‘what this country does not need is 
another damaging immigration debate, like we saw in the 1980s. Immigration is 
inevitably an issue, but it requires more than usual sensitivity when handling it.’265 In 
1995 Geoffrey Blainey, the man who sparked significant debate about the racial makeup 
of immigration quotas in the mid 1980s, attacked such editorial and political opinion. In 
his estimation, the reluctance of the media and political parties to discuss the issue of 
immigration corresponded to an affront to democracy: ‘Again and again newspaper 
editors and others insist that there must be a partisan approach. We are told that the 
people can’t be trusted to vote on immigration. Nearly every Immigration Minister in 
the past 12 years has followed this line of argument.’266  
In the run up to the 1996 federal elections, several high profile political 
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candidates raised the issue of immigration. The National Party, the Labor Party and the 
Liberal Party all had to deal with renegade candidates making racist and anti-
immigration comments. Bob Burgess of the National Party termed Australia’s 
citizenship ceremonies “dewogging exercises,” while his fellow party member, Bob 
Katter, called people who opposed immigration critics “little slanty-eyed ideologues.”267 
Meanwhile, Labor MP Graeme Campbell had by then became more and more outspoken 
in his opposition to immigration; going so far as to promote the Australians Against 
Further Immigration party on several occasions.268 The Liberals also encountered 
problems controlling one of its candidates, a certain Pauline Hanson, who made several 
outspoken attacks on immigrants and Aborigines during her campaign. The Labor and 
Liberal parties responded by sacking Campbell and Hanson whilst the Nationalist party 
officially reprimanded its candidates.269 Despite this setback, both won their respective 
seats as independents with Hanson’s victory in the traditionally safe Labor seat of Oxley 
in Queensland representing one of the most remarkable electoral swings in Australian 
history. 
In September 1996, Hanson raised many polemical issues when giving her 
inaugural speech to the Australian Parliament. In addition to attacking Aborigines, she 
confronted the issue of immigration head-on: 
 
[F]or far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate by the major 
parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that 
of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. 
Between 1984 and 1995, 40 per cent of all migrants coming into this country were of 
Asian origin. They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not 
assimilate. Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my 
home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country.270 
 
Hanson’s speech sparked off a frenzy of tabloid interest. From the date of Hanson’s 
speech in mid September to the end of 1996, for example, Pauline Hanson’s name 
featured in no less than 521 articles in the tabloid Daily Telegraph.271 It was not only the 
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tabloid press that was fascinated by her impact. The broadsheet Age identified her as ‘a 
social barometer’ while the Australian Financial Review believed she had hit the ‘public 
bullseye’.272  
Hanson also fascinated talkback radio show hosts. With their penchant for the 
controversial and their claim to represent ordinary Australians, Hanson became an 
immediate hit.273 Alan Jones, perhaps the most famous of Australia’s talkback hosts, 
gave Hanson his implicit support, in between registering his own shock at her 
popularity. The day after her inaugural address, Jones told listeners: “I’ve got to tell you. 
Pauline Hanson. She doesn’t know what groundswell of public support she’s tapped.”274 
The next day Jones informed his Sydney audience that: “There’s never been figures like 
this on any issue rung on an open poll ever. We took 37,430 calls yesterday, and 98.48 
per cent supported Pauline Hanson.”275 Bob Francis, Wayne Roberts and Stan Zemanek 
also found their respective Brisbane, Adelaide and Sydney audiences supportive of 
Hanson’s policies.276 
Significantly for Hanson, her election win coincided with John Howard’s onset 
as premier in a landslide election victory for the Liberal-National coalition over Labor. 
Howard immediately attempted to take away many of the formalities of Australian 
politics that had hindered his political career since his ill-fated comments on Asian 
migration in 1988; in effect aiding Hanson’s rise. Less than two weeks after Hanson’s 
infamous speech, for example, Howard signalled the death knell of the political 
correctness that previously symbolised Australian immigration debates:  
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One of the great changes that have [sic] come over Australia in the last six months is 
that people do feel able to speak a little more freely and a little more openly about what 
they feel. I welcome the fact that people can now talk about certain things without living 
in fear of being branded as a bigot or as a racist or any of the other pejorative 
expressions that have been flung around in this country whenever somebody has 
disagreed with what somebody has said.277  
 
The 1990s represented a decade of considerable change in Australian indigenous 
affairs, especially relating to Aborigines’ land rights. The 1992 Mabo decision 
concluded that native land titles survived the settlement of the British in Australia and 
the 1996 Wik judgement ruled that pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native 
title. Hanson’s outspoken opposition to these decisions and other welfare programmes 
assisting Aborigines won her many admirers. But the Liberal-National coalition allayed 
much of this criticism by producing a ‘Ten Point Plan’.278 As Howard reminded listeners 
to Alan Jones’ Sydney radio show in May 1997: “I’m the Prime Minister who took 
money out of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission budget.  I’m the 
Prime Minister who was attacked by the media of the country for [doing so]…I’m the 
bloke who has been under constant attack from Aboriginal leaders for being insensitive 
to their situation. ... I’m also the Prime Minister who belonged to the party that voted 
against the Native Title Act in 1993.”279 By introducing such moves, the Liberal-
National coalition took the steam out of Hanson’s sails. During the late 1990s and early 
2000s the coalition also sought to address the other issue from which she received most 
of her popularity: immigration. Yet they achieved this goal through the prism of boat 
people seeking asylum.  
 
2.4 Restricting Asylum Advocators and Advocating Restrictions, 1996-2001 
 
In the light of Hanson’s meteoric rise, one commentator in the Australian Financial 
Review wondered which of the main political parties ‘ will now be first to have both the 
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moral courage and the political savvy to (largely) agree with Mrs Hanson?’.280 The 
Liberal Party’s decision to steadfastly amend many of Labor’s migration policies soon 
after coming to office and John Howard’s reluctance to label Hanson supporters in a 
negative light quickly answered this question. In Howard’s opinion, fans of Hanson’s 
policies were not “bigoted, narrow-minded and racist” but people concerned with “the 
pace of change and the pressures that parts of our community are under. These concerns 
deserve the most sensitive understanding.’281 Research in late 1997, illustrating that the 
majority of Hanson’s supporters previously voted for the coalition parties, demonstrated 
why Howard and the Liberals discussed Hanson’s potential supporters so carefully.282  
In the summer of 1998, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party published its 
proposed immigration policy.283 One central component related to asylum seekers. 
According to the policy proposal, those who qualified for refugee status would be 
provided only with ‘temporary refuge until the danger in the refugee's country is 
resolved’.284 John Howard dismissed One Nation’s immigration and asylum policies as 
“alarmist nonsense,” while the Justice Minister, Amanda Vanstone, asked: “Why ... 
anybody tries to continue to give Ms Hanson and her ratbag nonsense collection of 
policy any publicity, I don’t know.”  
 Hanson’s popularity peaked in June 1998, when her One Nation Party, formed 
following her election victory in 1996, took over twenty per cent of the vote in 
Queensland’s state election. In doing so, One Nation became the second most popular 
party in Queensland following Labor. Shortly thereafter, the party self-imploded due to 
a number of internal rankles. Its influence lasted considerably longer, however, with the 
Liberals embracing some of her policies, most notably that relating to temporary refuge, 
and Labor silently watching for fear of alienating some of its voters. 
 
Formation 
From 1989 to 1996, Labor introduced various asylum policies to discourage future boat 
people from arriving and to impede boat people already in the country from remaining. 
                                                
280
‘Hanson hits public bullseye’, Australian Financial Review, 19 Sept 1996. 
281
 John Howard, ‘Empty populism offers bitter future’, Australian, 19 May 1997. 
282
 See ‘One Nation lures Liberals, Nationals’, SMH, 5 May 1997. 
283
 John Howard dismissed One Nation’s policy as “alarmist nonsense,” while Justice Minister, Amanda 
Vanstone, said: “Why ... anybody tries to continue to give Ms Hanson and her ratbag nonsense collection 
of policy any publicity, I don’t know.” See ‘Refugees should be expelled: Hanson’, Age, 2 July 1998 and 
‘Leaders line up to shoot holes in policy’, Australian, 3 July 1998. 
284
 Taken from One Nation’s 1998 policy paper, entitled ‘Immigration, Population and Social Cohesion’, 
http://www.australianpolitics.com/parties/onenation/immigration-policy-98.shtml. 
86 
 
The Liberals, under the leadership of John Hewson until 1994, regularly condemned 
Labor’s asylum policies. But when John Howard took over the leadership of the party in 
early 1995, the Liberals began to support Labor’s measures. After taking office in 1996, 
the Liberals resolutely vowed to continue Labor’s tradition of attempting to deny actors 
sympathetic to boat people from influencing asylum policy.  
The number of boat people arriving in Australia declined significantly from 1996 
to 1998 (from 589 to 157). Consequently, discussion during this period centred on boat 
people’s asylum applications and their possible repatriation (by May 1996, Australia had 
returned over 1,000 boat people to China).285 When the government refused to hand over 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) letters to detained boat 
people informing them of their right to claim asylum, the HREOC successfully 
challenged the Australian government in the Federal Court.286 The government quickly 
responded by introducing the 1996 Migration Legislation (Amendment) Bill (No.2) to 
continue its pre-court practice. The HREOC declared that the bill was “unjust, unfair 
and un-Australian.”287 Labor, on the other hand, supported the bill wholeheartedly, with 
only the minor Democrat Party voicing any meaningful political opposition. 
The Labor government introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 
1994 to limit the amount of appeals made to Australia’s courts by asylum seekers. But 
because of its only partial success, the recently re-elected coalition government 
presented further amendments seeking to curtail boat people’s access to the Australian 
judicial system in 1998. Philip Ruddock, the Liberal Immigration Minister, outlined the 
main objective of the 1998 Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill: to 
reduce the “manipulation of Australia’s judicial system by unlawful non-citizens 
seeking to delay their departures from Australia”.288  
To punish people who failed to “do the right thing” and apply for asylum from 
outside the country, as those entering the country as part of the Refugee and 
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Humanitarian Scheme did, the government announced its intention to implement the 
1999 Migration Amendment Regulation (No. 12). The bill proposed that boat people 
given refugee status would only be entitled to three year Temporary Protection Visas 
(TPVs) instead of permanent protection, as Hanson had advocated in July 1998. Another 
part of the bill proposed that boat people classified as refugees would be ineligible from 
obtaining permanent visas and associated benefits, such as family reunion and the right 
to travel outside of Australia.289 Accommodation became the responsibility of the visa 
holders to find, as did the setting up of bank accounts and other administrative tasks 
previously performed by officials for refugees. Responding to NGOs’ appeals 
concerning the lack of government assistance given to these TPV holders, a government 
spokesman replied: “They are the ones who chose to come here illegally. If they had 
come through the normal channels, their situation would be quite different.”290 Labor 
backed the move.291 This followed a number of measures enclosed in the Border 
Protection Legislation Amendment Bill, which was passed in September 1999. It 
contained similar instruments to the EU’s Dublin Convention by allowing the state to 
return any boat person found to have applied for or received asylum in another country. 
 
Implementation 
Despite the government’s stated aim to ‘restrict access to judicial review in visa-related 
matters’ – a policy ‘upon which it was elected in 1998’, according to the Immigration 
Minister – the amount of appeals made by asylum seekers to the Australian courts 
continued to grow.292 In 1995/96, 282 asylum applicants sought judicial review of 
decisions made by the administrative Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in the Federal 
Court. By 1998/9 this rose to 651 and by 2000/01 to 914.293 A parallel rise occurred in 
the number of cases in which either the judge set aside the RRT’s decision or the 
immigration department agreed to reanalyse the case. This occurred in eleven per cent of 
cases in 1996/7, sixteen per cent of cases in 1997/8 and twenty-five per cent of cases in 
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1998/9.294 Accordingly, the government began another attempt to stem the influence of 
the courts. Ruddock defended this by stating ‘the principle that the foundation of judicial 
powers lies in the will of the people as expressed through Parliament’.295  
Appeals could only be brought before the Federal Court on limited grounds. 
Furthermore, it could only recommend a re-examination of the immigration department 
and the RRT’s decisions. The High Court still retained the right to change the decisions 
imposed by the administrative refugee determination process as guaranteed by the 
Australian Constitution. Consequently, the High Court began to witness a noticeable 
growth in appeals related to asylum cases. In 1995-6, one year after the terms under 
which asylum applicants could seek review before the Federal Court became more 
restricted; cases relating to asylum decisions comprised eighteen per cent of all High 
Court cases. By 1999-00, this had risen to forty-seven per cent.296 As Mary Crock and 
Ben Saul point out, the Australian High Court consisted of seven judges chosen to 
decide on the most pertinent legal questions facing the country rather than adjudicate 
over refugee appeals.297 
The rise in appeals coming before the Federal and High Courts also reflected the 
increased number of boats arriving toward the beginning of the twenty-first century.298 
Between 1999 and August 2001, over 8,000 boat people arrived in the country, 
compared to less than 600 the two years beforehand.  
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Source: Barry York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official 
Sources, pp. 140-1. 
 
The coalition government consistently reinstated its desire to maintain and upgrade its 
detention measures in order to deter future arrivals. Yet, figures continued to increase 
despite implementation of increasingly punitive measures. Instead, they produced a 
series of domestic challenges that once again raised the issue of the ethics and feasibility 
behind the sustained detention of all boat people in Australia. 
 
Effects 
A combination of the Australian government’s desire to mandatorily detain all boat 
people and rising numbers resulted in overcrowded detention facilities. This contributed 
to a notable escalation in the manifestation of various forms of peaceful and violent 
protests by those detained. These demonstrations often served to highlight the treatment 
meted out to boat people by Australasian Correction Management, a private company 
owned by the US security firm Wackenhat that supervised Australia’s immigration 
detention centres. Nonetheless, they also led to a further build-up of hostility to boat 
people by an increasingly apathetic Australian public and government. 
The first protest that captured public interest took place at Curtin airbase 
detention centre in West Australia in February 2000, when a number of boat people 
stitched their lips together in protest at detention camp conditions. The West Australia 
Premier, Richard Court, communicated his bewilderment at the situation:  
 
We are looking after them here while we sort through whatever the paperwork details 
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are and yet they are protesting in this way. … I mean, I can't quite follow the logic. 
What a nerve to be complaining about the system they have sort of thwarted. … They 
have come in illegally and just have complete disregard for the proper processes of 
coming into this country, so I don't think they are in any position to protest.299  
 
As detainees’ protests against their inhumane treatment became more extreme, so too 
did many Australians’ opposition to their release. In early June 2000, several hundred 
boat people escaped from Woomera detention centre in protest against conditions.300 
Even though the centre only opened in the remote South Australia town in November 
1999 – to accommodate the rising number of boat people arriving in Australia – it 
became the focus of boat people’s protests in the forthcoming years.  
Remonstrations reached a climax in late August 2000 when riots occurred at 
Woomera over its overcrowding problems. Demonstrations also took place 
simultaneously at several other detention centres around the country. Detainees set 
buildings alight and staff responded by using tear gas. The Australian public felt 
outraged, with 98% of nearly 5,000 calls to a Herald Sun opinion poll stating that 
Australia ought to expel protesting asylum seekers from the country.301 Philip Ruddock 
also took a dim view of the rioters’ actions and openly informed readers in the 
aforementioned Herald Sun what he thought of boat people: ‘the people who 
demonstrated came to Australia without invitation or authority. … Reluctantly, we have 
to accept their arrival, at least in the short term.’302  
 Incidents continued to occur throughout the following months. In January 2001, 
asylum seekers at the isolated Port Hedland centre staged another riot, which led 
Ruddock to suggest that chemical injections should be more “comprehensively 
implemented” in stemming these actions.303 In April 2001, two riots took place at in 
Curtin and again at Port Hedland. Ruddock reiterated the government’s stance on 
protests: “Some people seem to believe they will be able to force our hand, that they will 
be able to get different decisions if they are able to put pressure on us … There is no 
way that we will succumb to that type of pressure.”304  
                                                
299
 Quotes taken from ‘Court hits out at ‘nerve’ of protesting detainees’, Australian, 8 Feb 2000. 
300
 See ‘Illegals storm town centre’, Australian, 9 June 2000. 
301
 See Herald Sun, 30 Aug 2000. 
302
 Philip Ruddock, ‘Riots will not sway us’, Herald Sun, 30 Aug 2000. 
303
 See SMH, 23 Jan 2001 for details of the riot and Ruddock’s response. An Australian court later found 
the centre’s operation manager guilty of assaulting an Iranian asylum seeker. This actually sparked riot. 
‘Officer guilty of bash attack on refugee’, Australian, 27 April 2001. 
304
 ‘Ruddock won’t give in to rioters’, Australian 6 April 2001. 
91 
 
Contrastingly, actors sympathetic to detainees reasoned that these riots 
demonstrated the futility of mandatory detention, using the growing body of information 
on the ill effects of detention to highlight their arguments. In February 2001, a senior 
Australian diplomat, Philip Flood, produced a report into immigration detention 
procedures that found ‘a small proportion of detention officer staff was treating 
detainees, including children, as if they were criminals’.305 One month later, the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Oliver Winder, issued a report urging the government to 
find an alternative to detention: “My investigation revealed evidence at every (detention 
centre) of self-harm, damage to property, fights and assaults, which suggested there was 
systemic deficiencies in the management of the detainees, including individuals and 
groups, staff, women and children.”306 In June of the same year, a twelve member 
parliamentary Human Rights Sub-Committee, which included five MPs from the ruling 
Liberal Party, unanimously recommended a 14-week time limit on the mandatory 
detention of asylum seekers arriving in Australia without a valid visa. The report 
outlined the despair many asylum seekers felt detention instigated:  
 
The most constant complaint from detainees was about the length of their detention. They 
felt that they were being held in a jail-like environment and treated as criminals. A 
comparison with prisoners was often made, with claims that prisoners were better off 
because they knew why they were in jail, were provided with better facilities and knew how 
long their sentence would be.307 
 
Australia’s Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, and Prime Minister, John Howard, 
reacted with dismay to the findings and recommendations set out in the report. Both 
referred to the committee as naïve, with Howard underlining the committee’s innocence: 
“A jail is confronting … a lot of people have never been inside jails in any kind of 
capacity. And when they first go there, even as a visitor, they find it very confronting.” 
Ruddock went further in his criticism of the committee, accusing them of indolence: 
“The report comes from a group of people who have not put in the hard yards.” 308  
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2.5 Boats and Votes: Tampa and Beyond, 2001-2008 
 
Ruud Lubbers, the head of the UNHCR, wrote an article in the Australian in June 2001 
criticising the substance of asylum debates in Australia and other liberal democratic 
states in recent and upcoming elections:  
 
Statistics are frequently manipulated, facts are taken out of context, and the character of 
asylum seekers as a group is often distorted in order to present them as a terrible threat – 
a threat their detractors can then pledge to crush. Politicians taking this line used to 
belong to small extremist parties. But nowadays the issue is able to steer the agenda of 
bigger parties. Their opponents - finding their party presented as weak in the face of the 
foreign hordes clamouring at the gates - respond by seeking tighter laws, making it 
more difficult, for foreigners of any sort to cross into their territory. It becomes a 
numbers game: reduce arrivals at all costs. 309 
 
Despite Lubber’s plea for change, the debate over boat people in Australia from July 
2001 until the general election in November 2001 corresponded almost unerringly with 
the scenario Lubbers wanted to avoid. The Liberals made the issue a topic of primary 
importance, pledging to reduce the number of boat people at all costs. Their rhetoric 
frequently resembled that of the One Nation Party. Predictably, Labor, fearing the loss 
of voters, begrudgingly followed the government’s hard-line on boat people. This 
enabled the coalition government to oversee the enforcement of Australia’s most 
restrictive policies on boat people since the dismantling of the White Australia 
immigration policy in the late 1960s. Labor’s return to power in early 2008 saw a 
reprieve in the rhetoric used against boat people although question marks remain over 
whether this will lead to a noticeable change in policies.  
 
Formation 
A spokesman for the Immigration Minister in August 2001 remarked: “If we get another 
few large boats it’s going to put the system under strain.”310 The appearance of the 
Norwegian Tampa off the coast of Christmas Island in late August 2001, with over 400 
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rescued asylum seekers onboard realised this prophecy. Nonetheless, the government 
would convert this practical problem into a tool to achieve considerable political gains in 
the subsequent pre-election weeks. Before the political storm caused by the Tampa 
incident, polls suggested Labor would comfortably return to power at the November 
federal elections. But the Tampa crisis sparked brought voters back to the coalition like 
no other issue. Despite Howard insisting that “It’s got nothing to do with the upcoming 
elections,”311 it had everything to do with them.  
The Australian government categorically denied the Tampa permission to land at 
Christmas Island as it approached in late August. The government took this move, 
according to the Prime Minister, “in the national interest” because it “prevent[ed] 
beyond argument people infringing the sovereignty of this country.”312 An international 
standoff ensued between Indonesia – in whose waters the Tampa rescued the boat 
people, Australia and Norway. Australia’s decision to disallow the Tampa to land on 
Christmas Island incurred the wrath of the UNHCR, as well as widespread international 
condemnation. But the coalition remained determined to disallow the boat from 
approaching the island, with Ruddock insisting: “If these people were to enter Australia 
now, it would be seen as the sign for all of them [boat people] to continue coming in the 
way in which they are.”313  
Labor initially supported the government’s stance. But when the coalition 
attempted to rush through emergency legislation to reinforce its power to forcibly move 
the ship, Labor hesitated and rescinded its approval. The coalition responded by 
attacking Labor’s perceived weakness on the issue. Nevertheless, in early September, 
with the standoff slowly developing into a critical international situation, it appeared 
Howard and his cohorts had unsuccessfully overstepped the mark. Australia received 
few international offers to share the asylum burden,314 and it looked increasingly as if 
Australia would have to let the Tampa land because of the mounting humanitarian 
situation facing the boat’s Norwegian captain. But just as it seemed the Australian 
government would have to perform an embarrassing volte-face, it produced its saving 
grace: the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’.  
The Pacific Solution involved transferring the rescued boat people on the Tampa, 
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and future asylum seekers found on course for Australia, to a small number of islands 
dotted around the Pacific. Nauru, the smallest republic in the world with a population of 
12,000, became the first island to accept Australia’s offer of substantial compensation in 
exchange for housing the asylum seekers in detention centres built with Australian 
money. When Nauru agreed to Australia’s venture, Howard’s relief was palpable. He 
exultantly announced: “I have had a goal, and so far it looks as if that is being achieved. 
… I am very pleased that the people are now on the way.” In his opinion: “What has 
been achieved is that we have demonstrated a determination not to just meekly accept a 
situation where people can, without authorisation say ‘we are coming to your 
country’.”315  
As Michael Gordon pointed out in the Age, Howard’s uncompromising stand 
was ‘untidy, costly [and] damaging to Australia’s international standing … [b]ut it has 
put the Prime Minister back in contention for the election that seemed a lost cause just 
four months ago.’316 Gordon also reflected on how the episode had damaged Labor’s 
election chances. For some voters, the Labor leader, Kim Beazley, had faltered on the 
issue of boat people by appearing too soft and inconsistent; for others he appeared 
overly harsh and compliant with the government on the issue.  
The Australian government’s Pacific solution to the Tampa crisis failed to signal 
the end of the debate on boat people. By 2001, the majority of boat people came from 
Muslim countries, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, after the terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the issue of boat people 
entered political debate once again, as actors opposed to the entry of boat people raised 
the possibility of potential links existing between boat people and terrorism. The 
Australian Solicitor-General, for example, drew a powerful analogy between boat 
people and the perpetrators of the New York terrorist attacks only two days after the 9-
11 attacks.317 So too did Peter Reith, the Liberal Minister for Defence, when linking 
asylum policy with terrorism: “I have no doubt whatsoever that the horror of the last 36 
hours, 48 hours, is only going to reinforce the whole security issue in terms of dealing 
with terrorism. And that means you have got to be able to control your borders, 
otherwise if you have got people moving in and out willy nilly, then this can be a 
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conduit for extremist terrorist groups.”318  
Worse caricatures of boat people followed some weeks later. On 6 October the 
Australian government announced that intercepted boat people had jumped in the water 
and thrown their children overboard to stop the navy towing their boat back to 
Indonesian waters. Ruddock considered this action despicable: “I regard this as one of 
the most disturbing practices I’ve come across.” He also inferred that because those in 
the water wore life jackets, it represented a callous, calculated act by the boat people in 
question.319 Two days later, John Howard added his voice to the discussion: “Quite 
frankly, I don’t want in this country, people who are prepared, if those reports are true, 
to throw their children overboard.”320 The government distributed two photos showing 
the Australian navy rescuing several children in the water to support its account. The 
tabloid Daily Telegraph also revealed that the boat people included ‘a man believed to 
be a “sleeper” agent with connections to Osama Bin Laden’.321 The navy subsequently 
transported these asylum seekers to a new detention centre set up on another Pacific 
neighbour, Papua New Guinea, under the terms of the new Pacific Solution. 
Two weeks later, 353 asylum seekers destined for Australia drowned. The boat, 
referred to as the SIEV X (Suspected Illegal Entry Vehicle – the X stood for unknown), 
encountered serious difficulties after hitting bad weather on the first night of its journey 
from Indonesia on 18 October 2001. Exceedingly overcrowded, by midday on 19 
October, the boat’s engine ceased to work. Later that same afternoon, the ship sank 
rapidly. On 20 October, Indonesian fishermen rescued the remaining forty-five 
survivors.322 Instead of arousing bilateral compassion, a slugging match between Labor 
and the Liberals ensued. Kim Beazley, the Labor leader, sparked the clash by indirectly 
linking the disaster with the government’s perceived foreign policy failure to force 
Indonesia to stop boats leaving for Australia. Philip Ruddock replied in kind: “If there is 
a linkage, it is in the failure to get reform through which would have addressed thoughts 
of Australia as an easy touch.”323 The tragedy of the SIEV X related to the amount of 
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victims who had attempted to join family members already residing in Australia on 
Temporary Protection Visas. Previous legislation would have enabled these refugees to 
facilitate family reunion but changes made in 1999 made this an impossibility. 
Several days before the November election, John Howard chose to attack Kim 
Beazley again over his perceived weakness toward boat people: “Can you believe … 
with all the fraying at the edges that is now occurring, that if Mr Beazley were to 
become Prime Minister he would maintain the policy I have adopted?”324 
Simultaneously, houses across Australia received Liberal Party pamphlets containing 
John Howard’s photo alongside his popular statement on boat people: “We will decide 
who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.”325 Days before 
the election, Howard again revived the possible link between terrorism and boat people: 
“You don’t know who’s coming and you don’t know whether they do have terrorist 
links or not – I just don’t know but I think a country has got a perfect right to try [to] 
find out. And the only way you can find out is for them to be processed in a proper and 
reasonable fashion.”326 
 
Implementation 
Several government bills proposed to counter the arrival of boat people in a ‘proper and 
reasonable fashion’. One bill to excise certain Australian islands from the country’s 
territorial waters for boat people (the Migration Amendment [Excision from Migration 
Zone] Bill 2001). Another reduced the rights of boat people to access the Australian 
judicial system by transporting them to Pacific islands outside the remit of Australian 
law (the Migration Amendment [Excision from Migration Zone] [Consequential 
Provisions]). Another stipulation allowed officials to direct a ship carrying boat people 
from Australian territorial water back into international waters. The government also 
introduced a privative bill to ensure rejected asylum seekers in Australia could not 
access the national courts. In early October 2001, Philip Ruddock outlined the effects 
this hard-line political response would have: ‘unauthorised arrivals do not achieve their 
goal of reaching Australian soil; there is no automatic access to Australian residency; 
[and,] there is no access to the judicial system’.327 Though sympathisers successfully 
disputed the privative clause in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, the government 
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managed to implement the other measures it presented after Tampa. 
When Ruddock brought in temporary protection visas (TPVs) for boat people in 
October 1999, he reduced the rights and benefits available to those entitled to refugee 
status. The changes effected in the wake of the Tampa crisis proposed to reduce the 
rights for those people even further. While the 1999 changes denied access to permanent 
residency and family reunion for three and five years respectively, the new model 
intended to deny permanent residency or family reunion for an unlimited period. 
Furthermore, if refugees on TPVs ever left Australia they would nullify any entitlement 
to return. 
James Jupp has written that John Howard’s decision to deny Tampa permission 
to land, and his government’s subsequent enforcement of the Pacific Solution, 
represented an attempt by the Prime Minister to regain many of the one million votes 
that Jupp estimates his party had previously lost to Hanson’s party.328 Whether this won 
the election for the coalition or not, it definitely helped it to a decisive victory on 10 
November.329 In the words of a later Senate Committee report: 
 
The timing of the Tampa incident in the lead up to the Federal election provided an 
opportunity for a hardline political response which reflected popular sentiment. The 
terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September further fed fears concerning unauthorised 
boat arrivals, many of whom were Muslims from Iraq and Afghanistan, through a loose 
linking of the asylum seeker issue with national security concerns.330   
 
Effects 
In the wake of the November federal election, actors sympathetic to boat people became 
more vocal than ever before. Several former leading politicians severely criticised the 
government’s stance. Most consistently vocal of these was former Liberal Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Fraser. Others included former prominent Liberals, John Hewson, 
Ian Macphee and Fred Chaney. Prominent academics and journalists also questioned the 
messages communicated to the public by politicians. As the Australian Defence Force 
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Academy’s William Macey pointed out, the offshore program was “not a place in a 
queue but a ticket in the lottery”.331 Tim Colebatch, the Age journalist, concurred: ‘each 
year, just one in every 2000 people living in refugee camps gets a ticket to enter 
Australia. We take one Afghan refugee a year for every 4000 in the camps.’332 Critics 
also questioned the “wonderful humanitarian record” that Howard promoted at the 
height of the Tampa crisis, with one journalist finding that out of 71 countries that took 
displaced persons, Australia came in 32nd in the ranking. When calculated on a per 
capita basis, Australia slipped down to 38th on the standings. Of twenty-nine developed 
countries that accepted refugees and asylum seekers, only four placed asylum seekers 
into detention centres.333 To emphasise the disapproval of policy regarding boat people 
among a significant section of Australian society, a new Melbourne based group, 
Australians Against Racism, began running TV advertisements querying the 
government’s asylum policy in December 2001.334  
When Dr Aamer Sultan and Dr Kevin O’Sullivan published an article in 
December 2001 attempting to determine the psychological impact of indefinite 
imprisonment on asylum seekers, it gave these actors’ further ammunition to attack 
government practices. Sultan, himself an asylum seeker detained in Villawood 
Detention Centre, and O’Sullivan, a consultant psychologist at Villawood, determined 
that the 33 detainees in their study displayed traits that demonstrated psychological 
problems on four different levels caused by their detention. This went from detainees 
feeling aggrieved and shocked at their imprisonment, to ‘develop[ing] frankly psychotic 
symptoms’ with some of them engaging in ‘repeated acts of self-harm or self-mutilation 
leading to acute hospital admissions’.335 
In May 2002, the Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace 
produced a report, entitled Damaging Kids, which found that ‘widespread psychological 
and emotional abuse of children and young people [wa]s occurring as a result of being 
incarcerated in Immigration Detention Centres.’ It firmly pointed the finger of blame at 
the Department of Immigration: ‘Responsibility for this human destruction and 
psychological child abuse lies not with the people detained but with DIMIA 
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[Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs].’336 
In October 2002, criticism of the government’s handling of asylum seekers 
reached new levels, with the release of a senate report into the government’s allegation 
that asylum seekers deliberately threw their children overboard after an altercation with 
the Australian navy in early October 2001 (discussed above). The report found that the 
government had misled the media by mislabelling the photographs distributed.337 
Although some sources questioned the veracity of the government’s claims in the run-up 
to the general election,338 ‘through a combination of denial, obfuscation, and misleading 
statements the media, senior officials and the public were deliberately and 
systematically deceived about the evidence for the veracity of the claim.’339  
In late 2002, one NGO alleged that those responsible for the management of 
detention centres on Nauru and Christmas Island treated asylum seekers in an inhuman, 
cruel and degrading way.340 Nauru later denied entry to lawyers, human rights activists, 
health care professionals and independent observers during the trial of twenty-one 
asylum seekers prosecuted for their alleged involvement in riots that took place on 
Christmas Eve 2002.341 The timing of these reports, following the Bali Bombings that 
took the lives of eighty-eight Australians, meant that sympathy for boat people 
repeatedly linked with Islamic terrorism by government politicians remained relatively 
muted.   
In addition to NGOs, academics and former politicians highlighting the plight of 
asylum seekers kept in detention centres; asylum seekers themselves launched a series 
of protests aimed at drawing attention to their troubles. In January 2002, a series of 
protests took place at Woomera detention camp when approximately 200 Afghans went 
on hunger strike. Dozens sewed their lips together to protest against the postponement of 
Afghans’ asylum applications, which followed the fall of the Taliban. The government’s 
first reaction mirrored earlier responses, with Ruddock maintain that protestors would 
change nothing by protesting.342 Days later however, the government rescinded its hard-
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line stance, agreeing to fast-track Afghans’ asylum applications after protests 
intensified.343  
Simon Crean, who took over from Kim Beazley as Labor leader after its 2001 
election defeat, obviously felt that public opinion towards boat people had softened 
enough for him to publish a Labor policy paper on asylum and refugee policy with his 
immigration spokeswoman, Julia Gillard, in December 2002. The paper declared 
Labor’s opposition to the denial of permanent residence in Australia to boat people and 
its intention to grant boat people with refugee status similar rights to overseas refuges, 
including English lessons and access to the Job Network. It also proposed the end of the 
“Pacific solution” and promised instead to treat people in detention in a more humane 
and ‘Australian way’.344  
Unfettered, the coalition government announced in the same month Labor 
launched its policy initiative that no boat people managed to land on Australian land 
between 17 December 2001 and 17 December 2002.345 Changes imposed in the wake of 
the Tampa crisis, they argued, had successfully stopped boat people. As a bonus, 
Australia’s tough new stance also resulted in the number of people applying for asylum 
while ‘legally’ in Australia dropping by 50 per cent, in what Hatton and Lim’s referred 
to as the ‘Tampa effect’.346  
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Jan 2009).  
 
Despite those in favour of more expansionist policies managing to keep the issue 
of detained boat people in the news, they failed to influence the government’s asylum 
policy in any meaningful way. When Mark Latham replaced Simon Crean in December 
2003 as leader of the Labor Party, formidable political opposition to the government 
became once again muted. Though the Justice Project, a group formed by several 
leading Australian figures, such as ex-politician Malcolm Fraser, academic Robert 
Manne and the barrister Julian Burnside, attempted to keep the issue of asylum seekers 
and refugees in the public sphere in the run up to the 2004 federal elections, asylum 
failed to figure in key debates.347 Kim Beazley’s return to the Labor leader’s position 
soon after the elections ensured this trend continued. Nonetheless, when it came to light 
in 2005 that the department of immigration had detained and deported several foreign 
born people legally resident in Australia, the department became the subject of 
investigation.  
Inquiries into the detention for ten months of Cornelia Rau, a German citizen 
with permanent Australian residence, and the deportation of Vivian Alvarez Solon, an 
Australian citizen originally born in the Philippines led to criticism of the department of 
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immigration’s negative culture, which ‘had shifted from settlement towards compliance, 
detention and prevention’.348 Further condemnation of the department followed in mid 
2007 when the then Immigration Minister, Liberal Kevin Andrews, who had replaced 
Amanda Vanstone earlier that year, cancelled the work visa of Mohamed Haneef, an 
Indian medical doctor arrested on suspicion of terrorism in early July 2007. Despite 
Australian authorities releasing Haneef and dropping all charges against him, Andrews 
maintained that Haneef had little chance of having his work visa cancellation revoked, 
sparking widespread condemnation.349 
 When Kevin Rudd became the new Labor Party leader in late 2006, he called for 
the return to a more liberal Australia immigration and asylum policy. Labor dedicated 
one chapter of its national platform and constitution, published in late April 2007, to the 
subject of human rights and indigenous affairs. Much of it centred on the fair treatment 
of asylum applicants, as the chapter’s title, “Respecting Human Right and a Fair Go for 
all,” clearly indicated. Labor pledged to ‘administer a fair and flexible refugee and 
humanitarian program’, detain asylum seekers only for health, identity and security 
checks, end the Pacific Solution, and provide permanent protection for asylum seekers 
given refugee status.350 Since Labor’s crushing defeat of the Liberal-National coalition 
in late 2007 (symbolised by the loss of Howard’s own seat), Kevin Rudd and his 
Immigration Minister, Chris Evans, has begun to implement these and other policies 
relating to asylum seekers. The opposition Liberal Party responded by discussing boat 
people and asylum seekers in a more conciliatory tone than under John Howard. 
 
Conclusion 
Labor’s return to power under Kevin Rudd led to a remarkable turnaround in rhetoric 
used in debates on boat people. From 1989 to 2007, successive Labor and Liberal-
National coalition governments, as well as the majority of opposition politicians, 
portrayed boat people as potentially unwanted migrants from undesirable locations 
breaching Australia’s shores without permission. Consequently, Australia introduced 
draconian measures to stifle the arrival of boats. This did an injustice to the sophisticated 
and egalitarian migration system that Australia built up since the 1970s because it 
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embodied methods that went against the country’s “fair go” culture. The often lengthy 
detention of asylum seekers arriving by boat, the desire to reduce legal avenues open to 
these people and the forced processing of their claims outside Australia after 2001 
contrasted sharply with the generous and liberal welcome extended to people who 
applied for asylum after arriving on a valid visa or those hospitably received as part of 
the country’s extensive refugee and humanitarian intake programme.  
One reason for the Australian overreaction to what in effect amounted to an 
extremely small proportion of its overall annual migration intake related to the supposed 
threat boat people posed to the national migration system. Michael Walzer wrote in 
1982 that ‘if we offered a refuge to everyone in the world who could plausibly say that 
he needed it, we might be overwhelmed’.351 Australian politicians, voters and the 
national media largely agreed with this sentiment for much of the 1990s and 2000s when 
debates turned to boat people. These reactions displayed Australia’s insularity and 
tendency to exaggerate the consequences of allowing certain migrants to enter the 
country, since the number of people seeking asylum in other industrialised states in 
North America and Europe in the same period dwarfed what occurred in Australia. This 
can be partly explained as maintaining Australia’s long tradition of effective 
immigration control since its foundation as a country. Another reason Australian 
politicians chose to focus so much of their attention on boat people was because it 
served to counterbalance growing criticism of the national immigration policy amongst 
the public and the media, particularly after the emergence of Pauline Hanson in 1996, 
who threatened the country’s heretofore bipartisan political support for migration more 
generally. 
Almost eighteen years of targeting boat people for especially harsh treatment 
bred certain consequences, however. In more recent years, a noticeable rise in sympathy 
for boat people languishing in isolated detention centres began to occur in the light of 
regular reports highlighting the psychological and physical ill-effects of long-term 
detention on boat people who, it turned out, had a much greater chance of attaining 
refugee status than people who applied for asylum in Australia after entering on valid 
visas.  In August 2004, for example, 61 per cent of Australians polled said they favoured 
allowing all or some boats in to Australia – an increase of twenty per cent since October 
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2001.352 When Kevin Rudd’s Labor Party, in stark contrast to the John Howard’s 
coalition government, called for more humane treatment of boat people in April 2007, it 
appeared to strike a chord amongst voters. Kevin Rudd’s government’s determination to 
treat asylum seekers with dignity and fairness since coming to power in late 2007 
suggests, therefore, that there may be a limit to how far governments can restrict asylum 
policy before enduring humanitarian principles prevail. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Seeking asylum in Italy 
 
Lo straniero, al quale sia impedito nel suo paese l’effettivo esercizio delle libertà  
democratiche garantite dalla Costituzione italiana, ha diritto d’asilo nel territorio della 
Repubblica.      
Article 10.3 of the Italian Constitution 
 
Despite a large rise in asylum applications in Italy since the late 1980s, Italy still lacks 
an official asylum policy. This is despite the 1948 Italian Constitution’s assertion that 
foreigners have the right to asylum; despite Italy’s ratification of the Geneva Convention 
in 1954; despite the extension of the same convention’s geographical restrictions to all 
parts of the world in 1990; and despite the inclusion of sections on asylum in 
immigration legislation enacted in 1990, 1998 and 2002.  
Legislation that does exist has placed those seeking asylum in a precarious 
position. Doubts arose over who was an asylum seeker, how they were to be treated, and 
who was responsible for their welfare because of the varied treatment asylum seekers 
received. Some obtained temporary work visas, such as the Albanians who arrived in the 
spring of 1991. Some faced incarceration in a football stadium without access to any 
asylum procedures before being shipped back to their country of origin, such as those 
Albanians who came in autumn 1991. Some acquired a favourable reception, such as the 
Kurds in the late 1990s. Some attained temporary humanitarian visas, such as the 
Kosovars who arrived before July 1999. Some were classified as clandestines, such as 
the Kosovan Roma who came after June 1999. Some waited over one year in shanty-
towns and squats for a response to their applications because of little access to welfare 
or accommodation support, such as those escaping various African countries in the early 
2000s. And some were repatriated before they submitted their appeals, such as some of 
those who disembarked from Libya’s shores.  
This chapter will give a chronological account of Italy’s asylum policymaking 
after 1989, by focusing on asylum policy debates, asylum policy changes and asylum 
policy effects. It will begin with the Martelli Law, formed by the centrist coalition led by 
the Christian Democrat leader, Giulio Andreotti, in 1989-1990 in response to the rise of 
immigration and asylum as issues in Italian political and public debate. The enormous 
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political changes Italy underwent in the early 1990s with the disintegration of the 
Christian Democrat, Communist, Socialist and Republican parties will also feature on 
account of the influence it would later have on the politics of immigration and asylum in 
subsequent years. Into the breach this rupture created in the centre and on the right of the 
political spectrum stepped Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the Lega Nord and the reformed 
ex-fascist party Alleanza Nazionale; on the left came the Partito Democratico della 
Sinestra and the Refounded Communists. The latter two parties helped instigate the so-
called Turco-Napolitan laws from 1998 onwards, which sought to form a coherent 
asylum policy similar to other EU countries. In 2002, following the election victory one 
year earlier by a coalition of Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, the Lega Nord and two 
small parties linked to the former Christian Democrats, the Bossi-Fini Law again sought 
to redefine the country’s immigration and asylum policy. These policies and others will 
be discussed in chronological order after briefly introducing Italy’s considerable history 
of emigration and under-researched immigration past, especially in relation to the 
country’s hosting of refugees before 1989. 
 
3.1 Seeking asylum in Italy before 1989 
In contrast to Australia but in common with Ireland, Italy had a rich history of 
emigration, particularly in the years from its foundation as a modern state in the mid 
nineteenth century until the outbreak of the First World War. Italy had a large 
population surplus in the late nineteenth century, with demand often outweighing 
supply. To escape the growing poverty, many chose to leave their homeland for Europe 
and the Americas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the promise of earning higher 
wages meant that many turned to North America. While emigration from northern Italy 
to neighbouring European countries had dominated emigration in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, in the first quarter of the twentieth century most emigrants hailed 
from southern Italy and headed to the Americas. Though Italy’s population steadily 
increased from 27.6 to 35.7 million between 1871 and 1911, it did so without over 13 
million Italians, who left their country of birth between 1876 and 1914.353 Nonetheless, 
a small number of foreigners came to Italy; sometimes in search of asylum. Between the 
mid- and late-1860s the recently founded Italian state drew up a number of civil codes 
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and public order laws that specified that foreigners, especially nomads, vagabonds and 
those without work could be subject to surveillance. Accordingly, the state applied 
sometimes drastic measures upon ostracised foreigners, such as Roma nomads and 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian anarchists. Nonetheless, Italy maintained the right to 
asylum after the rise of Fascism, following the First World War. A number of Russian 
refugees fleeing the Bolshevik revolution, for instance, settled in Italy while political 
refugees from Albania received asylum in 1925. Simultaneously, the number of Italians 
seeking asylum from Fascist Italy rose significantly, with many settling in neighbouring 
France. Although emigration from Italy recommenced following the First World War, it 
never reached the heights of pre-war days because of the introduction of immigration 
restrictions, especially after the economic problems that occurred in the wake of the 
1929 Great Wall Street Crash, and the decision of the Fascist Italian government in the 
late 1920s to make emigration illegal.354 Emigration to Italy’s colonies, which the 
Fascist government keen promoted, proved a noticeable exception. 
Surprisingly, Mussolini’s Italy allowed Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany to 
enter its territory from 1933 to 1938. Indeed, Italy represented one of only eight 
countries to sign the League of Nations 1933 Convention relating to the International 
Status of Refugees.355 The mood towards Jews changed considerably by the late 1930s, 
however, leading the Fascist government to bar Austrian Jews from entering Italy six 
days after the 1938 Anschluss. Later that same year, the government introduced 
measures to revoke Italian citizenship from any Jews that attained it after 1919.356 
Indeed, Michele Sarfatti notes that for a brief period in the autumn of 1938, certain 
Italian anti-Jewish laws were harsher and more oppressive than their German 
counterparts.357 Italy interned many of the foreign Jewish refugees living in the country 
during the Second World War in the southern location of Ferramonti di Tarsia.358 
Luckily for them, the order to transfer all Jewish refugees to the northern city of 
Bolzano – and so into the hands of the Germans – failed to occur because Mussolini’s 
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government fell on the very day of the order.359 Those approximately 43,000 Jews 
unfortunate enough to find themselves in the northern part of the country, which came 
under the control of the Third Reich, suffered a crueller fate. Of the roughly 35,000 
Italian and 8,000 non-Italian Jews present in the northern German-dominated territory, 
the Fascist authorities arrested approximately 8,000 (of whom no real figures exist 
specifying the number of Italians and non-Italians).360 Of these, only 1,000 survived. 
Debates about what happened to the thousands of Italian and non-Italian Jews 
transported to Nazi concentration camps in the Holocaust rarely occurred in the new 
Italian Republic until after Primo Levi’s death in 1987 and later by the publication of 
books on Jews in Fascist Italy by historians such as Liliana Picciotto and Michele 
Sarfatti.361 Less remarked upon, however, but nonetheless just as horrific and even more 
deadly was the extermination of an estimated 25,000 Roma transported from Italian 
territory to German extermination camps during the War.362 The tragic history of 
Europe’s Jews and, to a much lesser extent Europe’s Roma community, contributed to 
the establishment of a right of asylum in the new Italian republic’s constitution, which 
came into force in 1948.  
While the constitution’s affirmation and Italy’s ratification of the UN 
Convention on Refugees in 1954 suggested the new republic welcomed people seeking 
political asylum, Italy’s practices throughout much of the Cold War period suggested 
otherwise. Instead of settling refugees, Italy transported them. Between 1952 and 1978, 
almost 80,000 refugees from Soviet Europe temporarily stayed in Italy on their way to 
one of the traditional English-speaking receiver states. Italy remained very much a 
country of emigration rather than immigration. After the fall of Fascism and the end of 
the Second World War, emigration began to reoccur. Many went to neighbouring 
European countries but began to return from the late 1950s onwards, when Italy 
experienced extensive economic growth. Indeed, between the 1950s and 1970s, 
approximately nine million people migrated within the country from the 1950s to the 
1970s.363 Most transferred from rural areas – the South, the islands and the Veneto 
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region – to industrial cities located predominantly in the North and especially Turin, 
Genoa and Milan.364  From the mid 1970s, however, Italy began to receive a positive net 
inflow of migrants made up predominantly of returning migrants, although some foreign 
migrants also arrived; a pattern that would intensify throughout the 1980s. Concurrently, 
the number of people seeking asylum in Italy rose considerably.  
In the late 1970s, 2000 Vietnamese boat people came to Italy. They all received 
refugee status because of the government’s decision to override the country’s continuing 
enforcement of the geographical reservation pertaining to the Refugee Convention, 
which meant that Italy theoretically only provided asylum to Europeans.365 Displaying 
the critical involvement of secular and religious NGOs in future work in Italy with 
refugees and asylum seekers, the Red Cross and Caritas played crucial roles in helping 
the Vietnamese on arrival. By the mid to late 1980s, the number of people in search of 
asylum that came to Italy rose considerably because of easier access to tourist permits in 
Soviet Europe than in previous decades. Most asylum seekers stayed in a special camp 
set up in 1957 to house refugees from Soviet Europe in Latina, a small city located south 
of Rome.366 Conditions at the camp deteriorated to such an extent that in August 1987 
hundreds had to move to hostels and a local church after the collapse of one of the 
camp’s dilapidated buildings.367 Overcrowding of the camps also occurred, leading to an 
inevitable build-up of pressure on the limited services provided. Hostels housed 4,327 
refugees; the Latina camp accommodated 2,223 – even though the official capacity 
measured 800; and another camp, Capua, contained 720 refugees.368 Though most of 
these refugees subsequently travelled to North America and other countries to join their 
relations, people seeking asylum in Italy from outside Europe often lacked such an 
option.  
Italy, along with Malta, remained one of the only countries in 1980s Europe, 
outside the Warsaw Pact, which failed to rescind the geographical limitation on refugees 
to Europe alone. Nonetheless, small presences of non-European de facto refugees 
already resided in Italy from Iran, Ethiopia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Zaire and Vietnam. 
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Many of these appeared in the first government amnesty to legalise immigrants in 1986. 
Of the 116,000 immigrants regularised, for instance, 3,607 came from Sri Lanka, 3,004 
from Iran and 2,492 from Ethiopia. Elsewhere in Europe between 1980 and 1985, over 
125,000 people from the same three countries applied for asylum.369 Non-Europeans in 
Italy unable to take advantage of the first amnesty failed to qualify for any state aid. 
Consequently, the Italian state refused to accommodate de facto refugees, unlike their 
counterparts fleeing Soviet Europe. Many had to work without the necessary 
documentation in order to survive. As one UNHCR employee interviewed in the late 
1980s commented: “In Italy anyone can have asylum … but what asylum? To live off 
air, off the sun, to not eat? … [i]f you can’t give a person the right to work, to live 
adequately ... one can’t talk of asylum.”370 Consequently, the UNHCR regularly 
provided accommodation for non-European refugees for the first three months of their 
stay, while simultaneously trying to protect their rights thereafter against the threat of 
expatriation from the Italian authorities on account of their tenuous legal situation.371  
Many worked in underpaid, undocumented and dangerous employment. 
Accommodation remained a major problem with demand and rents often forcing these 
people to live in irregular housing, as demonstrated by the case of Jerry Masslo, a South 
African refugee. Due to the restrictions on non-Europeans, Italian law barred Masslo 
from applying for political asylum in Italy. Instead he hoped to resettle in Canada. After 
one and a half years in Italy, however, his status remained unclear. Despite living in a 
centre for refugees run by a religious group, Masslo constantly sought work to garner 
some kind of income. This led him to the tomato farms south of Naples, where he 
worked irregularly alongside many other African migrants.372  
 
3.2 The Martelli Law and the “Albanian Effect”, 1989-1991 
 
In 1985, a European Parliamentary report indicated that Italy had one of the lowest rates 
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of racist incidents in Europe.373 By the late 1980s this changed as a dramatic increase in 
racist incidents took place,374 culminating in the murder of the aforementioned Masslo in 
August 1989. The reaction to his murder marked the growth of Italy’s anti-racist and 
pro-migrant groups. Several state politicians attended Masslo’s funeral, which Italian 
television broadcasted live.375 In the weeks following Masslo’s murder, immigration 
became an issue of political and public importance for the first time. Masslo, according 
to one author, became ‘a symbol for the concern felt about racism, the exploitation of 
immigrant workers, and their deplorable living conditions’.376 Suddenly, Italian public 
opinion became more hospitable to immigrants than only two years before, with several 
opinion polls showing a notable decrease in animosity towards immigrants.377 
Highlighting this change one month later, between 100,000 and 200,000 people, 
supported by a broad range of groups including Catholic and secular NGOs, trade 
unions and the Italian Communist Party, marched in Rome to protest against racism in 
Italy and urge political intervention.378 ‘Riding this wave of public sympathy and 
concern’, the Italian vice Prime Minister, the Socialist Party’s Claudio Martelli, 
proposed new, expansive immigration legislation.379 
 
Formation 
Jessika ter Wal records that the positive debate following the Masslo murder and the 
anti-racism demonstration ‘created the conditions for the presentation of the Martelli law 
as a positive and liberal policy.’380 Martelli made a point of including many 
sympathisers in discussions about the proposed legislation, such as various secular and 
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religious NGOs and leftist trade unions that favoured the promotion of expansive 
immigration policies. Nevertheless, real political opposition to immigration began to 
manifest itself when the Republican Party disputed many of the law’s measures. 
Although the party had little popular political support, its presence in the power-sharing 
executive government meant that the issue became one of large media interest. The 
legislation developed into a personal battle between the deputy Prime Minister, Martelli, 
and the Republican Party leader, Giorgio La Malfa. Interestingly, the media devoted 
little or no coverage to the views of the two most popular political parties in the country, 
the Christian Democrats, who headed the coalition, and the opposition Communist 
Party.381 The Christian Democrats’ silence stemmed largely from its desire to appease 
the Catholic Church, which consistently displayed a sympathetic attitude towards 
immigrants.382 The Communist Party, although in support of the new legislation, rarely 
commented on the subject because of the ideological turmoil that befell the party after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall – a subject dealt with in further detail below. The media also 
chose to ignore the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) party, even though it 
opposed the legislation more vehemently than the Republican Party.383 Yet, the anti-
immigrant northern leagues demonstrated their future controversial stance on 
immigration when the Lombard League announced its slogan against the Martelli law: 
“Whites and blacks do not integrate.”384  
The political debate ignited by the Martelli law summoned the popular media’s 
attention to the subject of immigration. Previously, only certain experts in the field had 
covered immigration. From 1989 onwards, however, popular journalism “discovered” 
the topic.385 As a result, the issue became politicised, social conflict became amplified 
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and generalisations about immigrants quickly spread.386  
 
Implementation 
The broad-ranging Martelli law affected all facets of immigration. In relation to asylum, 
it rescinded the geographical restriction that previously disallowed non-Europeans from 
applying for asylum in Italy. In addition, the state bestowed a temporary residence 
permit on asylum seekers as well as a small daily allowance for the first forty-five days 
of their application.387 The government established a central commission for the 
recognition of refugee status in May 1990 to fulfil the conditions outlined in the Martelli 
law.388 This comprised of representatives nominated by the Minister of the Interior and 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as a representative from the UNHCR, who 
participated at commission meetings in an advisory capacity.  
Despite Italy’s recognition of the right of non-Europeans to apply for asylum, 
Europeans fleeing the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe made up the bulk of 
asylum applications in the early and mid 1990s. Italy’s reaction to such developments 
would show that the favourable Martelli law merely represented window dressing for a 
strategy constantly in flux, with no identifiable parameters within which to operate.  
With trouble flaring in Albania in spring 1991 – over 100,000 took to the Tirana 
streets on 20 February to protest against the government, knocking down the statue of 
Xoxha en route – many Albanians escaped the country. Some of the first Albanians to 
flee encountered gun fire from Albanian patrol boats but as the numbers departing grew, 
the military opposition lessened. 389 By 7 March, several thousand Albanians had arrived 
in southern Italy by boat. Confusion and ineptitude marked the Italian state’s reaction.390 
Initially, the government used the recently installed Martelli law that dealt with labour 
migration – and not the section that dealt with asylum – to claim that only those 
Albanians with work permits would be allowed to enter Italy.391 Days later, and after the 
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UNHCR appealed to Italy to allow the Albanians land, the government appeared 
divided.  
Martelli clearly stated his intentions: the Albanians would be taken in and given 
help but afterwards they would be sent back to Albania.392 Taking another view 
altogether, Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Prime Minister at the time and leader of the 
Christian Democrat party, called for Italians to ‘adopt’ their ‘Albanian brethren’.393 
Emphasising this affinity with the Albanians, Andreotti’s party colleague, Flaminio 
Piccoli, explained to parliament that these newcomers shared several traits with Italians: 
 
Attention must be drawn also to another fact: those who disembark in Italy [...] even in 
their weakness, even in their fragility, even in their destitute appearance, are people with 
their own families, who in fact have a culture [culto] of family, who love their own land, 
who have a tradition, a history of utmost respect that has many similarities to our history 
and our traditions.394 
 
Reflecting this turnaround in official attitudes towards the Albanians, the government 
decided that neither the labour restrictions of the Martelli law nor its asylum rules 
applied to the newcomers. Instead, the government introduced a special law specifically 
exempting them from the Martelli legislation and giving the Albanians a three-month 
visa during which time they would have to find work. If they failed to attain a job within 
three months, they would be sent home.395  
Local people from the Puglia region initially reacted positively to the boatpeople. 
Under the direction of voluntary agencies, such as the Red Cross, they fed and assisted 
the Albanians. The government delayed intervening because it thought providing help to 
the Albanians would attract more people from the small Balkan state, who followed the 
drama from across the Aegean on Italian TV.396 Indeed, some commentators suggested 
that Italian TV attracted many of the Albanians because of the false glitzy promise it 
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provided to those watching in Albania.397  
By 9 March, the sanitary and humanitarian crisis facing Brindisi, the main 
destination for the Albanians, became more serious, with vocal criticism coming from 
voluntary agencies and from the Vatican attacking the government’s nonchalance.398 
One local representative commented: “They (the state) have left us alone. After the 
initial confusion, the local council successfully put in place an emergency plan. But 
what we can do is like a drop in the ocean. Fifteen thousand, twenty thousand refugees 
are a fifth of the population of Brindisi.”399 Nonetheless, no state aid came, forcing the 
council to accommodate the Albanians in tent camps for months on end. The propensity 
of the Italian state to place the onus of responsibility for the welfare of asylum seekers 
on regional and city council, without sufficient financial compensation, would become 
another common trait of Italian asylum policy over subsequent years, as would those 
same councils’ criticism of the state’s apparent disregard for the difficult situations the 
councils regularly encountered.  
The sanitary problems caused by the Albanians’ extended stay in the city caused 
exasperation amongst locals as the crisis persisted. Living in cramped and 
uncomfortable conditions for months on end with no knowledge of their future, the 
Albanians also became restless; the tent camps they habituated became the setting for 
several violent protests and internal fights – some of them deadly.400 Further displeasure 
emanated amongst Albanians in June when the Italian government announced that those 
without jobs by 15 July would be repatriated.401 Popular anti-Albanian sentiments 
emerged elsewhere in Italy when the government eventually distributed the Albanians 
nationwide.402  
The government exemplified its hesitant handling of the situation once again in 
mid June. The Minister for Immigration, Margherita Boniver – who the government 
appointed to the temporary ministerial position after the first large influx of Albanians 
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arrived – stated that of all the Albanians who arrived in March and applied for asylum, 
less than 1,000 attained refugee status. For the thousands that failed, she went on to 
declare, they had approximately one month to show Italian authorities that they held 
jobs – even though most of them had resided in tent camps and other emergency 
accommodation in Puglia up until that very month.403 Furthermore, no subsequent 
Albanians that arrived in Italy would qualify for asylum status because, according to 
Italy’s Foreign Minister: 
 
The political conditions in Albania today are different. The country is run by a 
government in which also the opposition parties participate. We cannot make any more 
exceptions and consider those arriving in Italy as political refugees automatically. The 
immigration laws apply to everyone, including Albanians. Therefore, whoever arrives in 
our country without a visa has to be considered illegal and clandestine.404 
  
 The attitude towards immigration amongst the public slowly transformed from 
hospitality, symbolised by the post-Masslo murder atmosphere, into hostility. In Milan, 
tram drivers went on strike to protest against Moroccans living beside one of the tram 
depots; in Rome newspapers reported battles between police and Somalis; in Varese, 
certain parts of the city remained off-limits to North Africans.405 Opinion polls released 
in late July of that year seemed to reflect the growing enmity to immigration in the 
country, with one newspaper arguing that the “Albanian effect” had helped to increase 
public opposition to immigrants more generally compared to opinion polls from 1989 
and 1987.406 In one survey, the percentage of Italians hostile to immigration increased 
from 43.1 per cent in 1989 to 61 per cent in 1991.407 Much of this opposition came from 
fear of newcomers. As one expert recorded, 55.4 per cent of Italians surveyed felt a clear 
correlation existed between increasing criminality and the rise in the numbers of 
immigrants.408 Interestingly, a slight majority of the 50.7 per cent questioned in 1991 
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said that immigrants did not take jobs from Italians.409  Yet, the 46.5 per cent that 
believed foreigners threatened their employment still represented a worrying figure, 
particularly at a time when unemployment remained high. 
 
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
 
 The Italian government adopted a markedly tougher stance on immigration, 
promising on several occasions to expel Albanians without work permits by mid July.410 
Nonetheless, the number of Albanians repatriated never matched the tough rhetoric used 
by the government to publicise its intentions. The failure to send back Albanians without 
work permits after the government’s deadline expired epitomised this feature. The new 
Minister for Immigration, Margherita Boniver, demonstrated how Italy’s asylum and 
immigration policy remained sporadic when defending this oversight several weeks later 
in an interview with La Repubblica: 
 
Boniver: “We decided together (with the minister for the interior, Vincenzo Scotti) the 
deadline of 15 July for the distribution of the displaced persons [profughi], and that of 
the 31st for the immediate expulsion of the irregulars.” 
Repubblica: “And why didn’t the expulsions take place?” 
Boniver: “That should be put to the department of the interior, don’t you think? And it 
turned out no one proposed to complete a round up to identify the irregulars. Amongst 
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other things, I’m wondering whether the expulsions were really possible …” 
Repubblica: “Why?” 
Boniver: “Because the same Scotti granted a permission of stay for one year last March 
to all those that embarked in Puglia. And it seems to me that these permits cannot be 
revoked. There is no doubt then that there were a lot of dispensations to the Martelli 
laws, justified because of the particular climate – elections had yet to take place in 
Tirana – predominating in Albania.411 
 
Effects 
The outcome of Italy’s mixed reaction to Albanian asylum seekers demonstrated itself in 
the summer of 1991, when another large exodus of Albanians arrived en masse. In late 
July, the Albanian Foreign Minister had warned her Italian audience of the trouble that 
lay ahead:  
 
This summer the drop has overflown the vase. They [the Albanian people] don’t have 
enough to eat, they don’t have any prospects. Who will help them? We are helping them 
a bit, but only us! The situation has got out of hand; they ask us to repatriate the 
displaced people but we don’t know where to put them; the ports are invaded by people, 
the airport is insecure.412 
 
In addition to the huge food shortages in the country and the major political instability 
caused by the gradual but chaotic transformation from a communist to a post-communist 
society, as portrayed so vividly in Gianni Amelio’s film Lamerica, the Albanian GNP 
for 1990 measured half that of 1965, exports had diminished to 15 per cent of the 
previous year’s total and prices rose by at least 300 per cent. 413 
One week after the Albanian minister’s statement, Durazzo, a main port in 
Albania, provided the scene for mayhem as thousands attempted to break through the 
erected barriers. Initially, troops fired shots at those trying to escape, killing several 
people in the process. Days later, however, shooting abated and thousands of Albanians, 
as well as several hundred policemen, managed to climb on board the Vlora, a large ship 
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stationed at Durazzo.414 On 8 August – the middle of Italy’s traditional ‘ferragosto’ 
holiday season – approximately 20,000 sailed into Bari on the Vlora. 
Analogous with the state’s inadequate reaction to events in Brindisi earlier that 
year, the Italian state’s inability to deal with the emergency nature of the situation 
quickly became apparent. One person died on the Vlora, thousands arrived dehydrated 
and hungry, dozens of women suffered miscarriages and many boat people had 
dysentery and scabies. Nonetheless, the only evidence of the state’s presence came in 
the form of military and police personnel. As one Red Cross worker recorded, the state 
remained absent from a critical situation:  
  
We’ve been working here for seven hours … do you see those ambulances? They are all 
private; you won’t find a single one with ‘Local sanitary unit’ written on its side! I 
would really like to know who and how anyone would have the courage to go to Cortina 
[the holiday resort where the prime minister was staying] or on a cruise boat …. That’s 
right, I was also like Andreotti this morning preparing to leave on holiday, but how can 
one leave children to die like this?415 
 
Part of the reason for the government’s failure to provide adequate emergency 
aid derived from its classification of the crisis as a military and police operation rather 
than a humanitarian one.416 Police quickly horded the Albanians into Bari’s football 
stadium, leading one observer to comment that the operation bore a striking resemblance 
to Pinochet’s handling of dissidents in Chile.417 The inability of the Italian state to 
provide adequate amounts of food and water led to harrowing scenes of Albanians 
fighting amongst themselves under the observances of Italian forces, who threw supplies 
into the crowd from cherry-pickers directed over the sides of the stadium’s walls.418 
Inevitably, with police providing the Albanians with little or no information concerning 
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their plight, a series of battles broke out.419 The Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, 
backed the tough stance taken by the state. So too did the Italian president, Francesco 
Cossiga, who termed the arrival an attack on Italian sovereignty.420 The incarceration of 
Albanians in the stadium, or what the Italian media fittingly dubbed the ‘concentration 
camp stadium’,421 only ended when an operation began on 10 August to repatriate the 
migrants by airlift and boat.422 Justifying this move, the Minister for Immigration, 
Margherita Boniver, said that if Italy failed to impose such measures, “50,000 would 
return.”423  
Italy then took the precaution of placing its armed forces in Albanian waters – 
with the acquiescence of the Albanian government – to prevent any other “invasion” 
from taking place; a move that the Minister for Justice, Claudio Martelli, admitted was 
“at the limit of international law.”424 Additional measures included providing the 
Albanian state with funding to alleviate food shortages, followed by the explicit 
agreement of the Albanian government to prevent any more flights of its people to 
Italy.425 The international reaction to Italy’s handling of the situation remained low-key, 
with the United States praising the promptness of the country’s offer to financially aid 
the Albanian state.426 Although media establishments, important religious figures, 
NGOs, certain political parties and trade unions levelled criticism at the government’s 
management of the situation, the public appeared to support the tough stance taken.427 
The reaction to the two Albanian influxes illustrated the haphazard nature of 
Italy’s asylum policy. The fluctuant nature of public and media responses to the arrival 
of large numbers of potential asylum seekers goes a long way to explaining the 
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variances of the state’s responses, which Barbara Palombelli’s front page article in La 
Repubblica captured so dramatically:  
 
Truncheons and water. Punches and bread. Kicks and Gatorade. What kind of a strange 
country is this? It is a country in which the government, personified by the President of 
the Council [Andreotti] first symbolically adopts three young Albanian displaced people 
and then locks 16,000 people in a concentration camp for three days without water and 
food. After the first invasion, an ad hoc ministry for immigration was invented. And the 
new department continued to postpone the repatriation date for the first wave of exiles, 
thus cruelly sustaining false hope. A two-faced government deceived a whole 
population. Nevertheless someone still has to find the courage to explain to Albanians, 
and to Italians, if this is really a country of fairytales in which three desperate people can 
become sons of the head of government or whether it is an inferno that should not be 
approached.428  
 
The Italian treatment of the approximately 500 Albanian soldiers and officials 
that fled with their compatriots symbolised successive governments’ failure to apply its 
laws to its policies. Despite the real threat that these people would be subject to 
persecution upon their return to Albania for deserting, the government also transported 
these people back, albeit some days after their fellow-nationals had returned. The 
UNHCR immediately communicated its disdain: 
 
The displaced persons were made believe that they would have been able to start an 
application for asylum. … We were not informed of the manner or of the details of the 
plan [to repatriate them without access to the proper asylum procedures], despite the 
Italian authorities assuring the UNHCR that it would be able to contribute to 
establishing who had the requisites for asylum and who did not.429  
 
Several ministers doubted the veracity of Albanians’ asylum claims but those 
escaping the contemporary civil war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s clearly required 
protection. Nonetheless, what happened to the second wave of Albanians affected the 
claims of those coming from the former Yugoslavia. Of the 214 people who arrived in 
Ancona from the west coast of Yugoslavia at the end of August 1991, none claimed 
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asylum. Instead, they all declared themselves migrants in transit, returning to work 
elsewhere in Europe or joining loved ones dotted across the continent.430 By late 1992, 
approximately 10,000 people from the former Yugoslavia had come to Italy. Of these, 
however, only 1,700 applied for asylum because seeking asylum in Italy remained a 
precarious endeavour.431  
Apart from the fear that they would be sent back, many of those fleeing the war 
in Yugoslavia failed to apply for asylum because of the problems that came with it. Of 
the 2,216 asylum applications made in Italy in 1992, only 86 attained refugee status. 
Italy’s asylum system remained, the US Committee for Refugees commented, 
“extremely restrictive.”432 In addition, the welcome centres where asylum seekers lived 
often contained inadequate services and the government provided no state aid to people 
prohibited from working after the first forty-five days. In late 1992, 300 Somalis 
attempted to highlight these unsuitable conditions by applying for asylum at the Vatican. 
One of the Somalis’ main grievances related to the destruction, by an accidental fire, of 
the abandoned building many of them had lived in. Because the local province 
responsible failed to find alternative accommodation, many of the Somalis had taken to 
living on the streets. One Somali interviewed by La Repubblica commented:  
 
We don’t believe in Italy. We thought Italy was like our second home. We said: there 
we can restart to live, there they are our friends, our Italian brothers. But it is not like 
that. Here no one wants us. No work, no house, no money …you humiliate us, you look 
at us crookedly and now you give us a fire [referring to the burning of their 
accommodation].433 
 
The Somalis targeted the Vatican because of the Catholic Church’s assistance to 
migrants in Italy through various religious NGOs. Amongst these, Caritas stood out. 
Though the Vatican refused to provide the Somalis with asylum, it did make various 
statements calling on the Italian government to aid and defend all migrants. Speaking on 
World Refugee Day in September 1993, the Pope asserted that Italy possessed a 
responsibility to defend refugees ‘from every type of marginalization and racism, 
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promoting an industrious and convincing culture of solidarity’.434 
 
3.3 Tagentopoli and the Politics of Immigration, 1992-1996 
Between mid 1992 and 1995, the issue of immigration remained largely absent from 
political debate. Instead, attention centred on the fallout of the crisis caused by the 
corruption scandal identified as Tangentopoli (roughly translated as “Bribesville” in 
English), Italy’s largest political crisis since the birth of Italy’s post-war Republic. 
Nonetheless, Tangentopoli indirectly led to the rise of the Lega Nord, Alleanza 
Nazionale and Forza Italia and the dismemberment and disappearance of many of 
Italy’s most established parties. The break-up of Italy’s main parties and their 
replacement by new and renewed groups greatly affected future immigration politics. 
In the wake of Tangentopoli, the popularity of the Christian Democrats – the 
most successful political party post-fascism – decreased enormously, leading to the 
party’s division into several smaller versions. Similar developments took place within 
the Socialist Party, the Italian Republican Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party 
and the Liberal Party, culminating in the Socialist Party’s leader, Bettino Craxi, seeking 
political asylum in Tunisia. Almost simultaneously, the Italian Communist Party, 
traditionally the country’s second largest political party, disintegrated. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Soviet Europe threw the party into 
ideological turbulence, eventually leading to the formation of two contrasting parties. 
 
Source: 'Bistecche impotenti ed altri partiti politici', La Repubblica (Il Venerdi), 11 April 2008, p. 28. 
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The Partito Democratico della Sinestra (PDS) and the Refounded Communist Party 
replaced the Italian Communist Party. The Refounded Communists’ rhetoric closely 
resembled the Communist Party’s inclusive approach to internal migrants in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Its support remained small, attaining just six per cent of the vote. The other 
branch of the former Communist Party, the PDS, also advocated an expansionist 
position on immigration although Davide Pero recently concluded that ‘there seems to 
exist a remarkable discrepancy between the inclusionary and politically correct official 
rhetoric of the [PDS] Left and the often instrumental if not exclusionary character of its 
grassroots’ on issues related to immigration.435  
The Italian Communist Party had adopted, included and eventually integrated 
many of the southern Italian migrants who moved to northern Italy in the 1950s and 
1960s under the rubric of class struggle and socioeconomic justice. But its inability to 
attain power in the 1970s and 1980s and its ultimate demise after the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe meant this never occurred with foreign migrants in Italy in the 1990s 
and 2000s. The Christian Democrats reacted ambiguously to immigrants, as 
demonstrated by its contrasting reactions to the two waves of Albanian migration to 
Italy in the spring of 1991 and August 1991. Nevertheless, some empathy towards 
migrants still existed within the party because of its links to the Catholic Church, which 
consistently voiced its support for migrants. Yet, the Church’s capacity to influence 
Italian politics diminished after the dissolution of the Christian Democrats in Italy’s 
biggest political crisis post-fascism. The parties that stepped into the political vacuum 
that Tangentopoli created brought the issue of immigration to the fore of public debate 
from the mid 1990s onwards and especially in the run-up to the 2001 and 2008 general 
elections.  
The extinction of the Italian Communist Party symbolised the end of the neo-
fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) as it existed up until the end of the Cold War. 
Before 1989, the MSI used its opposition to communism as its central platform, but the 
redundancy of this approach and the opportunities presented by Tangentopoli resulted in 
the creation of a new more centrist party focused on the promotion of family values, 
security and national identity. The MSI became the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in January 
1994. Previously a minor party, the AN established itself in succeeding years as a 
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mainstream political party, more than doubling the support its predecessor attained.436 
  
 
Source: ' Fini: "Senza di noi non si governa"’, La Stampa, 27 March 1994. 
 
The anti-establishment ideology of Lega Nord benefited enormously from 
Tangentopoli. Formed by the amalgamation of various “leagues” from northern Italy in 
early 1991, the Lega vowed to transform Italy into a federalist state in order to revoke 
the national administration’s control, which it felt squandered northern taxes on the 
underproductive South.  
Forza Italia (FI), founded in 1994 by the media and financial tycoon Silvio 
Berlusconi, benefited most from the political scandals that rocked the country in the 
1990s. Containing many ex-Christian Democrats, ex-Liberals and ex-Socialists, FI 
stepped into the political vacuum created by the fall of Italy’s established parties. 
Berlusconi’s party came to public attention on a wave of publicity, helped considerably 
by Berlusconi’s ownership of several television stations and other media outlets, to form 
a new Italian government in April 1994 along with AN and the Lega. Despite the 
coalition government’s remarkably short term of office – the government fell in 
December 1994 – all three parties, particularly the Lega and AN, would repeatedly bring 
the issue of immigration to public and political attention over the following years. 
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3.4 Emergency Measures and Absent Laws: Asylum in Italy, 1997-2000 
In 1995 an outbreak of cholera occurred in Albania, followed one year later by a polio 
epidemic, demonstrating the lack of facilities and services then available to the Albanian 
people. Conditions in Albania degenerated further in early 1997, when the Albanian 
Prime Minister announced in parliament the collapse of the pyramid schemes in which 
so many Albanians had invested in, resulting in the disappearance of great swathes of 
the remittances sent home from Albanian immigrants in Italy and Greece. Half the 
country’s GDP for 1996 vanished as a result.437 Violence and disorder overtook the 
country, particularly in the south. By March the President had removed the Prime 
Minster and placed the Chief of Staff of the Army under house arrest. Fire broke out at 
opposition press offices. Anarchy descended as gangs attacked and sacked police 
stations, army barracks, prisons, banks and public offices, leading to the widespread 
availability of firearms amongst the public.438 The enforcement of Emergency law gave 
police the right to shoot at stone-throwers on sight. In response, a new wave of Albanian 
migration began. Whether these new migrants deserved asylum status or not became the 
focus of substantial political debate over the ensuing weeks.  
Approximately 16,000 Albanians arrived in Italy in spring 1997.439 The new left-
wing coalition government, which came to power in May 1996, originally voiced its 
intentions to advance an asylum policy resembling its EU neighbours. Accordingly, the 
Interior Minister, Giorgio Napolitano, announced: “We don’t believe that the situation is 
so complex as to justify the automatic concession of political asylum. But in every case, 
Italy will respect all Italian and international laws on the subject of political asylum; for 
that reason every request advanced will be examined with attention.”440 One week later, 
the same government reacted to criticism of its handling of the Albanians by outlining a 
series of emergency measures that included assigning temporary permits of stay lasting 
between 60 to 90 days to all those Albanians already landed in Italy. It also declared that 
the Italian navy would return any boats bringing Albanians to Italy.441 This new system, 
which one journalist compared to ‘a game of cops and robbers’,442 ran into serious 
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problems days later when an Italian navy vessel struck a small boat containing Albanian 
migrants, leading to the deaths of dozens of boat people. The Greens promptly blamed 
the government for the tragedy and the Refounded Communists demanded a stop to the 
controls on all Albanian boats. Forza Italia claimed: “The tragedy is […] an involuntary 
crime committed on the part of those that transformed a humanitarian emergency into a 
military emergency.”443  
Italy had already presented a plan to its EU colleagues in mid March to lead a 
military intervention in Albania to stem the flow, but the EU had rejected the 
arrangement, preferring instead some kind of civil solution.444 Italy then pressed the 
United Nations for international backing. On the same day the naval tragedy occurred, in 
late March, the UN approved Italy’s repeated requests and the country accepted 
responsibility to lead an international military-humanitarian mission to Albania, which 
included policing the country’s coastline from potential migrants.445 The reason for the 
Italian government’s desire to lead such an intervention, according to Ted Perlmutter, 
related to two factors. First, the negative reaction of Italians to the first wave of 
Albanian boat people in 1991 meant that the public’s tolerance for more mass exoduses 
of Albanians remained minimal. Second, Italy attempted to display to its EU partners 
that it too had an effective and trustworthy foreign policy in the run-up to a decision 
concerning its European Monetary Union application.446  
Though this policy initiative did succeed in alleviating the numbers of Albanians 
arriving in Italy, it failed to solve the issue of how to treat the approximately 13,000 
Albanians that remained; of whom 1,685 applied for asylum.447 On 1 September 1997, 
one day after the expiration of the Albanian temporary stay permits, the Italian Prime 
Minister, Romani Prodi, announced an extension of the permits until 30 November. 
Those with valid work permits, those granted asylum and those with family already in 
Italy would be allowed to stay after this date. Those unable to meet any of these 
conditions would be repatriated. Maurizio Gasparri (AN) responded critically but 
tellingly: “The intention presupposes that these clandestines will be retraceable and 
identifiable in a few days. I am really curious to know if they will do it.”448 Two months 
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later, only several hundred of the 4,789 earmarked for repatriation returned to Albania; 
most others remained untraceable. 449 Many of these Albanians, as well as the Albanians 
from 1991 became regularised through the various amnesties that the Italian government 
sporadically announced in order to regularise some of the large undocumented migrant 
population that constantly grew throughout the 1990s. The various amnesties that took 
place in 1990, 1995 and 1998 regularised over seventy thousand Albanians. 450 
 
Formation 
The relatively small number of asylum applications Italy received compared to its EU 
colleagues and the fallout from Tangentopoli meant the country remained one of the 
only EU members yet to implement any specific national law that legislated for the 
asylum process. From 1997 onwards, with the increase in applications caused by the 
Albanian episode and the arrival of thousands of Kurdish asylum seekers, the 
government reacted by proclaiming itself ready to address this legal oversight through 
the so-called Turco-Napolitano law.451 The Turco-Napolitano law aimed to replace the 
emergency nature of previously proposed over Italian immigration and asylum policy 
with a regularised system. The law aimed to divide Italy’s immigration policy into two 
distinctive channels: immigration and asylum. The first part aimed to create a quota 
worker system to match the country’s labour needs, the number of foreign workers 
already available and unemployment rates, as well as proposing a residence permit for 
those that lived in Italy for over five years.  
 Debate between the government and the opposition coalition, the so-called Pole 
of Freedom that comprised Forza Italia and AN, over the Turco-Napolitano law 
remained relatively cordial, with Napolitano complementing sections of the opposition 
after the houses of parliaments passed the economic migrant segment of the law: “The 
contribution of some representatives of the Pole of dissension, but also of a constructive 
wording, was in part welcomed by the government.”452 Contrastingly, the Lega Nord’s 
strident opposition to the law even managed to surprise some of their past and future 
right-wing partners, with Gianfranco Fini, the leader of AN, commenting that Italian 
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right-wing parties never calculated that immigration could be included so successfully in 
the anti-system rubric that made up a fundamental part of the Lega’s identity.  
The second part of the Turco-Napolitano law, formulated in unison with 
numerous NGOs and the UNHCR, aimed to establish an asylum system on a par with its 
northern EU neighbours. To appease actors sympathetic to asylum seekers, the new 
asylum bill intended to extend asylum to minors and women facing persecution on 
account of their gender, as well as establishing norms for asylum seekers to access 
psychological and medical help during their application. The bill also included a number 
of EU agreements that affected national asylum law, such as the Dublin Convention. 
Significantly, asylum seekers would be provided for, according to the new law, by the 
local council for the duration of their asylum application rather than the forty-five days 
stipulated by the Martelli law, thereby bringing Italy into line with other EU 
countries.453  
In the first major senate debate on the asylum law in July 1998, the Lega 
objected to the amount of costs the bill would create for the state if it became law. The 
Alleanza Nazionale believed that the state lacked the structures necessary to enact the 
law and hence called for further debate on the bill in the autumn. Forza Italia agreed, 
stating that people in need of economic asylum rather than political asylum might take 
advantage of the law if not amended further.454 Though the first part of the Turco-
Napolitano law rapidly passed through the various official channels, the second part 
stalled in the senate because of various problems raised by the opposition. 
The government made various changes to the asylum bill in early November 
1998 to attain the necessary support from the Senate. Nevertheless, the Lega remained 
obstinate in its opposition because, in its opinion, “it will underhandedly open the doors 
to a country whose doors are already fairly open.”455 Although AN and FI voiced their 
disapproval of judging asylum applications based on the ‘socio-political’ situation in the 
asylum seekers’ country of origin,456 the law passed with almost bipartisan approval.  
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Nonetheless, the new coalition government that replaced the Prodi government 
in October 1998, led by the left-wing Massimo D’Alema, failed to enact the legislation 
thereafter. The law lingered in officialdom for the next eighteen months before Giorgio 
Napolitano, by then a member of the European parliament, attacked his own 
government’s inability to properly legislate for asylum seekers three years after he 
presented his asylum bill to parliament.457 Some months later, in October 2000, the 
UNHCR led the battle-charge against the Italian state, denouncing Italy as overseeing 
one of the worst asylum policies in the EU, berating the tiny number of refugees present 
in the country compared to other EU countries, such as Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands.458  
The government reacted by rejuvenating the asylum law previously approved by 
both houses. Because of small changes made in the intervening period, the law was 
obliged, once again, to pass through both houses of parliament. This time, much of the 
opposition to the law focused on whether those entering “clandestinely” or “illegally” 
could apply for asylum.459 Because the law was debated several weeks before the spring 
2001 general election, the positions taken by opposition parties betrayed their general 
overall stance to immigration. The AN called for further amendments to be made to the 
law because of the possibility that terrorists, “especially Islamic” terrorists, might enter 
Italy using asylum as an excuse.460 The Lega again called for a clear delineation between 
those entering clandestinely and those entering legally because of the probable criminal 
element of irregular entrants: 
 
If a person is persecuted, they can claim [asylum] at the consulate, embassy and also at 
the border of the Italian state when entering legally, citing the recognition of the right to 
asylum. Vice-versa, we would have a lot of cases of people residing clandestinely in 
Italian territory and profiting from this law to stay in Italy without claim and continuing 
maybe to commit crimes against the state and against other persons.461 
 
FI agreed that “those that enter clandestinely in Italy damage the principal [of asylum] in 
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a serious manner.”462 Nonetheless, the various amendments made to the law in the final 
debates in the chamber of deputies caused the law to pass convincingly by 197 to 92 
votes. One day later, the bill arrived in the senate. The opposition again voiced its 
opposition, with FI claiming that because of the serious changes made to the law in the 
chamber of deputies, the senate required more time to examine the modifications, “in 
particular those measures pertaining to that critical moment, amply discussed by the 
senate, relating to the conditions of the subject before claiming asylum … [and] the 
persistent connection in some concrete cases with the phenomenon of clandestine 
immigration.”463 As a consequence, the president of the senate postponed the passing of 
the law and shelved it once again with elections approaching. Accordingly, Italy’s 
asylum policy still relied on one article of the 1990 Martelli law to deal with the large 
number of people seeking asylum in Italy from the late 1990s onwards. 
  
Implementation 
Notwithstanding the failure of Italian parliament to pass specific asylum legislation, the 
‘immigration’ section of the Turco-Napolitano law did contain important provisions 
relating to all migrants arriving in Italy, including asylum seekers. The Turco-
Napolitano law led to the establishment of reception centres for migrants intercepted by 
the Italian navy and police entering Italy.464 The law created two different categories of 
centres: welcome centres (CPAs) and centres for temporary stay (CPTs). The latter’s 
function involved establishing economic migrants’ identity while the former’s role 
related to the registration of asylum seekers. After their registration, the responsibility 
for housing asylum seekers during the processing of their applications fell to the 
country’s regions and cities.465 
 Crucially for the large influx of Kurdish boat people that began to arrive on 
Italy’s southern shores from mid 1997 onwards, one provision of the Turco-Napolitano 
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law undertook to provide temporary protection for people hailing from non-EU 
countries in ‘considerable humanitarian need, because of conflicts, natural disasters or 
other events of particular seriousness’.466 Though many Kurds would receive temporary 
protection visas, the government initially assured those Kurds landing in Italy that they 
would be eligible to obtain, with preferential treatment, political asylum.467  
Italy’s treatment of Kurdish boat people perturbed the Turkish government. In a 
strongly worded letter, Ismail Cen, the Turkish Foreign Minister, spoke of his country’s 
disquiet at Italy’s stance. In his government’s opinion, the Kurds faced no human rights 
problem and hence remained ineligible from receiving political asylum. By accepting 
them, the letter outlined, the Italian government only promoted further migration by 
criminal traffickers.468 But Italy, according to the vice Prime Minister, Walter Veltroni, 
disagreed. Speaking after an EU meeting on the subject in Paris, Veltroni announced 
that “real conditions to grant political asylum existed” for the Kurds.469   
Italy’s approach to Kurdish asylum seekers met with the rapturous approval of 
the UNHCR, who termed the Italian response: “absolutely exemplary.”470 Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, considering the hostility to Italy’s asylum law in the senate, 
many of Italy’s opposition parties fully supported the government’s stand on this issue. 
Gianfranco Fini, the leader of AN, commented: “There is no doubt that those Kurds are 
a people. And there is much evidence that they have been treated as an oppressed 
people. I therefore share the decision to grant the right of asylum to those that request 
it.”471 More unexpectedly was the statement from the Lega. Wearing a t-shirt in 
parliament that read “Freedom for Kurdistan,” one Lega deputy compared the plight of 
Kurds to that of the Padanians in northern Italy, struggling to break free from the 
clutches of Italy.472 
 In mid November 1998, Italy faced another international dilemma over its 
asylum policy when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish PKK movement 
(Kurdish Workers Party), applied for political asylum in Italy. Germany and Turkey 
immediately called for Öcalan’s extradition to their own countries to face prosecution 
                                                
466
 Article 20.1, Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla 
condizione dello straniero (also known as the Turco-Napolitano law), 25 July 1998. 
467
 ‘Politico asilo per i  profughi curdi’, Corriere della sera, 31 Dec 1997. 
468
 ‘Ankara contrattacca’, La Stampa, 5 Jan 1998. 
469
 ‘Veltroni: andiamo avanti per la nostra strada’, La Repubblica, 6 Jan 1998. 
470
 ‘Kohl fa pace con l’Italia’, La Repubblica, 7 Jan 1998. 
471
 ‘Prodi: “I curdi sono perseguitati politici”’, Corriere della Sera, 8 Jan 1998. 
472
 ‘Coinvolgere anche l’Onu il problema orami e` di tutto’ La Repubblica, 9 Jan 1998. 
133 
 
for various attacks.473 Two days later, the United States advised Italy not to extend 
political asylum to the Kurdish leader.474 Contrastingly, the Lega, the Greens, the 
Refounded Communists (who subsequently revealed that one of its members brought 
Öcalan to Italy),475 and the Vatican all supported Öcalan’s application for asylum.476 
One week later, Turkey threatened Italy with an economic boycott and the 
discontinuation of all diplomatic ties with the country if Italy granted Öcalan political 
asylum.477  
 This placed Italy’s new Prime Minister, Massimo D’Alema, who replaced Prodi 
as head of the coalition government in October 1998, in a difficult situation, as his 
majority consisted of a mix of communists in favour of granting political asylum to 
Öcalan and centrist politicians who considered Öcalan a terrorist. In addition, Turkey 
and other countries exerted considerable pressure on Italy. D’Alema refused to extradite 
Öcalan to Turkey or Germany on condition that he left Italy voluntarily. On 18 January 
1999, eight million viewers tuned in to watch the departure of Öcalan from Italy.478  
One month later, Turkish secret forces captured Öcalan in Kenya and returned 
him to Turkey to face trial. A Turkish court subsequently sentenced him to death, 
although the country’s abolishment of the death penalty in 2002 meant his execution 
never took place. In October 1999, Rome judges granted Öcalan asylum in absentia 
(Öcalan’s lawyer made an appeal to the court before he abandoned Italy) on the grounds 
that Turkey failed to guarantee fundamental liberties to the Kurdish leader.479  
Nationals of various countries, not just Kurds, began to arrive by boat during the 
late 1990s in search of asylum. Of the almost 1,000 boat people to arrive in southern 
Italy in a forty-eight hour period in mid January 1999, Kosovars made up a majority and 
Kurds a minority.480 This pattern intensified further over the forthcoming months as 
thousands of fleeing Kosovars sought protection in Italy. 
Italy accepted Kosovar asylum seekers with great hospitality following the new 
Interior Minister’s trip to Kosovar refugee camps in March 1999. After witnessing for 
herself the Kosovars’ situation, Rosa Russo Jervolino pleaded for Italians to empathise 
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with the Kosovars’ plight: “I have witnessed terrible scenes of people who have lost 
their families; they must move the conscience of Italians.”481 One week later, Italy 
pledged large financial support to the UNHCR for the upkeep of refugee camps, with the 
head of the UNHCR terming the Italian donation “the most passionate and the largest 
compared to other countries.”482 Italy also undertook to temporarily house 10,000 
Kosovar refugees in ex-air bases in the country as part of the international effort to help 
Kosovar refugees fleeing the NATO bombing of the region.483 The Italian government 
approved a special decree to provide Kosovars with temporary humanitarian protection 
visas entitling recipients to work and study until 31 December 1999.484 
In addition to Italy’s pledge to house thousands of Kosovars, boats continued to 
arrive with thousands of additional Kosovars applying for asylum in subsequent 
months.485 By the end of June 1999, the makeup of those fleeing from Kosovo changed 
somewhat, with Serbs and, in particular, Roma fleeing threats of retaliation from 
returning Kosovars. Italy declared on 21 July 1999 that all boat people hailing from 
Kosovo would be classified as ‘clandestines’ from then onwards rather than asylum 
seekers or refugees.486 This abrupt about-face turn demonstrated the subjective nature of 
Italy’s asylum policy. The UNHCR responded by stating: “An automatic rejection of 
refugees would violate international rights and Italian law. It’s necessary to guarantee 
the individual examination of the circumstances of each asylum seeker.” Amnesty 
International, the Greens, the Refounded Communists and religious groups all joined in 
to criticise this new government stance.487 One Roma asylum seeker wondered whether 
this change was as a result of discrimination towards Roma: 
 
According to you the war is finished there? We escaped because we wanted to? We are 
second- or third-class refugees, while Kosovars were first category [refugees]? Why 
can’t we claim political asylum? Why doesn’t NATO intervene for us and for all the 
other ethnic minorities that the Albanians are expelling from Kosovo?488 
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Italy originally offered hospitality, assistance and support to Kosovars arriving in Italy, 
who it denoted as deserving refugees. Several months later, Italy labelled Kosovars 
arriving by boat “clandestines” undeserving of Italian help. This turnaround exemplified 
the contradictory nature of an Italian asylum policy dictated by whims rather than by 
specific norms; a trend symbolised by the country’s failure to insert proper asylum 
legislation. 
 
Effects 
The amount of welfare aid asylum seekers received remained minimal because of the 
failure of the Italian government to enact asylum legislation assuring provisions for 
asylum seekers for the duration of their application. Consequently, asylum seekers 
received a state contribution for only forty-five days, despite asylum applications 
frequently taking over one year to process.  Accordingly, Italy remained a country of 
transit for many asylum seekers rather than a country of protection. As one UNHCR 
representative explained:   
 
It’s a comprehensible phenomenon. In Italy a person that makes a request for asylum 
must wait 13-14 months before they are recognised as refugees. In the meantime, 
according to the law, they don’t have the right to work and the state gives them an 
allowance of 34 million lira [EUR 17.56] a day, but only for a maximum of 45 days.489 
 
Kurds and Kosovars remained most prominent amongst those asylum seekers in transit. 
Italy’s enactment of the Schengen accords in Italy in late 1997 greatly facilitated their 
onward voyage north.  
Governing and opposition German political parties lined up to criticise Italy’s 
failure to stem the flow of Kurds moving further north, with the opposition SDP 
complaining in early January 1998:  
 
Italy behaves like no other country in the western world: it tolerates organised gangs 
exploiting the destiny of unfortunate people to make money, and the political, social and 
financial consequences of this traffic fall back on the populations of other countries. In 
other words: the norms of Schengen entered into force too early maybe, for a country 
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that is not able to respect them.490 
 
The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, also made it clear that Italy had to “stop 
the activity of traffickers” and operate “tight controls over the EU’s external borders.”491 
Germany’s contrite remarks over Italy’s inability to control its borders appeared 
comprehensible, considering the failure of large sections of Kurds and Kosovars to 
attend asylum hearings because of their presumed onward migration further north.492 Of 
the 8,330 asylum seekers from 1999 called to interview by the national commission in 
charge of processing asylum applications, 6,000 failed to appear.493 This trend continued 
into the 2000s, exemplified by the discovery of large groups of Kurdish asylum seekers 
in trucks bound for Germany and at the French border.494 
Calvita notes that many of the intentions of the Turco-Napolitano law appeared 
genuinely understanding of immigrants’ plight. Nevertheless, its enforcement remained 
highly problematic.495 The treatment of hundreds of asylum seekers forced to live on 
Italy’s streets or in self-made shanty structures exemplified this. The state maintained 
that the responsibility for providing appropriate provisions for asylum seekers rested 
with the regions; yet the state provided no funds for such a requirement, demonstrating 
the local-national dichotomy. National intransigence often led to local problems that 
Italy’s regional and city councils floundered to resolve. 
By mid 2000 in Rome, for example, approximately 100 Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers lived in a self-made shack in Colle Oppio Park, next to the Coliseum, because of 
a lack of sufficient accommodation for asylum seekers. Most of the Iraqi Kurds slept on 
a communal carpet in the park and washed themselves in a nearby fountain. Religious 
organisations, unable to house them, brought them food every day.496 A similar story 
emerged in December 2000 when an African journalist fleeing his home country had to 
live on the streets of Bologna because the city only had limited numbers of places for 
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those seeking protection.497  
  In an attempt to address this problem the interior ministry, the UNHCR and 
Italy’s regions launched a National Programme for Asylum (Programma Nazionale 
Asilo) in March 2001. This followed an initiative set up by a group of Italian NGOs and 
other non-state groups in mid 1999 called Communal Action (Azione Commune). It 
aimed to alleviate the plight facing the large numbers of Kosovars who arrived in the 
country towards the end of the decade and succeeded in gaining funding from the 
European Commission for its work with Kosovars. The following year, it extended its 
brief to include all asylum seekers, and not just those from Kosovo. The Consiglio 
Italiano per i Rifugiati headed the group, with the religious NGO Caritas and the secular 
NGO Consorzio Italiano di Solidarieta` (ICS) to the fore – the latter of which was set up 
in 1993 to help refugees escaping the war in the former Yugoslavia. Other important 
members included workers groups, such as the Associazioni Cristiane Lavoratori 
Italiano (ACLI), trade unions, such as the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori 
(CISL), various branches of the leftist NGO, Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale 
Italiana (ARCI) and the religious NGO, the Federazione delle chiese evangeliche in 
Italia (FCEI). 498  
  The National Programme for Asylum endeavoured to establish sufficient 
accommodation to shelter asylum seekers in certain regions and cities. In Milan the 
council opened a refurbished centre to look after migrants who received temporary 
humanitarian visas. Puglia also launched a new centre to house 30 asylum seekers and 
Rome dedicated a new centre to housing 120 asylum seekers.499 But because asylum 
applications increased enormously in 1999, these centres only managed to accommodate 
a small fraction of those arriving.500  
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Source: Commissione Centrale per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato (Commissione nazionale per 
il diritto d'asilo) 501 
 
In 1998, for example, over 11,000 applied for asylum. Compared with only two years 
before, when just 675 applied, this represented a remarkable increase. Numbers rose 
again the following year as 1999 saw applications peak to a level of over 33,000 in the 
wake of the Nato bombing of Kosovo. Although this number declined in 2000, 
approximately 15,000 still made applications. 
 
3.5 Anti-Immigrant Politics, 2001-2008 
 
In the run-up to the 2001 general election, the Lega and AN frequently focused on 
immigrants’ apparent criminality. Both parties called for a rethink of the Turco-
Napolitano law to address and tackle this problem. Nevertheless, a considerable 
difference in the language used by both parties became apparent. Because AN’s 
electoral base sat in the south and centre of the country, where the Lega had little or no 
support, AN rarely competed for votes with FI on the issue.502 Nevertheless, AN’s focus 
on security issues often led to loaded comments regarding the physical threat posed to 
citizens by foreigners.  
In addition to focusing on immigrants’ supposed criminality, the Lega also 
highlighted the perceived misappropriation of local resources by immigrants at the 
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expense of natives. Nothing highlighted the twin-pronged approach, emphasising the 
economic and physical threat immigrants represented, more than the Lega’s mouthpiece, 
the Padania newspaper. Headlines frequently depicted immigrants as a danger from 
which northern Italians needed protection: ‘State of siege, and now to defend ourselves’; 
‘Houses, first nomads’; and, ‘Curfews for immigrants’ all coming from one page of the 
newspaper.503  
 
Formation 
The Lega regularly made anti-immigrant comments before the late 1990s. Nonetheless, 
its relatively conciliatory involvement in negotiations over immigration with the 
predominantly centre-left technocrat Dini administration in the mid 1990s meant that the 
party’s later stance on immigration came as a shock to other parties. The Lega’s decision 
to exclude itself from all other alliances from 1996 to 2000 – when they unsuccessfully 
pressed for secession – saw their views on immigration harden. Throughout the early 
and mid 1990s, the Lega’s hostility to immigrants had been based on the belief that they, 
in a similar manner to southern Italians, received state benefits that came out of hard-
working northerners’ pockets, without paying their dues to society in return.504 When 
the Lega returned to national Italian politics in 1999 following their self-imposed exile 
and secessionist attempts, their antagonism towards immigrants took on another 
dimension. In Thomas Gold’s opinion, anti-immigrant rhetoric actually came to replace 
the ultimately futile previous efforts at secession in the Lega’s lexicology.505 The Lega 
characterised immigrants as physically dangerous criminals intent on disrupting the 
social order. Umberto Bossi, the Lega’s authoritarian leader, claimed that immigrants 
had taken over northern Italy, bringing with them crime, prostitution and incompatible 
religions.506  
The criminalisation of immigrants in Italy became the subject of serious political 
debate from the mid 1990s onwards. The presence of rising numbers of foreigners in the 
Italian prison system –16 per cent of the total prison population in 1991 and 28 per cent 
of the total by 1996 – meant that emphasising the criminality of immigrants was 
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frequently met with a receptive audience.507 The media often confirmed political parties’ 
attempts to cement the link between a perceived rise in crime and a noticeable increase 
in immigration rather than negate or explain it. Indeed, newspapers regularly reported 
crimes involving immigrants by highlighting the protagonists’ foreignness and 
emphasising their nationality or their broad geographical origin (sometimes mistakenly 
as it so happened, such as wrongly terming Albanians as Slavs). The supposition that the 
increase in immigration resulted in more crime appeared to have much sustenance in 
public debate and opinion. Of those polled at the end of 1999, for instance, 73.5 per cent 
believed that the presence of immigrants had increased general delinquency.508 This 
seemed to mirror what Diamanti and Bordignon concluded: people saw immigration in 
the late 1990s as a negative development and frequently linked it with criminality at a 
time when personal safety became a particularly relevant issue for Italians.509Asylum 
seekers failed to escape the perceived link between immigrants and criminality, 
especially those coming by boat, By contrast, the involvement of various mafias – 
Italian and non-Italian – in bringing boat people to Italy helped to emphasise this link. 
Moreover, because of the failure of the Italian state to adequately differentiate between 
asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, commentators consistently termed boat 
people “clandestines,” which carried a connotation of illegality.510 One noted 
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commentator, Miriam Mafai, explained Italians’ fear of immigrants when she wrote:  
 
On the theme of security and immigration (the two problems frequently seem to 
overlap) we all suffer from a singular distorted view of reality. We are convinced that 
we live in an insecure country, in a sort of Bronx …  The official numbers state that it is 
not like that … [But] [t]he official figures don’t reassure us, not even the increase of 
police on the streets assures us. We feel in danger. …  Our schizophrenia is 
unfortunately being fermented by the schizophrenic analogies communicated by our 
ruling classes.511  
 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party retained its rather aloof position on the 
subject of immigration in the run up to the 2001 election;512 although its focus on 
security did contribute to further negative stereotyping of immigrants by constantly 
linking them with criminality. Furthermore, Forza Italia rarely if ever criticised the 
opinions put forward on immigrants by its coalition partners in the self-proclaimed Casa 
della Liberta, made up of FI, AN, the Lega, the last remnants of the Christian Democrats 
and various smaller parties. Indeed, the perceived failings of the Turco-Napolitano law 
became a central issue in the run up to the 2001 election, with all three main opposition 
parties promising to replace it with more effective anti-immigrant legislation if elected. 
Although the Lega only received approximately four per cent of the national vote – 
down from ten per cent in 1996 – it experienced a considerable rise in its political 
influence on account of a pre-election pact done between Berlusconi and Bossi that 
attributed a certain number of ministerial positions to the Lega. The aforementioned 
coalition went on to become Italy’s longest-serving post Second World War 
government, remaining in power from mid 2001 to mid 2006. 
Most of the asylum seekers who came to Italy in the 1990s originated primarily 
from the former communist European states, and particularly the Balkans, but by the 
early 2000s a shift occurred in the origin of boat people, with many coming from Africa 
– in particular, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Liberia – and Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries, such as Kurdish Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Though the 
nationality of the boat people’s changed, Italy’s asylum policy remained remarkably 
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static with the government consistently dedicating emergency measures to temporarily 
stemming the flow of migrants in place of a structured asylum system symbolised by a 
definitive asylum law. The most vocal opposition to these moves came not from the 
opposition Left but from NGOs. 
In 1959, the UNHCR noted that most of the NGOs dealing with those in need of 
asylum in Italy represented international organisations, such as the World Council of 
Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee and the International Rescue 
Organisation. By the early 1990s, the number of NGOs – Italian and international – 
dealing with asylum seekers and migrants in Italy had risen considerably. A study by 
OECD, published in 1993, found that Italy had forty-six NGOs that concentrated on 
issues related to human rights, refugees, migration and development.513 In 2008, the 
association of NGOs in Italy recorded that it had over 160 member NGOs, of whom 
many dealt with issues relating to asylum. These sympathetic actors, of which secular 
and religious NGOs, international organisations and the Catholic Church were most 
prominent, referenced humanitarian ideals, national commitments to human rights and 
the rule of law to promote a more generous understanding of the plight facing asylum 
seekers. They faced overwhelming odds, however. 
 
Implementation 
When over 900 Iraqi Kurds arrived on Italy’s southern shores in March 2002, the new 
Forza Italia Minister of the Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu, responded by immediately 
declaring a state of emergency against what he termed “clandestine migration,” thereby 
conflating the issue of asylum with illegality.514 The Italian government’s appeals to its 
fellow EU members to reduce the amount of boats because of their supposed criminal 
links compounded this further. Claudio Scajola, the Italian Minister for the Interior, 
amply demonstrated this correlation of boat people with criminality when seeking EU 
help in fighting boat people: 
 
We are the country most exposed to maritime immigration that, along with bringing a 
large number of desperate people to our shores, also brings with it criminal elements, 
human and even organ trafficking. The sea borders can’t be left only to Italy. The 
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government has put into action various counteractions. But these are very weak if they 
are not divided amongst other members of the [European] Union […].515 
 
Over the next year, the government attributed primary responsibility for guarding the 
Italian coast to the Italian navy rather than the police, as before. The government 
stepped up spending on coastal surveillance considerably, from EUR63 million in 2002 
to EUR164 million in 2003.516  
The Lega opposed all boat people regardless of whether they escaped from a war 
or arrived in search of work. In response to the prospect of refugees fleeing the 
impending war in Iraq, the leader of the Lega, Umberto Bossi, made his stance clear: 
“We do not want refugees. They should stay in their own homeland.”517 In June 2003, 
Bossi denounced his own government’s slow response to halting the flow of boat people 
by calling for the use of force: “At the second or third warning, boom, fire the canon. 
Without beating around the bush. The canon will stop anybody. Otherwise we’ll never 
finish with them.” 518 
In that same summer, various EU talks focused on the possibility of externalising 
asylum policy to outside the EU, with Tony Blair suggesting the introduction of transit 
camps in the Ukraine, Albania and Morocco to process asylum claims.519 Although 
several EU countries’ opposition scuppered the proposal, Italy had already made the first 
steps to initiating an agreement with a neighbouring non-EU country in relation to 
migrants. In late June 2003, Italy’s Interior Minister, Giuseppe Pisanu, flew to Tripoli to 
meet the Libyan President, Muhammar Gheddafi, for talks on the initiation of a policy 
designed to decrease the number of boats coming from Libya to Italy. Such an initiative 
appeared to receive backing from Europe, with the President of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi, ringing Gheddafi personally to speak about the proposed 
agreement.520 Nonetheless, it took one year for Italy and Libya to finalise a deal on 
migration. In the interim, Italy also struck up bilateral agreements with Tunisia, Turkey 
and Egypt to enable it to repatriate irregular migrants coming from these countries. The 
agreement with Libya, in exchange for Italian help ending the EU blockade of Libya – 
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in place since the 1986 Lockerbie disaster –  and other unspecified rewards proved the 
most controversial, however. As part of the deal, Libya agreed to accept all migrants that 
disembarked from Libya, from where they would be repatriated home.521 
The head of Caritas Italia, Monsignor Franco Anfossi, had stridently opposed 
moves by the centre-right coalition to bring forward measures to stop all boat people as 
early as January 2003, stating they “did not distinguish between those that entered Italy 
clandestinely from those that entered to request asylum. They are driving out all of 
them.  And that, for a victim of persecution, can also mean the death sentence. A 
prospect that a civil country could not allow.”522 The initiation of the Italy-Libya deal 
took place in late September-early October 2004, when Italian authorities transported 
over 1,400 recently-arrived boat people from Lampedusa to Libya only days after their 
disembarkation, 523 exacerbated sympathisers further, causing consternation amongst 
NGOs, international organisations and opposition political parties.  
Much of the sympathisers’ resistance centred on Libya’s continuing failure to 
sign the Geneva Convention and Italy’s repatriation of migrants without clear access to 
proper asylum procedures. The Italian representation of Medicins sans Frontieres 
summarised much of the hostility to new developments:  
 
We run the risk of sending men and women back to countries where they were fleeing 
persecution and massacres. For that reasons, the procedure used by the government is 
serious, especially from a humanitarian point of view, even more than a judicial one. … 
Flying migrants to Libya before identifying them is unacceptable. 524  
 
The main opposition party, Democratici di Sinistra – PDS’s successor – also voiced its 
concerns: “We are worried for the right to political asylum contained in the Geneva 
Convention. We don’t know if the people arriving in these last days at Lampedusa had 
the possibility to at least present a request for asylum, having seen the short amount of 
time taken to repatriate them.”525 The UNHCR vehemently criticised the measure, citing 
the Libyan state’s treatment of 75 Eritrean asylum seekers repatriated from the country 
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at the end of August 2004: 
 
An airplane with 75 Eritreans onboard was sent back to its native land, violating the 
principle of never sending refugees in danger back to their country of origin. Fifteen of 
these diverted the airplane so that it landed at Khartoum where they asked for our 
intervention. We listened to them separately, all of whom recounted to us that they were 
held for long periods in detention in Libya, without any charge [senza alcun capo di 
imputazione], and were subject to violence, had appealed for the right to asylum and had 
requested to talk to us [UNHCR], without any results. This leaves us to understand that 
there is an alarming situation in the country, confirmed by the claims [segnalazioni] of 
Amnesty International and by the fact Libya has still not signed the Geneva 
Convention.526 
 
The Italian government countered these criticisms by maintaining its actions 
corresponded to all national and international norms.527 Crucially, the EU mutely 
supported the Italian government’s measures.528 Brussels only changed its attitude six 
months later after sustained and renewed appeals from Amnesty International and the 
UNHCR relating to Italy’s policies of mass expulsions. The EU commissioner for 
Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, warned that Italy must “guarantee to all 
the right to present an asylum application and cannot expel these people if a decision has 
not yet been taken.” 529 Though Italy’s Interior Minister, Pisanu, promised Frattini a full 
report detailing the treatment of recently repatriated boat people, one week earlier he 
had responded less sympathetically to further criticism of Italy’s agreement with Libya 
by Amnesty and UNHCR by warning: “Who washes their own mouth by declaiming 
problems should respect those who try to resolve them. Defining the individual rejection 
of clandestine immigrants at the border as deportations is an insult to the truth.”530  
Several weeks after this episode, Italy came in for further criticism following a 
resolution from the European Parliament that called on Italy to ‘refrain from collective 
expulsions of asylum seekers and 'irregular migrants' to Libya as well as to other 
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countries and to guarantee that requests for asylum are examined individually and the 
principle of non refoulement adhered to’. It also chided Italy for violating the principle 
of non refoulement by declaring they had ‘failed to meet their international obligations 
by not ensuring that the lives of the people expelled by them are not threatened in their 
countries of origin’.531  One month later, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
ruled that Italy suspend the repatriation of several individuals because of the inadequate 
response of Italian authorities to its queries regarding the identification, treatment and 
grounds under which Italy repatriated these migrants to Libya.532 Several weeks later, 
the Council of Europe visited Italy to monitor its repatriation procedures. It found Italy’s 
actions lacking on several fronts, especially that of asylum: 
 
By failing to give aliens practical access to asylum procedures, Italy is indirectly 
violating the principle of non-return, and leaving a state, which is non-democratic and 
also unwilling to commit itself to respecting international refugee law, to determine the 
fate of people who may qualify for asylum or face violation of their most fundamental 
rights.533 
 
 In addition to receiving criticism directed at Italy’s decision to return thousands 
of immigrants to Libya, Italian policies on the treatment of asylum seekers already in 
Italy began to gain domestic and international attention. As part of the proposed Bossi-
Fini law, which sought to amend the Turco-Napolitano law, asylum seekers were to 
remain in centres (CPTAs) during the processing of their applications.534 Furthermore, 
rejected asylum seekers could be deported even if their claim was subject to court 
appeal. This provoked considerable unrest amongst sympathetic actors, who appealed to 
the Italian Constitutional Court. Up until then, the Italian Constitutional Court remained 
largely aloof from intervening in immigration-related policy issues. On this occasion, 
however, it ruled that the government’s policy was unconstitutional, prompting a 
significant setback for the Bossi-Fini law in the process.535 The treatment of migrants – 
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both asylum seekers and economic migrants – in these centres became the source of 
much scrutiny over subsequent years.  
 
Effects 
In July 2002, a visit by various Refounded Communist members to Lampedusa revealed 
the terrible conditions migrants often had to endure. Previously, the Italian Red Cross 
had run the centre, with 24 volunteers and an interpreter. Each migrant received a 
hygiene kit, two packs of cigarettes a week and a telephone card. But by the summer of 
2002, most of these benefits disappeared when duties became entrusted to forty Italian 
police officers that the government deployed to the centre. Though the capacity of the 
centre numbered 86, the Refounded Communist members encountered 197 migrants. 
Conditions, according to the visiting deputies, resembled that of a “real concentration 
camp”: 
 
Conditions in the camp are absolutely unacceptable for a civilised country. It’s missing 
everything. But the worst thing is the absence of an interpreter, which deprives 
immigrants of adequate assistance and knowledge of their rights. A lot of them, fleeing 
from countries devastated by war, for example, cannot avail themselves of the 
possibility to request political asylum.536 
 
Little over one week later, the head of a prominent religious NGO, Pax Christi, outlined 
similar problems when describing the centres as prisons, where “any glimmer of 
humanity is banished” and migrants “are not considered persons.”537 After one visit to 
Agrigento’s CPT, one Refounded Communist member of the Sicily regional council 
called for all similar centres to be closed down. In his words, “it is embarrassing; this 
industrial shed, in its current state, is not suitable for human beings.”538 Caritas also 
announced its opposition to the holding centres in early January 2003.539 In the summer 
of that same year, forty police officers presented medical certificates demonstrating their 
inability to work at the centre situated in Palese, Bari. A representative from the police 
officers’ union explained: “The welcome centres are concentration camps where the 
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police work in inhuman, slave-like conditions.”540 But at least the police officers got to 
go home – unlike the migrants. 
 One year later, in the summer of 2004, one Italian journalist succeeded in 
passing himself off as a Kurdish asylum seeker washed up on the Lampedusa shore. 
During his eight days in the migration centre on the island, he recorded the physical and 
psychological abuse of immigrants by certain guards (including having to line up for 
what he describes as a “Fascist parade”), the unsanitary conditions migrants encountered 
during their stay (such as the presence of raw sewage in the camp) and the lack of space 
available for sleep and rest.541 He also illuminated the uncertain nature of the asylum 
system when officers transported him to the Sicilian mainland after one week in 
Lampedusa, where he received a free train ticket along with a number of others before 
being told that he had five days to leave the country.542   
The continuous arrival of boat people to Italy resulted in the release of many 
asylum seekers from these centres after several days or weeks before the termination of 
their asylum application. Many of these encountered serious accommodation problems 
when awaiting the outcome of their asylum applications, especially after the reduction in 
funding for the National Asylum Programme (from then on known as the Protection 
System for asylum seekers and refugees) in the autumn of 2002. Similarly, Berlusconi’s 
government discontinued the work of the National Commission for the Politics of 
Integration of Immigrants (Commissione nazionale per le politiche di integrazione degli 
immigrati), a study group set up in the late 1990s to produce annual reports on migrant 
integration. In the absence of national integration plans, it was left to the regional and 
city councils to create positive relations between migrants and locals on already 
stretched budgets.543   
Despite various changes in Italy’s asylum policy, many asylum seekers 
eventually received some form of protection, especially from 2003 onwards when a 
large increase occurred in the amount of humanitarian protection visas distributed.  
 
3.5 Decisions on Asylum Applications in Italy, 2001-2005 
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Year 
Asylum 
applications  
Applications 
examined 
 
Decisions 
 
Refugee Status 
Negative but with 
Humanitarian 
protection visa 
Negative without 
protection visa 
 
2001  9.620 13.219 2.102 564 10.553 
2002  16.015 14.713 1.121 704 12.888 
2003  13.455 13.428 726 2.181 10.501 
2004  9.722 8.701 780 2.352 5.569 (2627 were 
untraceable 
2005  9.346  14.439  907  4.375 9.157 (3587 were 
untraceable) 
Source: Central Commission for the recognition of refugee status (known as the National Commission for 
the Right of Asylum since 2004)544 
 
But Italy offered little else to these people in terms of welfare or sustenance, thereby 
forcing many to live in squalid conditions and eke out an irregular existence.  
One newspaper report similarly told of 36 Congolese, Sierra Leone and Liberian 
asylum seekers who lived on the Rome streets because of a lack of suitable 
accommodation.545 Moreover, a lack of accommodation meant that many asylum 
seekers ran the risk of becoming untraceable in the event of the communication of a 
decision regarding their refugee status, illustrated by the account of one Somali asylum 
seeker, Hassan Nagi, living in Puglia. Nagi arrived in Otranto, southern Italy, on board a 
boat with Pakistanis, Kurds, Sudanese and Liberians. Placed in a local CPA, authorities 
reassured him that his asylum application would be evaluated in a few weeks. After one 
month inside the ‘Lorizzonte’ CPA, however, he had heard no news. Yet, he was given a 
temporary permission visa and, in his own words, “left on the street.” Though the law 
barred asylum seekers from working or studying, the lack of any available 
accommodation centre for Nagi meant he had to find a viable alternative. For EUR8 a 
day, Nagi found work as a farm hand. He lived beside the stables along with two men, 
one from Sudan and another from Palestine. In addition to his petty pay packet, the 
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farmer and his family provided clothes, food and cigarettes.546 
 To reduce the pressure on the country’s asylum system, the Italian government 
instigated new measures to accelerate the asylum process. Regional committees replaced 
the national committee that dealt with asylum applications and the government proposed 
that asylum applications would only take 20 days to process rather than the long periods 
that had exasperated the system.547 After the approval of these changes in the summer of 
2004, the UNHCR appeared supportive but sceptical and highlighted once more the lack 
of any tangible asylum law in Italy.548 The UNHCR’s scepticism proved warranted; 
several months later, asylum requests still took much longer than twenty days to process. 
In October 2004 one Milan NGO lamented the long delays in processing applications 
and outlined the problems this led to, recounting the amount of asylum seekers forced to 
sleep in abandoned buildings and on the streets because of a lack of viable alternatives. 
Perhaps the most infamous example of such problems became known as ‘Hotel Africa’, 
located in a disused shed with no electricity or running water, which previously 
belonged to the national train network, situated near Rome’s Tiburtina train station. 
Occupied from 1999 onwards, the settlement originally housed three to four hundred 
asylum seekers from various countries, especially Albania, Kosovo and Sudan, 
according to one newspaper article in October 2002.549 By early 2004, most of the 
people inhabiting the building were asylum seekers and refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and Sudan, generating the misleading name ‘Hotel Africa’ that many of the inhabitants 
took issue with. As one Sudanese asylum seeker explained, “Everyone knows Tiburtina 
as Hotel Africa but we who live here don’t like the name. We don’t like it because you 
can’t call a place a hotel where there’s no light, no water, no good air. Tiburtina is not a 
hotel and it’s not Africa either, it’s Italy.”550 Nonetheless, the same asylum seeker 
explained that Tiburtina filled a vital role by providing shelter for “[t]hose just after 
arriving, for those who can’t find a place in the welcome centres and for those living on 
the streets.”551 There appeared to be a vital sense of community in the settlement, with 
one asylum seeker explaining to an Italian researcher:  
 
When I arrive here I find people, they say hello to me, you are Sudanese, only this 
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counts. All come and bring me things reserved for guests, eat, drink, they ask me how I 
feel, how I came, where I came from, what problems I met, they allow me into their 
circle so that I do not feel that I am an outsider, as if I had known them for a long time. I 
ask information to know whether I should stay or go to another country. I ask how the 
situation is here. They give me all the information: police, school, the public mess, the 
reception centre, work possibilities. If I want to leave they give me information about 
how to go away.552  
 
In August 2004, the Rome council transferred all of the settlement’s inhabitants 
to a number of welcome centres around the city in what Alessandro Triulz has termed a 
reaction to the increase of newspaper interest in the settlement.553 But two months later, 
reiterating the difficulty Italy continued to incur when housing asylum seekers, 150 
Eritreans occupied a disused schoolhouse to protest at conditions in their welcome 
centre, which they deemed worse than ‘Hotel Africa’: “There are six of us living in one 
room, we can’t cook and we only have two toilets for twenty people. We came to Italy 
in search of liberty and instead we have finished in prison.”554  
The return of a centre-left coalition to government in April 2006 led to a slight 
softening of Italy’s approach to asylum seekers for a short period of time. In September 
2006, for example, the government ruled that asylum seekers had permission to stay in 
Italy until they had exhausted all appeal avenues, thereby bringing the country into line 
with existing EU norms.555 Nonetheless, the government failed to tackle the appalling 
conditions asylum seekers faced when seeking accommodation during their asylum 
applications. Instead, the Left remained intent on showing voters that it, too, had the 
potential to clamp down on migrants and asylum seekers if necessary.  
In a sign of the focus perceived immigrant crime would play in the 2008 general 
election debate, the centre-left government issued an emergency decree to remove EU 
citizens perceived to represent a public threat after the violent rape and murder of an 
Italian woman by a Romanian Roma on the outskirts of Rome in October 2007.556 In the 
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2008 general elections, the right-wing coalition returned to power on a wave of anti-
immigrant sentiment aimed especially at Roma and their small camps dotted around the 
country. In many cases, these camps housed Roma asylum seekers and refugees who 
received little or no state support. The Catholic Church condemned the xenophobic 
nature of the Lega and AN’s pre- and post-election rhetoric towards Roma but its 
influence had shrunk somewhat because the descendant party of the Christian 
Democrats, the UDC, remained outside of the right-wing coalition; unlike between 2001 
and 2006. Symbolising the increase in Italy’s anti-immigrant measures, the country’s 
navy began to intercept and return boat people to Libya in May 2009 without screening 
them first for asylum, in a move that provoked the wrath of several human rights NGOs 
and the UNHCR.557 Although the European Commission later questioned Italy’s 
tactics,558 the exercise served to give the Italian public the impression that the 
government remained strong in the face of immigration; even though the reality was that 
boat people only represented a small fraction of irregular migrants staying in Italy.559  
 
Conclusion 
 
Contradicting government rhetoric has symbolised the official reaction to asylum 
seekers since 1989. In twenty years, the country failed to adapt a proper asylum system 
on a par with most of their fellow EU member states. Instead, successive Italian 
governments from the Right and the Left have reacted to asylum seekers by announcing 
a series of emergencies. Because of the maligned treatment of asylum seekers in Italy, 
many potential asylum seekers deferred from applying for asylum on reaching Italy and 
instead emerged in the large amnesties that periodically took place in the country since 
1986. Others migrated further north to search for a more regular lifestyle or to join loved 
ones. The story of Italy’s asylum system is thus linked with Italy’s inability to cope with 
its recent migrant influx. Due to the absence of a fixed asylum system, asylum 
represented less of an issue in Italy than many other western countries. Consequently, 
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many of the problems associated with asylum in other countries appeared in more 
general debates concerning immigration in Italy.  
Sceptics, including many of Italy’s political parties from the Left and the Right 
but most especially the Lega and AN, often cited economic factors, state sovereignty 
and public security in order to justify treating migrants and asylum seekers with disdain, 
intolerance and callousness. This met with much resonance from large sections of the 
public and the media. Despite their size and power, however, these sceptical actors 
frequently failed to successively apply restrictive measures to asylum seekers. The 
country’s geographic location, its porous borders (spanning over 7000kms of coastline), 
and the influence of powerful sympathetic actors, such as the Catholic Church and well-
organised NGOs, contributed to the sizeable difference that remained between the 
rhetoric of sceptics and their success at implementing restrictive migration policies. 
Until the mid 2000s, most migrants who entered Italy managed to migrate further north, 
out of Italy. But Italy’s northerly neighbours, in the meantime, managed to slow the flow 
of migrants travelling from the EU’s entry countries, such as Italy and Greece, to more 
northerly destinations. This led to a sustained rise to the number of people seeking 
asylum in Italy (see p. 231), at a time when asylum figures continued to drop in fellow 
EU member states.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Asylum in Ireland: From Empathy to Enmity? 
 
“Céad míle fáilte” 
“A hundred thousand welcomes” (traditional Irish phrase) 
 
In the mid-nineteenth century the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass marvelled at the 
reception he received when he travelled around Ireland attempting to garner support for 
the abolition of slavery in the United States. He wrote home to a friend that ‘I find 
myself not treated as a colour, but as a man – not as a thing, but as a child of the 
common Father of us all’.560 A mixture of poverty, political persecution and the general 
desire ‘to better themselves in material respects’561 had caused millions of Irish people 
to emigrate over the centuries. For this reason, the Irish felt that they could relate to the 
oppressed and the hungry everywhere because of their own history, as Douglass 
experienced. By the 1980s, this trait was still conspicuous, with Bob Geldof asserting 
that the Irish donated the most, per capita, to his 1985 Live Aid project to raise funds to 
help victims of the Ethiopian famine, notwithstanding the country’s considerable 
economic difficulties at the time. In the words of one character from Roddy Doyle’s 
1987 novel, The Commitments, it was simple: The Irish were the Blacks of Europe.562  
Yet, despite the manifest benevolence noted by Douglass in nineteenth century 
Ireland, he also alluded to the racist attitudes of the Irish living in America in the 
nineteenth century: ‘The Irish, who at home, readily sympathise with the oppressed 
everywhere, are instantly taught when they step upon our soil to hate and despise the 
Negro.’563 During the nineteenth century, the turn towards a nationalism that promoted 
Catholic ‘Irish-Ireland’ also led to the discrimination of people that happened to be in 
any way different, be they Protestant, Jewish or Traveller.564 
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This chapter seeks to examine whether Douglass’ observations of the Irish in the 
nineteenth century provide a fitting platform with which to discuss the arrival of 
thousands of asylum seekers in Ireland after 1989. Was the Irish response one of enmity 
or empathy? To achieve such a goal, this chapter will be divided into a number of 
sections. First, Ireland’s migration history will be surveyed including the country’s well 
known emigrant past, but also the virtually unknown history of immigration. Both of 
these sections will evaluate the two tendencies that are commonly found among Irish 
responses to asylum seekers: on the one hand, understanding and compassion due to 
their emigrant past and, on the other hand, intolerance and narrow-mindedness on 
account of Ireland’s perceived homogeneity. Following on from this, different sections, 
organised chronologically, investigate Ireland’s reaction to the large increase in people 
seeking asylum in the country after 1989. In line with the other case studies, elections 
and legal changes will provide the backdrop for many of the debates on the subject of 
asylum seekers analysed in the present chapter. 
 
4.1 Asylum in Ireland before 1989 
 
Most countries send out oil, iron, steel or gold, some other crops, but Ireland has only 
one export and that is people.565    
John F. Kennedy (June 1963) 
 
Actors sympathetic to asylum seekers after 1989 have regularly framed their appeals in 
the context of Ireland’s emigration history by asking the public and politicians to look 
kindly on the large number of asylum seekers that came to the country because of the 
resonance it retained in a society where everyone had friends or family members living 
abroad. Given that Ireland produced a considerable number of political refugees in its 
pre-independence past, it was often claimed that the country possessed a duty to 
welcome people escaping persecution. To give an indication of why references to the 
past retained such prominence in Irish society, the following section will briefly describe 
the huge number of people that left the island.  
Kerby Miller has estimated that from the early seventeenth century to the 
establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, as many as 7 million people emigrated 
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from Ireland to North America.566 Annual departures by Catholics only began to exceed 
those of Dissenters and Anglicans combined from the early 1830s onwards.567 Of the 1.8 
million who arrived in the United States in 1845-55, many came from much poorer 
backgrounds than previously; almost one third of the new arrivals originated from the 
poorer Irish speaking areas.568 For many Irish people, the Famine represented the final 
ultimatum before deciding to leave Ireland.569 Yet the outward flows continued in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Most of these emigrants departed for the simple 
reason that they wanted to improve their standard of living.570 Declining demand for 
agricultural labour and the fall of Irish wages in comparison with the United States 
thereby persuaded millions to follow the Famine exodus.571 Vast emigration meant that 
Ireland’s population dropped substantially from middle of the nineteenth century to the 
beginning of the First World War, with 4.5 million leaving between 1850 and 1913.572 
 Even though the Irish Free State was established in 1922, people of all 
persuasions continued to leave the country. Catholics left to find greener fields; 
Protestants emigrated for a combination of political and economic reasons. Between 
1926 and 1946, the number of Protestants residing in what became known as Free State 
Ireland decreased by one-quarter; a trend preceded by a one-third decrease between 
1911 and 1926.573  
From the 1920s onwards, a major shift in the destination of Irish emigrants took 
place as the United States began to implement restrictions on immigration from Europe. 
Consequently, many Irish people chose instead to move to the UK. Decisively, no 
restrictions existed between the two countries after the foundation of the Free State. 
From 1945 onwards, post-war Britain offered another pull factor unheard of in Ireland. 
In addition to widespread employment opportunities, the UK began to insert a generous 
and comprehensive welfare system under Attlee’s Labour government. In 1951, the Irish 
Prime Minister at the time, Éamon De Valera, in an attempt at slowing the exodus, 
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declared: 
 
There is no doubt that many of those who emigrated could find employment at home at as good, 
or better wages – and with living conditions far better – than they find in Britain. Moreover, not 
only did they fail to improve their own circumstances by going abroad, but they leave enterprises 
for the development of our national resources without sufficient labour to enable progress to be 
made as rapidly as we would desire. 574 
 
Although De Valera’s rhetoric appeared stern, his and other Irish governments’ 
reactions to emigration remained cursory as the state remained fearful to act even though 
some contemporary commentators predicted that if emigration continued, the ‘Irish will 
virtually disappear as a nation and will be found only as an enervated remnant in a land 
occupied by foreigners’.575 As Mary Daly asserts, successive Irish governments wanted 
to reverse population decline but feared that economic development might herald the 
break-up of an agrarian-based national identity. Instead, they fashioned statistical 
evidence to support ultimately futile pro-natalist policies that encouraged large, rural 
farm families.576 Amazingly, at age 30-34, 29.6 per cent of Irish women in 1961 
remained single. This compared to New Zealand’s 8.1 per cent, the country which, along 
with the United States, had the most similar total fertility rate patterns to Ireland’s 
amongst developed nations over the second half of the twentieth century.577 In Robert 
Kennedy’s opinion, Irish men and women decided to postpone marriage for economic 
and social reasons: a decision made possible by the strong moral code that the Catholic 
Church invoked at the time.578 As Ruttledge, the central character of John McGahern’s 
novel set in rural Ireland, That They May Face the Rising Sun, said when commenting 
on his old, single uncle, “He wanted to be on his own. He didn’t want to be married. … 
The priest, the single man, was the ideal of society, and with all the children we saw 
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looking up at us from the floors of those bungalows, who can blame him?”579 
Paradoxically, those who did get married usually produced large families. For one third 
of Irish women who gave birth in 1960, for example, it was for the fifth time or more.580 
Fortunately for the families concerned, emigration provided a safety net for assuring the 
survival of these large families if financial circumstances became intolerable. Again, the 
continuous cycle of emigration resulted in huge decreases in Ireland’s population as 
between 1945 and 1960 nearly half a million people had emigrated from Ireland; the 
vast majority of whom went to the UK.581 
Despite population growth throughout the 1960s, emigration continued. Ireland 
only experienced significant in-migration in the 1970s after relative modernisation of the 
Irish economy following decades of isolationist policies and the country’s entry into the 
European Economic Community.582 Yet, this trend came to a halt in the 1980s; a decade 
of mass unemployment and mass emigration, which also sparked disproportionate 
departure rates of third level graduates.583 One decade later, however, Ireland began to 
experience the start of the economic boom that would come to be known as the “Celtic 
Tiger,” which resulted in many former emigrants returning to Ireland along with, for the 
first time in the history of independent Ireland, large numbers of non-Irish migrants. The 
majority of these people came to the country with work permits. Nevertheless, a sizeable 
minority applied for asylum. As the next section will demonstrate, however, this did not 
represent the first time that Ireland received pleas for asylum from migrants. 
Most people associate Ireland’s migration history with emigration but this 
section’s goal is to recount Ireland’s infrequently referenced but rich immigration 
history, particularly that relating to asylum. Ireland’s riposte to Jews fleeing the 
attempted Nazi genocide symbolised the country’s exclusionary history of dealing with 
migrants in need of shelter before 1989. Moreover, the Irish authorities’ treatment of 
those who did manage to enter, such as the Hungarian, Chilean and Vietnamese refugees 
from the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s, demonstrated the ill-informed, ill-equipped and often 
illogical reaction of the state. Much of this antipathy and confusion stemmed from the 
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country’s sheltered status and search for homogeneity. 
Ronit Lentin writes that the revised Irish Constitution of 1937 appeared 
‘religiously non-inclusive’ and ignored ‘ethnic minorities’.584 Irish official attitudes to 
Jewish migration in the 1930s and 1940s confirmed this view. Immediately preceding 
the outbreak of the Second World War, the Irish government turned down a Vatican 
request to give temporary refuge to a number of Jewish doctors.585 Significantly, the 
1935 Aliens Act, which allowed the Irish government to control and prevent any influx 
of aliens, coincided with the rise of refugees fleeing Nazism. At the Evian Conference in 
1938, the Irish representative explained that the country’s economy lacked the capability 
to absorb any population increase.586 The rise of anti-Semitism in Ireland throughout the 
late 1930s and early 1940s gave the Irish government further justification to refuse the 
entry of Jewish refugees into the country.587 Instead, the government attempted to help 
Jewish families in France and Lithuania during the latter stages of the war. Dermot 
Keogh’s summation that the Irish government’s policy towards Jews during the Second 
World War remained ‘reactive rather than proactive’ appeared overly generous 
considering that as little as sixty people may have gained entry during the war period.588  
 Between the end of the Second World War and February 1953, approximately 
1,000 ‘aliens’ – excluding UK citizens – found a permanent home in Ireland.589 This 
included various Breton, Flemish and Basque ‘European ethnic minority nationalists, 
many of whom were wanted for war crimes, collaboration with Axis powers, or attacks 
upon the ‘territorial integrity’ of Allied states’.590 Ireland felt its contribution to the 
repatriation of refugees and displaced persons not ‘inconsiderable’ in view of the 
country’s ‘small size, limited resources and problems of unemployment and 
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emigration’.591 Accompanying this argument the government maintained that it had 
‘never been the practice to act on racial or religious grounds’ when dealing with the 
admission of foreigners. By contrast, the same department of justice memo stated that 
‘the question of the admission of aliens of Jewish blood presents a special problem and 
the alien law has been administered less liberally in their case.’592 The case of the 
Hungarian refugees in 1956, however, showed that Ireland had a problem coping with 
all foreigners and not just those of ‘Jewish blood’.  
In November 1956, Ireland ratified the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. An 
enthusiastic pledge by the government to accommodate hundreds of Hungarian refugees 
stranded on the Austrian border after the Hungarian uprising soon followed. Irish 
authorities housed the Hungarian refugees in a former army camp in Limerick from late 
1956, with some remaining there until the end of 1958. Owing to a breakdown in 
communication, the Hungarian refugees originally believed their stay in Ireland a 
temporary one. By contrast, the Irish government understood that the 539 refugees 
would remain permanently in Ireland. This led to increased friction and precipitated the 
launch of a hunger strike by the Hungarians at the end of April 1957, because of ‘what 
they considered to be inadequate efforts by the Irish authorities to assist them in their 
desire to secure admission to other countries’.593 In an attempt to get out of the 
predicament that it found itself in, the Irish government sent a letter to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees requesting that Ireland be reclassified as ‘a country of first 
asylum, in which the refugees should not remain for an unduly long period’.594 This 
misguided attempt to withdraw Ireland from the conditions it signed up to only six 
months previously displayed Ireland’s unwillingness and incapacity to deal satisfactorily 
with refugees. As Eillis Ward highlighted, Ireland accepted the refugees to attain 
prestige abroad rather than because of their genuine concern for the welfare of the 
Hungarians.595 The Irish government clearly desired to rid itself of the problem it 
unwittingly created for itself. 
Fortuitously for the Irish government, the Hungarian refugees also wanted to 
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leave the country. In a strongly worded letter written to the United States Congress, the 
refugees complained that they were ‘being kept in unheatable wooden huts, on 
unhealthy food, without the possibility of schooling’. They begged the US government 
to help them: ‘[Y]ou have promised us life, not concentration camps, depriving us of 
work and the hope of life.’596 By late 1958, only 61 refugees remained. Many left for 
various destinations, including the UK, the US and Canada, while some even returned to 
Hungary rather than remain in Ireland.597  
In the aftermath of Ireland’s forgettable experience with the Hungarians, the 
country returned to its tried and trusted policy of exclusivity. Ireland’s entry into the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1970s, however, forced the 
government to deal with the issue of refugees once again. In the mid 1970s, the EEC 
pressured Ireland to accept a number of refugees fleeing Pinochet’s regime in Chile. 
This caused serious difficulties for the government and especially for the historically 
xenophobic Department of Justice, who warned the Department of Foreign Affairs of its 
hazardous ramifications:  
 
Acceptance of refugees from distant countries with a cultural background very different 
from an Irish one poses difficulties for this country over and above what would be posed 
for many other countries, including EEC ones. Our society is less cosmopolitan than that 
of Western European countries generally and, in consequence, the absorption of even a 
limited number of foreigners of this kind could prove extremely difficult.598  
 
Additionally, the department of justice considered Chilean refugees as ‘Marxists and 
probably Communists’ who remained ‘liable sooner or later to engage in political 
agitation’ in a country that already had ‘a relatively large and well organised subversive 
group towards whom such persons could be expected to gravitate’.599  
Reluctantly, Ireland eventually accepted a small number of Chilean refugees.600 
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Nevertheless, it took three years to provide these refugees with English classes. 
Unsurprisingly, Chilean refugees found it hard to find employment, experiencing many 
of the difficulties that the 212 Vietnamese refugees, who arrived in Ireland in 1979, 
subsequently encountered.601 In the early 1990s, Ireland accepted more refugees, this 
time from Bosnia. A 1998 report found that Vietnamese and Bosnian refugees suffered 
high unemployment, poor English-language skills and isolation with up to half of them 
commenting that they only spoke with people outside of their communities at most once 
or twice a month.602  
 
***** 
 
Before turning to the reception of asylum seekers in Ireland after 1989, it is first 
necessary to provide a concise overview of Irish politics from 1989 to 2008. Fianna Fáil, 
a conservative centrist republican party, has dominated Irish politics since 1989. It held 
power, along with small coalition partners, between 1989 and 1994 and from 1997 
onwards. For the majority of Fianna Fáil’s seventeen years in office since 1989, the 
Progressive Democrats (PDs) joined them as coalition partners. Founded in 1985 as a 
result of a split from the aforementioned Fianna Fáil party, the PDs developed into a free 
market liberal party. It received a small percentage of the national vote but gained an 
influential role in Irish politics until its relative demise in 2007. The Greens replaced the 
PDs as Fianna Fáil’s coalition partners in government from mid-2007 onwards. The 
second largest party in the country, Fine Gael, spent only three years in power (1994-
1997) during the period under investigation. Bearing remarkable similarities to Fianna 
Fáil, it too is a centrist, conservative party. Its coalition partners in the ‘rainbow 
government’ of 1994-1997 included a variety of small left-wing parties and the centre-
left Labour Party, Ireland’s third largest political organisation.  
  
4.2 Surprise Guests, 1989-1997 
The fact that a significant number of people applied for asylum in Ireland from the mid 
1990s onwards surprised many in Irish society. While the country only had to contend 
with thirty-six asylum applications in 1989, by 1997 Ireland received nearly four 
thousand requests. This represented a remarkable turnaround in Irish history and caused 
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bemusement amongst Irish politicians, voters and media outlets. Some of the theories 
put forward to explain the arrival of these newcomers included Ireland’s growing 
international profile caused by their successful football campaigns at successive World 
Cups, Mary Robinson’s performance as President, the spread of Irish aid workers 
globally, the internet, the IRA ceasefire and the global diffusion of Irish pubs.603 
The strict entry conditions put in place throughout the twentieth century assured 
the growth of a relatively homogenous society free of foreigners. Contrastingly, 
increasing pressure on successive Irish governments in the 1990s by opposition 
politicians, domestic and international NGOs, as well as by the UNHCR, restricted the 
Irish government from using such harsh measures to limit the upsurge that took place in 
the 1990s. Indeed, since most asylum seekers submitted their applications once inside 
the country and not at its entry points, the country had arguably lost its capacity to stop 
all kinds of immigrants from arriving in the first place.604  
 
Formation 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ireland dealt with less than one hundred asylum 
applications a year. The incoherent and inexperienced manner in which Irish authorities 
treated these asylum seekers suggested a continuation of past malpractices. Just as 
Ireland proved ill prepared to receive Hungarian and Vietnamese refugees in the 1950s 
and late 1970s, the country struggled to come to terms with handling asylum seekers in 
the mid 1990s. Some asylum seekers spent time in prison awaiting the outcome of their 
applications and NGOs, such as the Red Cross and the Irish Refugee Council, cared for 
others.605 As if to confirm this general incompetence, the Irish police forced twenty-
seven potential Kurdish asylum seekers from Turkey back on board their flight at 
Shannon airport in November 1992 after they refused to return to their plane.606 In 
addition to receiving sustained attacks from Amnesty International and the Irish Refugee 
Council over these and other actions displaying the country’s invisible policy towards 
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those seeking asylum, Alan Shatter, a spokesman for the opposition Fine Gael party, 
proposed the enactment of legislation to comprise the UNHCR definition of a refugee 
into Irish law in 1993.607 Irish judicial procedures on refugees relied heretofore on a 
letter sent in 1985 to the Irish and British representative of the UNHCR for guidance, 
which detailed Ireland’s refugee practices in ten key points.608 Irish delegates signed the 
UN Convention on Refugees in 1956 but successive Irish governments believed that the 
small number of asylum seekers coming to the country failed to warrant the enactment 
of the necessary legislation to encompass the Convention into Irish law, hence the use of 
the so-called “Von Armin letter.”609  
By mid-1994, following sustained pressure from NGOs and opposition 
politicians, the Fianna Fáil government agreed to introduce a bill to fill this gap. The 
Fine Gael-led coalition that came to power in December 1994 developed this provisional 
bill further because, in the words of the minister in charge of drawing up new asylum 
legislation, Joan Burton, “concerns were voiced on all sides of this House that it did not 
go far enough in seeking to safeguard the interests of applicants for asylum.”610 
Accordingly, she presented to parliament an amended version of the so-called Refugee 
Act in the autumn of 1995. Bearing significant influence from NGOs and receiving all-
party support, the legislation was generous and liberal. It borrowed the Geneva 
Convention’s definition of a refugee, while also allowing asylum seekers fleeing gender-
persecution to attain refugee status. It also incorporated the Dublin Convention. 
During parliamentary debates over the new legislation, politicians sympathetic to 
the plight of asylum seekers used the memory of past Irish emigrants to evoke empathy 
for the new arrivals. By implying asylum seekers and Irish emigrants shared a common 
experience, actors sympathetic to those in search of protection claimed that Ireland had a 
moral debt or responsibility to help these people.611 This rhetoric initially met with much 
resonance amongst the public, politicians and the media because of the Irish state’s 
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historic tendency to represent, through constant commemoration, Irish emigrants as 
exiles escaping colonialism and its legacy.  
Irish secular and religious leaders throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century regularly blamed continuous emigration on British rule. This association tallied 
well with the traditional interpretation that long existed in Irish lore linking emigration 
with exile.  Although the majority of post-Famine emigrants left voluntarily, the image 
of forced migration “remained prevalent, still colouring the letters and memoirs of 
ordinary Catholic emigrants as well as songs and ballads, political speeches, and clerical 
sermons”.612 As Breda Gray illustrated, the Famine migrants, through constant state 
commemoration, became the “‘authentic’ Irish migrants, the traumatic, but genuine 
origin of ‘Irish emigration.’”613 
In the decades after the Free State gained its independence in 1922, this myth 
became questionable as emigration continued. To adapt to this reality, emigration 
became associated with both colonial and economic hardship. Popular culture also 
focused on the poverty and destitution that prompted many Irish migrants to leave and 
compared it to the arduous experiences of others elsewhere, especially Africans and 
African-Americans. In the 1990s, the Irish President, Mary Robinson, gave leverage to 
this view when speaking at a commemoration to Famine migrants in Canada in 1994. 
She told listeners that “as a people who suffered and survived … our history does not 
entitle us to a merely private catalogue of memories.”614 The Irish, because of their own 
traumatic experiences, had to relate their own memories of past injustices with 
contemporary ones around the world. 
Remarkably, in Ireland’s first meaningful asylum debate in 1995, every political 
party represented in parliament voiced its support for the formation of an expansive 
asylum policy.615 Liz O’Donnell of the PDs, for instance, highlighted the significance of 
forming generous asylum legislation in the same year the country celebrated the 150th 
anniversary of the Famine because “For generations our people have sought refuge in 
other countries from political and economic conditions which to them were 
intolerable.”616 John O’Donoghue of Fianna Fáil went further by commenting: “The 
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status of refugees is an issue which should strike a chord with every man, woman and 
child here who has any grasp of Irish history, our history books being littered with the 
names and deeds of those driven from our country out of fear of persecution.”617  
The only objections during the political debate surrounding the proposed 
legislation came from those who thought further improvements would help protect 
asylum seekers further. These related principally to the section dealing with “manifestly 
unfounded applications.” Politicians from Fianna Fáil, the PDs and Labour referenced 
certain NGOs’ misgivings, particularly those from Amnesty International, the Red Cross 
and the Irish Refugee Council, when pressing for more lenient interpretations of certain 
sections of the legislation.618  
 
Implementation 
Successive Irish governments’ responses to the rise in asylum seekers continued to be 
reactive rather than proactive as it unsuccessfully grappled with the problem. The Fine 
Gael-led coalition government in power between December 1994 and June 1997 
successfully brought the so-called 1996 Refugee Act through the various parliamentary 
requirements by June 1996.619 Several months later, however, the act remained static. 
The Minister for Justice, Nora Owen, told the parliament that the Refugee Act “will be 
implemented as soon as all the necessary implementing regulations are in place,” 
admitting that “I do not envisage that the new system will be in operation before April 
1997.”620 In-government bickering over where responsibility for the implementation of 
the act rested delayed developments further as did problems regarding state-funded legal 
aid for asylum seekers. Furthermore, an injunction from a former minister for justice, 
passed over for the new position of refugee applications’ commissioner, meant that the 
act remained dormant by the time Irish general election took place in June 1997.621  
 
Effects 
The massive increase in asylum applications represented what one journalist termed the 
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largest influx of those seeking shelter in the country since ‘the Celts were driven west by 
the Romans’.622 Ireland never had to deal with such large numbers of non-Irish people 
entering its territory in its post-independence history.  
 
Source: Figures for 1988-1991 are taken from the Minister for Justice's (Ray Burke, FF) statement to Dáil 
Éireann on 4 February 1992. Figures from 1992 onwards come from the Office of the Refugee 
Applications Commissioner. 
 
In the early-1990s the Red Cross accommodated asylum seekers and the Irish Refugee 
Council provided them with legal help. But as numbers escalated, Irish NGOs struggled 
to cope with increased demands placed on their limited services. Accordingly, 
responsibility passed to the state. Incompetence was initially rife. In May 1997, workers 
for the Eastern Health Board who were charged with dealing with asylum seekers’ 
welfare closed their offices because of staff shortages.623 Because it took an average of 
two years to deal with every asylum case, a huge backlog in applications amassed. In 
February 1997, the government announced that only 66 asylum applicants gained 
refugee status since January 1994. Approximately 1700 remained unprocessed.624 
Increasing asylum claims expounded this further. Since it fell to the state (which 
frequently abdicated responsibility to the health boards) to house, feed and provide for 
these people – the rules barred asylum seekers from working during their applications – 
the crisis facing the state grew exponentially. Simultaneously, so did the public focus on 
the new arrivals. While sympathetic actors, such as NGOs and politicians, found 
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widespread support for their compassionate attitude to asylum seekers in the early and 
mid-1990s, this began to change as public, media and political hostility towards asylum 
seekers increased from 1997 onwards. Sceptics argued that the increasingly harsh 
measures taken by Britain to restrict asylum applications encouraged traffickers to send 
people to Ireland, as did the country’s impressive economic growth and relatively 
generous welfare system. The collapse of communism, the civil war in the ex-
Yugoslavia, ongoing conflicts in the developing world and declining opportunities for 
labour migration in Europe rarely entered debates explaining the rise in numbers. 
 
4.3 Struggling to Restrict Asylum, 1997-2002 
 
In contrast to debates in the first half of the decade, discussions about asylum after the 
1997 general election became notably more critical of asylum seekers. Enmity replaced 
much of the empathy expressed in the 1995 parliamentary debate. Nonetheless, a 
number of sympathetic actors continued to promote generous asylum policies, with 
religious leaders, NGOs and left-wing opposition parties to the fore. They made frequent 
references to Ireland’s moral responsibility, its past history, and its human rights 
obligations to aide asylum seekers. By contrast, centrist political parties, large sections 
of the media, and an increasing majority of public opinion voiced their dismay at the 
increase in asylum applications. Accordingly, they advocated more restrictionist 
measures to reduce the number of those applying for asylum in Ireland and in effect 
reduce the burden that they felt asylum seekers had placed on the state’s finances. The 
media performed a manifest role in this change, with both tabloids and broadsheets 
painting asylum seekers in an overwhelmingly negative light. Accordingly, the new 
Fianna Fáil-led government halted the expansive initiatives undertaken by its rainbow 
coalition predecessors and instead sought to bring Ireland into line with its EU 
neighbours, particularly the UK. To demonstrate its uncompromising new stance, the 
Irish government began deporting rejected asylum seekers. But actors sympathetic to 
asylum seekers – most notably lawyers representing asylum seekers, NGOs, religious 
leaders, left-wing opposition political parties and certain broadsheet media outlets – 
challenged this new departure, meeting with most success in the domestic courts.  
 
Formation 
The nature of the asylum debate in Ireland changed substantially in the run-up to the 
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1997 general election. For the first time ever in the history of the state, immigration – in 
the form of a debate centred on asylum seekers – became an election issue. In April 
1997, the PDs accused the rainbow coalition government of presiding over “an 
unregulated flow of economic migrants into Ireland.”625 One PD deputy warned of the 
danger of “professional beggars” overwhelming the country.626 Liam Lawlor, of Fianna 
Fáil, made reference to the “floods” of immigrants arriving in the country.627 Aine Ní 
Chonaill also came onto the political scene for the first time. An independent election 
candidate in Cork, she ran on an anti-immigration platform and voiced her opposition to 
the entry of asylum seekers in Ireland.628  
The media amplified this newfound focus upon asylum seekers. Before 1997, 
empathy marked the media discourse on asylum seekers in Ireland. Throughout 1997, as 
numbers increased substantially, the media began to focus on the amount of money 
spent housing and supporting asylum seekers. Sensationalist headlines began to appear 
regularly, as the Sunday World’s May 1997 offering demonstrated; ‘Floodgates open as 
a new army of poor swamp the country’.629 Not all newspapers contributed to this 
development, but it became increasingly common especially among regional papers and 
tabloids. The media communicated several scare stories about biblical “floods,” “flows,” 
“invasions,” and “deluges” of “swampers,” “daytrip refugees,” and “sponger refugees” 
in the weeks approaching the election, with one regional story about “refugee rapists on 
the rampage” standing out. 630 
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Figures: National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), Media coverage of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Ireland, Dublin: NCCRI/UNHCR, April 2003, p. 10631 
 
According to a later report by the National Consultative Committee on Racism 
and Interculturalism (NCCRI) in conjunction with the UNHCR, the period 1997-1998 
represented the height of media irresponsibility regarding asylum issues. It concluded: 
‘There was a lot of sensationalised newspaper coverage related to the increase of asylum 
seekers coming to Ireland, including extreme comment that sometimes bordered on 
hysteria.’632 In November 1997 the Fine Fáil deputy, Ivor Callely stated publicly that 
“rogue” asylum seekers should be “kicked out” of Ireland. He added that these people 
were “carrying on in a culture that is not akin to Irish culture”, by doing such things as 
the “bleeding of lambs in the back garden”.633 Leaders of the Fine Gael, Labour, 
Democratic Left and even the governing Fianna Fáil party, unequivocally condemned 
Callely’s remarks.634 Nonetheless, obligations of political correctness did not apply to 
the media. As well as informing the public that asylum seekers competed for 
accommodation with homeless people, the Irish media reported a series of welfare 
frauds involving asylum seekers, which caused government officials to voice concerns 
that trafficking gangs had targeted the country.635  
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One journalist for the Irish Times, Andy Pollack, claimed that much of the 
negative press surrounding asylum seekers failed to deal with the issue properly and 
instead used ‘sensational headlines, misleading statistics, unsourced claims and often 
plain demonising of asylum seekers’ when tackling the subject.636 He levelled most of his 
criticisms at the Independent Group, which owned three of Ireland’s most popular dailies, 
the broadsheet Irish Independent, the tabloid Evening Herald and the tabloid Star, as well 
as possessing the lion’s share of the Sunday newspapers.  
Nonetheless, the traffic of opinion varied. Mary Robinson, the Irish President at 
the time and subsequently the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, warned of 
the danger of racism “rearing its ugly head” unless people learned to deal with the issues 
surrounding immigration and refugees.637 The Irish Times, one of the leading Irish 
newspapers, regularly advocated for more compassionate reactions to the plight of those 
seeking asylum. A 1997 editorial defending asylum seekers drew readers’ attention to 
the fact that ‘it [wa]s not so long ago that the Irish themselves were seeking succour and 
support at ports and airports in America, Australia and in Britain.’638 Yet, perhaps most 
refreshingly of all, asylum seekers and refugees themselves tried to safeguard their 
rights by forming their own NGO, the Association of Refugees and Asylum-seekers in 
Ireland (ARASI). One outspoken founding member surmised: “Irish people complain 
about refugees coming in, but they forget that as an EU member and a signatory of the 
1951 UN Convention on Refugees they have to accept refugees. They behave as though 
their international role consisted only of accepting benefits.”639 
 Yet voicing anti-asylum sentiments in 1997 failed to produce more votes: Aine 
Ní Chonaill received less than three hundred votes and Helen Keogh, the PD deputy 
who linked asylum seekers to professional beggars, lost her seat. Joan Burton, the 
outgoing junior minister with responsibility for asylum seekers, summed up future 
challenges, however, when she commented on how asylum had become a political issue: 
“[it]’s a genie, which, when let out of the bottle, is very hard to put back in”.640   
The Fianna Fáil-PD government that assumed office in the summer of 1997 
immediately refrained from implementing the previous ascendancy’s Refugee Act. 
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Instead, the new government promised to review the country’s asylum policy because of 
the impact rising numbers of applicants had on state services such as welfare, housing 
and healthcare.641  
For some, asylum seekers had clearly come for economic reasons rather than 
political ones.642 An important justification for this resource-based opposition derived 
from the large applications submitted from nationals of countries not at war. In 1999, for 
example, the largest group of asylum seekers came from Romania, the second largest 
Nigeria and the third largest Poland.643 Official comments from the Nigerian embassy in 
Dublin added to this perception, by branding Nigerian asylum seekers as ‘economic 
migrants’ with ‘the illusion of greener pastures outside the country’, who concocted 
‘tales of torture, harassment and humiliation’.644 Similarly, the Romanian embassy 
claimed that asylum seekers from its own country arrived in Ireland with the intention of 
milking the system.645 
 
 
Figures: Dáil Éireann, Vol. 513, 1 Feb 2000 and Vol. 520, 1 June 2000646 
  
In response to increased criticism of the asylum system, the Fianna Fáil-led 
                                                
641
 See John O’Donoghue (Fianna Fáil), Minister for Justice, Dáil Éireann, Volume 480, 9 July 1997. 
642
 See ‘Majority of Romanians flee for ‘economic reasons’, Irish Independent, 6 Aug 1998 and ‘From 
Cherbourg to El Dorado’, Irish Independent, 8 Aug 1998. 
643
 John O’Donoghue, Dáil Éireann, Vol. 520, 1 June 2000. 
644
 Letter from Edwin Edobar (Nigerian Chargé d’Affaires) to the Irish Times, 4 June 1997. 
645
 Romanian diplomat Dragon Nikita, paraphrased in ‘Saying what we were too polite to say aloud’, Irish 
Independent, 6 Aug 1998. 
646
 Data taken from John O'Donoghue, Dáil Éireann, Vol. 520, 1 June 2000 and John O'Donoghue, Dáil 
Éireann, Vol. 513, 1 Feb 2000. 
173 
 
coalition decided to reform the 1996 Refugee Act. In December 1997, the government 
implemented various parts of the 1996 Refuge Act in the form of another letter sent to 
the Irish representative of the UNHCR, Hope Hanlon. The letter sent to the UNHCR in 
December 1997 (and a further one sent in March 1998) outlined Ireland’s new stance on 
asylum applications. This included the adoption of the Dublin Convention preventing 
people from applying for asylum in more than one EU state and the foundation of the 
Independent Appeals Authority to examine the appeals of those whose applications the 
department of justice rejected. More controversially, the letter laid down twelve 
conditions under which the department of justice could interpret an application as 
“manifestly unfounded” in order to fast-track requests. Some of these grounds included: 
(a) [if] it does not show on its [the application] face any grounds for the contention that the 
applicant is a refugee, 
(b) the applicant gave clearly insufficient details or evidence to substantiate the application, 
(c) the applicant's reason for leaving or not returning to his or her country of nationality 
does not relate to a fear of persecution, 
(d)  the applicant did not reveal, following the making of the application, that he or she was 
travelling under a false identity or was in possession of false or forged identity 
documents and did not have reasonable cause for not so revealing, 
(e) the applicant, without reasonable cause, made deliberately false or misleading 
representations of a material or substantial nature in relation to the application, 
(f) the applicant, without reasonable cause and in bad faith, destroyed identity documents, 
withheld relevant information or otherwise deliberately obstructed the investigation of 
the application …647 
In addition to criticism of the new rules from NGOs, religious figures voiced their first 
major concerns with the government’s asylum policy in late 1997. While two prominent 
Catholic Bishops, John Kirby and Laurence Ryan, criticised the asylum rules that the 
new government wanted to bring in, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, Walton 
Empey, went further by asking ‘what reception would the Holy Family get if they came 
to Ireland in 1997’, emphasizing that ‘Jesus was a refugee’.648 Opposition politicians 
also went out of their way to condemn the government moves. 
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In March 1998 the Democratic Left’s Liz McManus brought a Private Members’ 
Bill forward to parliament to oppose the government reversal on asylum policy and, in 
particular, the specific measures proposed relating to “manifestly unfounded” asylum 
claims. She began by describing how that month’s Saint Patrick’s Day celebrations 
became global due to “generations of Irish asylum-seekers who were driven out to seek 
refuge among strangers.” For that reason, Ireland’s “history requires us to be generous 
and just.” She reminded the new Minister for Justice, John O’Donoghue, of his own 
declaration on how the plight of asylum seekers in Ireland in the 1990s related to the 
country’s history of emigration.649 McManus then informed the house that O’Donoghue 
had instead implemented a fast-track procedure that had the “potential for serious abuse 
and grave injustices.”650 Alternatively, she and the other opposition parties proposed to 
fully implement the 1996 Refugee Act drawn up by the rainbow coalition one year 
previously.  
O’Donoghue responded that the rainbow party’s Refugee Act represented a 
policy “which is independent from and substantially different from that of our European 
neighbours, is not sustainable in the short or long-term as the number of asylum seekers 
affected by, for example, changes in policy regarding arrangements, etc., by other 
European countries could encourage large scale movement to Ireland of such persons.” 
For that reason “a comparative study of Irish legislation and that of EU partners” would 
“align Irish policy more closely with that of EU partners.”651  
Subsequently, O’Donoghue cast doubt on the veracity of asylum applications 
when he claimed:  
 
It is a source of puzzlement to many people that at a time when there are no conflicts 
taking place near our borders of the kind that usually generate refugee movement, when 
we have no colonial links with countries in which political turmoil is taking place and 
when the number of claims for refugee status is declining in other European states, the 
Irish rate shows a major increase. … [T]here are significant issues, such as cost 
considerations, which are rightly the concern of Government.652 
 
The Minister’s comments met with significant opposition; none more biting than the 
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Labour Party’s Michael D. Higgins’s riposte: 
 
Does this mean Ireland should have been a colonising power in order for us to now 
accept refugees? Does it mean there should be conflicts taking place outside our borders 
before we adopt a responsible policy? The Minister’s statement is so morally bankrupt 
that it is appalling. … We are showing a version of ourselves that is depressing and 
mean. I imagine there is more decency in ordinary Irish people who, as already stated, 
have the ethic of memory. Most families in Ireland have relatives who went abroad … 
and they want to see the emergence of a kind of dignity and solidarity.653 
 
According to O’Donoghue and to his government, who voted seventy to forty-five 
against the motion, the rainbow coalition’s Refugee Act failed to differentiate effectively 
between refugees and “illegal immigrants” and in effect slowed the process of deporting 
those ineligible for asylum considerably.  
Other pressure on the government’s asylum policy came from NGOs. A UNHCR 
file from the 1960s on voluntary agencies in Ireland only listed one NGO: The Irish Red 
Cross.654 A 1993 OECD study done in conjunction with the UNHCR listed only ten Irish 
NGOs involved with human rights, refugees, migrants and development.655 By the late 
1990s, however, a group calling itself the Asylum Rights Alliance consisted of fifty-two 
NGOs from around the country. The alliance drafted a new charter on asylum rights 
which it encouraged the government to introduce. Support for the charter came from 
most of the opposition political parties, including Fine Gael and the Labour Party. 
Perhaps most controversially, it stated that ‘If an asylum case has not been decided 
within six months, he/she must be permitted to take up work and to study, with the same 
rights as an Irish citizen’.656 The subject of whether or not to allow asylum seekers to 
work would be put forward continuously to the government over the next two years by, 
amongst others, trade unions, politicians, the media, the public and NGOs.  
 In July 1998, a survey indicated that the majority of asylum seekers came from 
highly educated backgrounds, leading two of the most popular national newspapers, the 
Irish Times and the Irish Independent, to demand the right to work for asylum seekers. 
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In the words of an Irish Independent editorial, the ban on asylum seekers working was 
‘both anomalous and harmful. Anomalous, because many asylum seekers are highly 
educated people whose skills we could use. Harmful, because it encourages the false 
perception that their only object is to “sponge off the State”.’657 A junior minister in the 
government, Liz O’Donnell of the smaller PD coalition party, took up this call, referring 
to the ban as “counter-productive.”658 O’Donnell’s controversial move to criticise her 
own government came with the support of a large majority of Irish people as eighty per 
cent of those polled in a nationwide survey carried out by a Catholic lay organisation 
agreed that asylum seekers should work.659 Nonetheless, the Minister for Justice, John 
O’Donoghue, remained adamantly opposed to such a proposal since it would, in the 
words of his spokesman: “simply create another ‘pull’ factor which would put further 
pressure on the asylum-processing system and continue to delay recognition for genuine 
refugees in need of protection.”660  
 When another study, published in April 1999, asserted that 80 per cent of those 
asylum seekers surveyed had some form of third-level qualification, the pressure 
mounted once again, with the Labour leader calling the treatment of asylum seekers “a 
disgrace”: “we make them dependent on state supports because we won’t allow them to 
make a living for themselves.”661 In June 1999, the Labour Party went further by 
introducing a motion to allow asylum seekers apply for work permits whilst awaiting the 
outcome of their applications during the committee stage of the Immigration Bill. The 
vote on the motion ended in parity (opposition motions needed an absolute majority to 
pass), with some Fianna Fáil deputies actually backing the Labour stance. O’Donoghue 
reacted by stating that his job remained “to look after the interests of the Irish 
people”.662  
Opposition from inside and outside the government supporting the idea of 
allowing asylum seekers to work, however, finally caused the government to act in late 
July 1999, when it announced that between 2,000 and 3,000 work permits would be 
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available to those awaiting decisions on their applications for more than twelve months 
before 26 July 1999.663  
The bestowal of work rights on certain asylum seekers actually added to the 
government’s difficulties in administrating asylum because of the policy’s muddled 
implementation. The scheme prohibited asylum seekers, many of whom had language 
difficulties – a factor not alleviated by their disentitlement to language classes – from 
entering government sponsored training schemes. Furthermore, the policy obliged them 
to find an employer willing to seek out work permits on their behalf, which the 
employers would have to pay for on a monthly or yearly basis, rather than provide all 
asylum seekers under the scheme with individual work permits.664 The Irish Refugee 
Council commented that the scheme would “act as a deterrent to potential employers, 
who will be less likely to tackle the red tape around this overly restrictive scheme.”665  
 When, in November 1999, an opposition deputy asked the Minister for 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment the number of work permits issued to asylum seekers 
since the previous July, the Minister answered that to date “a total of 15 permits have 
been issued.” By May 2000, nearly one year after the government announced the 
granting of work permits to eligible asylum seekers, only a third of eligible candidates 
had received permits. 666 
***** 
 The growing resources needed to accommodate and support asylum seekers 
began to take a toll on those charged with responsibility in the second half of 1999. The 
Eastern Health Board (EHB), had to deal almost exclusively with the problem of finding 
emergency accommodation for those who had just applied for asylum. Rising numbers 
in late 1999 inevitably led to some asylum seekers being housed in hotels for short 
periods, accompanied by the usual tabloid fanfare, as well as some asylum seekers 
having to sleep rough until the EHB found suitable accommodation.667 The UNHCR 
criticised the government for the “unsatisfactory situation” that presented itself. The 
pressure to find a solution mounted once again when the Junior Minister for Justice, Liz 
O’Donnell from the PDs, controversially branded the handling of the asylum issue “a 
disgrace”. She stated: “I am part of this Government but as a PD I will not preside over 
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the chaos surrounding the treatment of asylum seekers.”668 The Opposition responded by 
tabling a motion of no confidence in the Justice Minister. Although the Government 
won out by 78 votes to 74, it became clear that the government needed to act quickly to 
stem growing discontent.669  
Scepticism surrounding the government’s management of asylum seekers 
increased further in December 1999 when Peter Finlay, the longest-serving member of 
the Independent Appeals Authority, outspokenly criticised the system established in late 
1997. He denounced the lack of free and independent legal advice provided for asylum 
seekers at the outset of the asylum procedure: 
 
I believe it’s a total and complete travesty to have a system of the type I have described 
… All of this in my view rings hollow as a humanitarian response to peoples’ needs. 
Not just for people coming here, but our needs as a society. They bear all the hallmarks 
of a narrow and prejudiced state of mind.670 
 
When Finlay resigned from his post one month later, he further denounced the state’s 
policies on asylum seekers as “so fundamentally flawed, from bottom to top, that they 
represent institutionalised racism”.671 
Further heavy-handed criticism followed the announcement by the Minister for 
Justice of new plans to establish a system of direct provision, which would “represent a 
cashless system with the State assuming responsibility for funding suitable 
accommodation, for providing health and education services and other essential needs.” 
O’Donoghue explained that the introduction would “simply bring us in line with other 
member states”. Significantly, the UK had announced its plans to initiate a system of 
direct provision several months earlier. O’Donoghue felt that the new system would stop 
undeserving applicants applying: 
 
Unscrupulous persons who use the umbrella of asylum to defraud the State naturally 
prefer a cash based system. Th[is] system will not alone provide for the basic needs of 
asylum seekers in a fair and effective manner but will send out a message to those 
engaged in fraudulent activity that the States responsibility is to the genuine asylum 
seeker and not to those who circumvent immigration controls simply to cash in on what 
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may be viewed as a generous welfare system.672 
 
The move met with considerable opposition from trade unions and NGOs representing 
asylum seekers. One NGO, the National Federation of Campaigns against Racism 
considered the system akin to “sticking a yellow star on asylum-seekers to set them 
apart from Irish citizens. … It [wa]s discriminatory, unconstitutional and demeaning in 
that it would mark them out in a very public way. It will effectively introduce a form of 
apartheid in Irish society.”673 The President of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
considered the new strategy to be “a defensive denial of rights”; while one union leader 
claimed that it symbolised the beginnings of institutional racism.674  
Almost simultaneously, the government founded the Directorate for Asylum 
Support Services (DASS) to coordinate the sourcing of suitable accommodation for 
asylum seekers all around the country. Previously, asylum seekers had access to social 
welfare assistance and rent allowance. Defending this move, O’Donoghue explained: 
“There is no other option: quite simply, the supply of accommodation for asylum 
seekers in the Dublin area has been exhausted.”675  The new plan envisaged the 
provision of short-term accommodation to asylum seekers in various locations around 
the country on a full-board basis, supplemented by a grant of £15 (EUR19.50) a week 
for each adult and £7.50 (EUR9.10) for each child.676 Forty NGOs met with the DASS 
in January 2000 to reject the new policy and many of the NGOs represented later 
reaffirmed their resistance to a policy they termed “discriminatory” and 
“unnecessary”.677  
 These new policies began to come into force from late March 2000 onwards, 
with an increasingly desperate government moving to approve “the provision of 4,000 
places in prefabricated accommodation, 1,000 places in mobile homes, and 1,000 places 
in flotels”.678  
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Implementation 
Expediting the asylum process, aligning Irish asylum policy more closely with other EU 
states and putting in place measures to deport rejected asylum seekers made up three of 
the most salient terms of the letter containing Ireland’s new asylum measures.679 
Nonetheless, the government failed to execute two out of three of these strategies as 
deportations stalled and applications continued to take several years to fully process.  
All individuals that applied for asylum in Ireland had the option of attaining free 
legal aid if they fulfilled the financial conditions.680 One reason for this related to a 
critical court case in January 1998 in which Justice Shanley delivered a verdict 
preventing the department of justice from deporting the parents, brother and sisters of 
Tara Suarez, a one-week-old Irish baby girl whose Chilean parents had unsuccessfully 
applied for asylum in Ireland. According to Justice Shanley, the deportation of Suarez’s 
family would have infringed upon her constitutional rights to the “company, care and 
parentage of her parents within a family unit.”681 This case used the Supreme Court 
ruling of December 1989, in Fajujonu v Minister for Justice, as justification for such a 
decision. Although the plaintiffs in the Fajujonu case never applied for asylum (and they 
technically lost their case), the judgement greatly influenced future asylum policy 
because of the assertion relating to the constitutional significance of the family. The 
ruling stated: 
 
While the parents in this case cannot claim (on foot of their being the parents of minor 
Irish citizens) any personal constitutional right to remain in the State, they are entitled, 
on their children’s behalf, to choose the place of residence of their minor children. As 
the children themselves are entitled to remain in the country of their nationality, so too 
may the parents lawfully choose such residence on the children’s behalf. 
As a result, the Minister for Justice, having regard to these constitutional considerations, 
could only deport the family or any of its members where the interests of the children 
were outbalanced by the exigencies of the common good and/or considerations of State 
security and/or collective wellbeing. In other words, deportation could only occur in 
                                                
679
 For the conditions of the letter, see John O’Donoghue (Fianna Fáil), Minister for Justice, Dáil Éireann, 
Volume 492, 16 June, 1998. 
680
 After a long campaign by the NGO Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC), which started in 1969, the 
government provided publicly-funded legal aid from 1979. In 1995, following the enactment of the Civil 
Legal Aid Act, the government created a statutory legal aid body, the Legal Aid Board. In 1999, the Legal 
Aid Board established the Refugee Legal Service under its auspices to ‘to provide confidential and 
independent legal services to persons applying for asylum in Ireland’ 
(http://www.legalaidboard.ie/lab/publishing.nsf/Content/Refugee_Legal_Service).  
681
 ‘Court bars deportation of Chile family after birth of child here’, Irish Times, 24 Jan 1998. 
181 
 
contravention of the children’s family rights and/or right of residence, where the 
Minister could show, after full consideration of all relevant matters, that the common 
good necessitated such a step.682 
 
The right to citizenship through birth on Irish soil (ius soli) had a long history in 
Ireland, going back to the very foundations of the state.  Indeed, the Treaty signed in 
London in December 1921 to recognise the Irish Free State had stated: 
  
Every person … who was born in Ireland or either of whose parents was born in Ireland 
… is a citizen of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) and shall within the limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) enjoy the privileges and be subject 
to the obligations of such citizenship.683 
 
The 1935 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act reiterated that all persons born in the 
territory of the Irish Free State were ‘natural-born citizens of Saorstát Eireann’.684 The 
state extended the right to people born in Northern Ireland in 1956 and again in 1998, as 
a result of the public referendum’s decision to amend articles 2 and 3 of the Irish 
Constitution (1937) after the signing of the 1998 Belfast Peace Agreement. The 
amended version stated: ‘It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the 
island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation.’685 
Just as Ireland opened up its automatic citizenship rights further to ius soli, most of its 
European counterparts were closing theirs and instead installing more restrictive 
national policies based on ius sanguinis. Ireland represented the only EU country that 
granted automatic ius soli citizenship at birth without any further condition. In no other 
European state – or Australia for that matter – would children of asylum seekers become 
citizens at birth, let alone enable the parents of these children to remain in the country 
just because of their child’s birth there.686 
Between 1996 and October 1997, 472 asylum seekers sought and received 
permission to stay in Ireland because of their parentage of Irish-born children. By April 
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2000, that number climbed to 1,873.687 In 2001 alone, 5,924 asylum seekers applied to 
remain in Ireland on such a basis.688 Consequently, by the end of 2001 approximately 20 
per cent of all people that sought asylum in Ireland since the early 1990s remained in the 
country because of the birth of an Irish born child.  
Another reason for the government’s inability to deport rejected asylum seekers 
related to a High Court case in January 1999 that brought all deportations of asylum 
seekers to a halt. Deeming the deportation of a Romanian asylum seeker as 
unconstitutional, the judge concluded in Laurentiu v Minister for Justice that because of 
the 1935 Aliens Act’s failure to properly set out deportation policy or the principles 
under which it must take place, all deportations had to cease:  
Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act of 1935 unconstitutionally delegated the power to the 
Minister to determine what was essentially a legislative matter. In determining the basis 
upon which aliens might be deported from the State, the Minister was not following 
principles and policies laid down by the Legislature, as the Legislature had failed to 
establish any guidelines that the Minister might follow. It had simply abdicated its 
power to make this decision to the Minister, without any indication as to how that power 
might properly be exercised. The Act thus (unconstitutionally) permitted the Minister to 
legislate for deportation.689 
The Supreme Court, by a majority of three to two, subsequently reinforced this High 
Court decision. As a consequence, no deportations took place for the next six months 
until the 1999 Immigration Act legislated for deportations in July 1999. Despite the new 
legislation, the numbers thereafter actually deported remained tiny when compared to 
the overall total of asylum seekers rejected. By June 2000, approximately one year after 
the passing of the Immigration Act, the government managed to deport only 30 people 
from the 396 orders signed.690  
In a renewed attempt to speed up applications, the government introduced a 
number of amendments to the 1999 Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, which it 
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formed to legislate for and criminalise human trafficking. Instead of giving asylum 
seekers six months to seek a judicial review in the case of a failed application, the new 
legislation gave the rejected asylum seeker only two weeks. Furthermore, and more 
critically in relation to deportations, amendments enabled police to detain asylum 
seekers after presenting a deportation order.691 Previously, the asylum seeker received 
fourteen days notice – hence the high rate of avoidance of deportation orders – before 
the police carried out the order. Realising the necessity of maintaining hospitable 
relations with sender states, the government established a number of bilateral 
agreements with Romania, Poland, Nigeria and Bulgaria for the readmission of all 
rejected asylum seekers.692 Nonetheless, the number of those deported still remained 
remarkably low compared to the number of rejected asylum seekers allowed to remain 
in Ireland.  
The government suffered another setback when the Irish President, Mary 
McAleese, referred the 1999 Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill to the Supreme Court 
to rule on its constitutionality. This represented only the second occasion since 
McAleese’s inauguration in late 1997 that the former law professor referred government 
legislation to the courts.693 Ultimately, the Supreme Court in August 2000 found the bill 
constitutional, but the case further delayed policy initiatives as a result.694 Later in 2000, 
the government finally implemented the 1996 Refugee Act with amendments from the 
1999 Immigration Act and the 1999 Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill. By then, the 
processing time for dealing with an asylum application from the initial stage to the 
determination of an appeal took between four months (for manifestly unfounded cases) 
and two years. Furthermore, if an asylum seeker appealed to the courts against a 
deportation order, this extended the process by a further twelve to fourteen months.695 In 
an attempt to ease the build up of cases in the High Court, the Refugee Act created the 
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) to assess asylum 
applications and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal to consider appeals for rejected 
applications. This followed the trend in industrialised countries of moving asylum 
appeals to administrative courts in an attempt to ease the pressure on cluttered courts.  
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Effects 
The failure of the Irish government to effect deportations properly until 2000, the 
prospect of receiving a work permit during the asylum application process, the long 
delay in assessing asylum applications and the prospect of bypassing the asylum process 
with the birth of an Irish-born child coincided with a considerable rise in asylum 
applications between 1997 and 2002.  
 
 
Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner  
 
The growth of political and media hostility towards asylum seekers coincided 
with the rise of asylum applications and resulted in a notable increase in racism in 
Ireland, particularly towards Africans. Much of the public enmity derived from the fear 
of the unknown. Most Irish people remained unaccustomed and unexposed to living 
alongside and dealing with foreigners until the 1990s. Therefore, the arrival of different 
peoples speaking different languages with different colour skin had the potential to 
alarm locals, who for decades had lived in a largely homogenous society.  
Although the media’s treatment of the asylum issue improved after the low of 
1997, certain media outlets often highlighted the identity of foreigners, and in particular 
asylum seekers and refugees, when communicating negative stories. One reader 
highlighted this practice in a letter to the editor of the broadsheet Irish Independent: 
 
When I read your paper on the internet recently I was confronted with the following 
headlines: “Investors stung for £10m by Nigerians”, “Asylum seeker arrested over 
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‘suitcase body’ killing”, “Ethnic violence in our cities ‘waiting to happen’ warning”, 
“Refugee arrested over fee fraud scam” and “Refugee is charged with murder”. 
One would be forgiven for believing that refugees and asylum seekers were responsible 
for a crime wave hitting the country on the basis of these headlines. Is it any wonder that 
you also report that four out of five people from ethnic minorities surveyed experienced 
racism here? 
You don’t normally indicate which county Irish criminals come from in your headlines, 
why treat refugees differently? … Like it or not, as shapers of public opinion you have a 
responsibility not to promote racist stereotypes.696  
 
A study published towards the end of 1998 confirmed that the vast majority of 
non-white asylum seekers questioned experienced some form of racism at the hands of 
Irish people. A few months later, in February 1999, a Catholic organisation called the 
Pilgrim House Community found that 95 per cent of African asylum seekers incurred 
racially motivated verbal or physical attacks while only 14 per cent of East European 
asylum seekers sustained the same treatment.697 As one African surmised, asylum 
seekers – especially black ones – often received a hostile reception in Ireland: 
 
On the streets of Dublin and in buses, too, I have continued to experience racism in the 
form of verbal abuses and unpleasant staring. I have also been assaulted several times. 
Imagine people calling me "motherfucker, dogs" or saying to me: "no blacks . . . no 
dogs, blacks go home . . . go back to your jungle". 
It pains me a lot also whenever I am referred to as a "scrounger". Many people do not 
think of one fleeing from persecution as anything but a ne'er-do-well. Again, any day 
that I dress well, people complain and ask me how I am getting the money to buy 
clothes. Looking tattered, they also complain (nagging is the best word) and regard me 
as an impoverished man from Africa. … What is the essence of life? I am not welcomed 
in my native country. I am not welcomed here, either – but why?698 
 
One study published at the end of 2000 found that almost two-thirds of asylum 
seekers experienced racism, with the percentage rising to 87 per cent among black 
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asylum seekers.699 Another survey, published in the same volume, found that a large 
group of Irish teenagers questioned for a study felt that well-dressed asylum seekers and 
refugees abused the Irish welfare system or pursued criminal activities. They also feared 
that they represented a threat to Ireland’s perceived cultural identity.700 Similar 
sentiments also appeared in responses from third-level students, with a quarter of those 
surveyed agreeing that people from ethnic-minority groups abused the social welfare 
system.701 Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this hostility pertained to its origin. 
Less than one per cent of those polled in the Pilgrim House Study had ever met or ever 
spoken to an asylum seeker. By contrast, sixty-one per cent cited the media as the source 
for their opinions.702  
Tabloid newspapers often propagated plainly false information, which intensified 
public antipathy towards asylum seekers. Political refutations of such false information 
remained rare. On 13 November 2001, for example, the Fianna Fáil deputy Conor 
Lenihan – who later became Ireland’s first minister with responsibility for integration – 
asked whether the government’s asylum policy resulted in “preferential treatment for 
housing allocation, free or subsidised motor vehicles, or mobile phones to asylum 
seekers.”703 Perhaps unconvinced by the answer in the face of continuing rumours and 
stories about such a practice, Lenihan asked the same question again over three months 
later.704  
The reason for the continued suspicion that such practices actually existed came 
from government inactivity. In October 2002, a Green Party member asked the Minister 
for Social Welfare whether or not she wrote to the Irish Daily Mirror after it ran an 
article entitled ‘Free Cars for Refugees: Cash Grants Buys BMWs’ one month earlier. 
The minister informed the Green Party member that although her department issued a 
press release refuting the allegation, it took no action against the newspaper in 
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question.705 Thus, the publishing of such untruths went largely unpunished.706  
Vociferous hostility towards asylum seekers became more widespread in the 
spring of 2000 on the back of the government’s decision to disperse people seeking 
asylum throughout the country, a trend helped in no part by the huge increase in asylum 
applications that took place in the second half of 1999. In the seven months from 
January to July 1999, 2,546 people requested asylum in Ireland. Yet, in the five months 
that followed the government’s announcement to grant work permits to certain asylum 
seekers, the number more than doubled, to 5,178 applicants.707  
 
 
Source: Irish Times and Irish Independent708 
 
The department of justice believed one of the reasons for the swell in requests related to 
traffickers deliberately misrepresenting the work permit announcement. Other 
explanations provided by the department related to the boisterous economic situation in 
the country, the relatively attractive welfare system and the Minister for Justice’s 
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inability to deport failed asylum seekers for most of 1999.709 
Resident groups drew serious umbrage at the decision to locate asylum seekers in 
their towns and villages. Locals from Rosslare, in the country’s south-east, opposed the 
move intently with one resident commenting that the asylum seekers could “come in 
with AIDs or anything else.”710 A Kerry councillor, fearing the arrival of asylum 
seekers, claimed that the vast majority of them were “freeloaders, blackguards and 
hoodlums.”711 In a Cork suburb, locals boycotted a meeting with department of justice 
officials to discuss the arrival of asylum seekers. One local clearly voiced his 
disapproval: “Tramore does not want the refugees. Give them to someone else.” More 
worryingly, a hotel in a small Tipperary town chosen to host thirty or more asylum 
seekers went on fire, the scene of a suspected arson attack.712 The up-market Dublin 
suburb of Ballsbridge, however, showed its opposition in a more subtle fashion. 
Residents immediately brought a case to the High Court, thereby halting state plans by 
citing planning irregularities in conjunction with the building supposed to house asylum 
seekers.713 One Clare councillor summed up much of the public feeling when he 
commented in January 2001: “We have enough of refugees and we want no more of 
them.”714 
The lack of government consultation with towns and villages on the issue made 
matters worse. As Hope Hanlon, the UNHCR representative for Ireland, wrote in 
December 1999 when discussing the government’s plan to disperse asylum seekers:  
 
A successful dispersal policy will hinge on preparing adequately both host communities 
and asylum-seekers alike. Successful integration in large part depends on the ability of 
both sides to understand where the other is coming from. It is a truism to say that 
informed debate will be the key. 
Primarily, dispersal must be considered in consultation with local and regional 
authorities, voluntary groups dealing with refugees, schools, trade unions, churches, 
police, local authorities and the community at large.715 
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Contrastingly, the government chose to send asylum seekers to certain towns and 
villages without the consent or the deliberation of local residents. It appeared that no 
dialogue took place until after the government took the decision, a determination that 
inflated public opposition further. 
In addition to identity-based opposition to asylum seekers, resource-based 
opposition also became prevalent. This became particularly clear when hospital Masters 
claimed that asylum seekers giving birth placed more pressure on a health system 
already under great stress. Dr Peter McKenna, the Master of the Rotunda Hospital in 
Dublin – the main maternity hospital in the capital – claimed in June 2000 that: 
 
We are seeing people come to us very late in their pregnancies, mainly Nigerians but 
also Eastern Europeans. We would often wonder how they manage to travel half way 
across the world pregnant and walk in the door to us at 39 weeks. We’re past the stage 
of being surprised at the numbers of refugees giving birth but I have no doubt 
whatsoever that the system is being exploited.716 
 
Another Dublin maternity hospital, Holles Street, complained one year later that 
it could not cope with the “baby boom” because of a shortage of midwives. Dr Declan 
Keane, the master of Holles Street hospital, outlined the situation when he commented: 
“The numbers are now what they were back in [19]81 or [19]82. Back then, only 25 per 
cent of patients were first-time mothers. Now it’s half – 48 per cent. There were no 
refugees then.” This, he claimed, had a stark effect on Dublin’s three maternity 
hospitals: “From a risk management point of view, from a health and safety point of 
view, there is a safe number you can deliver – otherwise you start to cut corners. It could 
well happen within the next few months that our insurers say this hospital is 
uninsurable.”717 Politicians and media groups carried similar messages. For instance, 
Enda Kenny, a future leader of the Fine Gael party, asked in parliament at the end of 
March 2002 whether the Minister for Health knew that “entire African villages in some 
countries intend to travel to Ireland and other EU destinations for general health care 
and for giving birth, with a view to future eligibility for health benefits.” Similarly, in 
May 2002 one independent councillor, aligned to Fianna Fáil, commented that asylum 
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seekers were “breeding like rabbits.”718 These negative perceptions inevitably created 
hostility amongst the public. A report published in March 2002 by the government-
backed National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism, found, for 
example, that pregnant black women received taunts in public because of “sweeping 
generalised statements that one finds enunciated from certain quarters” regarding 
asylum women giving birth.719 
Nonetheless, the government did put in place several measures to combat the 
growth of racism after constant pressure from NGOs, religious groups and the 
UNHCR.720 In early 2001 the government established a three-year £4.5m (EUR5.71m) 
public awareness programme to address racism and endeavour to promote a more 
inclusive society. Moreover the government launched the National Action Plan Against 
Racism in September 2001 and in February 2002 all the major Irish parliamentary 
parties agreed to sign an anti-racism election protocol, which forbade the use of racist 
material or remarks by candidates and party workers and demanded sensibility in 
discussing race-related issues.721 The signing of the anti-racism protocol by all of the 
main political parties meant that the subject of asylum seekers rarely made its way into 
pre-election discussions. Instead, parties fought the elections over traditional issues, with 
the Fianna Fáil-PD coalition receiving a resounding victory at a time of increasing 
economic prosperity. Aine Ní Chonaill, of the newly formed anti-immigration political 
party, Immigration Control Platform, received just 926 votes in her constituency out of a 
valid poll of 44,016.722 
 
4.4 Regaining control, 2002-2008 
 
When Michael McDowell of the Progressive Democrat party took over from John 
O’Donoghue as the new Minister for Justice after the 2002 general election, he vowed to 
implement a more vigilant asylum system. Though actors sympathetic to asylum seekers 
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protested, their power to influence appeared to have decreased somewhat. Nonetheless, 
much of the government’s problems stemmed from its past inability to deport rejected 
asylum seekers rather than from the direct influence of NGOs. The ability of asylum 
seekers to remain as parents of an Irish born child further complicated this problem. The 
2002 European Court of Justice Chen case, when a Chinese couple received the right to 
reside in the UK because their daughter qualified for Irish citizenship on account of her 
birth in Belfast – as will be described below, people born in Northern Ireland 
automatically qualified for Republic of Ireland citizenship – contributed to the 
government’s efforts to close this loophole.  
 
Formation 
The new Minister for Justice and former Attorney General, Michael McDowell, 
introduced a series of measures to lower asylum numbers shortly after taking up his new 
position. He advocated to fast track the asylum applications of people coming from a 
number of perceived “safe” countries in October 2002: 
 
Certain countries will be listed in a formal way as countries in respect of which Ireland 
doesn’t accept that they are likely to be oppressive or tyrannical regimes and in those 
cases there will be a presumption of manifest unfounded nature. There will still be a 
quick investigation of any particular claim but the presumption will be that the claim is 
unfounded.723 
 
Another move to clamp down on asylum numbers came at the end of that same year 
with the introduction of the 2002 Immigration Bill before parliament. The bill proposed 
the introduction of carrier liability for any airline, ferry company or haulier caught 
transporting undocumented migrants to Ireland. The department of justice also 
announced an investigation into the amount of social benefits asylum seekers received 
“to ensure that Ireland does not find itself unwittingly subsidising international criminals 
engaged in this trade by allowing their victims to pledge future social assistance 
payments in exchange for their illegal passage to the State.”724 In late 2002 he also 
abolished the advisory board for services relating to asylum seekers and refugees, which 
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included a number of NGO and trade union representatives.725 
 Not only NGOs and religious leaders reacted to these policy changes with 
exasperation. The IMPACT trade union clearly stated that, in its opinion, the new 
policies discussed by the government represented “a further drift from care to 
deterrence.”726 However, McDowell steadfastly defended his department’s moves: “95 
per cent of people support me. There’s a vocal minority of people who keep attacking 
me. But I believe that the people realise in their hearts that what has been going on for a 
number of years cannot be allowed to continue.”727 McDowell also rejected UNHCR 
criticism of the new legislation, citing other EU countries’ use of similar policies when 
defending the government’s plan.728 The Irish Human Rights Commission, whose 
statutory obligation required the organisation to ‘keep under review the adequacy and 
effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights’, 
complained in a letter to the Minister for Justice that ‘it was deeply concerned about 
aspects of the legislation [2002 Immigration Bill] and about the absence of time for 
adequate and reflective consideration of some very significant amendments’ that NGOs 
brought to attention in their submissions on the proposed bill.729 Moreover, the Social 
Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill published in February 2003 intended to 
“prohibit asylum seekers and certain other non-nationals from accessing rent supplement 
payments”.730 Up until then, asylum seekers who remained in Ireland because of 
parentage of an Irish child received rent supplements on the same basis as Irish 
nationals. When new legislation came in force in June 2003 however, asylum seekers no 
longer qualified for such benefits. Instead they had to remain in direct provision 
accommodation. The Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, defended the practice by 
again referring to the UK and the EU: 
  
The introduction of direct provision on 10 April 2000 brought Ireland into line with 
other member states of the European Union, including the United Kingdom, and 
followed thorough investigation and planning. It is widely accepted that a harmonised 
approach to asylum seekers is by far the best approach and I believe the system of direct 
provision is a humane, fair and effective means of meeting the basic needs of our 
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asylum seeker population. In fact, I would strongly contend that the treatment of asylum 
seekers in the State is, at a minimum, on a par with the best on offer anywhere in the 
world.731  
 One week later, McDowell told an upper house parliamentary committee that 
“the vast majority of [asylum] applicants are economic migrants and not asylum 
seekers”. To sustain his argument, he contended that “[n]inety per cent of cases are 
unfounded.”732 In January 2004, he continued to pour scorn on many of the applications 
made for asylum when he underlined a perceived criminal element in the process: 
“There is clear evidence to show that our asylum determination process is being abused 
by criminal elements whose activities have clear implications for the security and 
authority of the State itself and the general economic welfare of its citizens.”733 Two 
years later, McDowell reiterated this belief when he defended the Secretary General of 
his department and the Director General of the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration 
Service who reportedly stated before the Dáil Publics Account Committee that ‘the 
majority of asylum seekers are economic migrants and that in pursuance of their claims 
such persons invariably lie through their teeth and that the judicial process at his 
Department is ambushed right up to the point of deportation’.734  
 
Implementation 
As Minister for Justice, McDowell placed a renewed emphasis on enforcing more 
deportations from 2002 onwards. In his first summer in charge, McDowell ordered a 
series of early morning Irish police raids to capture those selected for deportation.735 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of asylum seekers refused refugee status never left 
Ireland under McDowell’s stewardship. The graph below shows the number of 
deportation orders signed between 2000 and 2004, as well as the number of deportations 
carried out. Evidently, the ratio of deportations carried out with McDowell as Minister 
for Justice remained remarkably similar to that of his predecessor’s. The real problem, 
as the government realised, related to the constitutional interpretation that an Irish-born 
child had the right to reside in Ireland with his/her family. 
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Source: Dáil Éireann, Vol. 609, 8 November 2005.736 
 
In 2002 the government consequently pressed ahead with its deportation order 
for a Czech couple and a Nigerian man who had failed to attain refugee status but relied 
on their parentage of an Irish child to remain in the country. In the High Court, Mr 
Justice Smyth noted that the Fajujonu family, whose case in 1989 had prompted 
thousands of asylum seekers to receive leave to remain in Ireland, had lived in the 
country for an “appreciable time” (eight years), whereas the applicants before him had 
lived in the state for less than one year. He judged that the amount of time spent by the 
child in Ireland, the age of the child and its adaptability to change at a young age 
retained importance when considering a deportation order.737 Citing these reasons, the 
judge refused their appeal to quash the state’s deportation orders. 
The Supreme Court ruled on the case in January 2003. In the meantime, the 
number of asylum seekers applying to remain on the basis of parentage of an Irish child 
continued to rise, with 6,887 applying in 2002.738 Conversely, the Supreme Court ruling 
threw the status of many of these cases into doubt when it declined to reverse the 
Minister for Justice’s decision to deport the aforementioned applicants by a majority of 
5-2. In Lobe, Osayunde and Others v Minister for Justice, the minister defended his 
decision to deport the applicants because of “the overriding need to preserve respect for 
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and the integrity of the asylum and immigration systems.” The Supreme Court clearly 
outlined its reasons for concurring with such a view: 
 
A child who is a citizen of Ireland also enjoys a constitutional right to the care and 
company of his or her parents and other family members. Such rights were not, 
however, without limits. It did not, in particular, follow that such children had an 
automatic right to be provided with parental care within the State. 
It is, in particular, legally and constitutionally possible for the State to deport the non-
Irish national parents of an Irish child, if the Minister forms the view that the common 
good so requires. This is permitted notwithstanding the fact that an Irish-born child 
might also effectively have to leave the State in order to enjoy the continued company of 
its family.  
… The family of an Irish-born child has no automatic right to reside in the State simply 
by virtue of such family relationship. 
Thus, where the Minister can demonstrate that, with good and sufficient reasons, the 
common good requires that non-Irish nationals no longer be permitted to remain in the 
State, it was open to the Minister to deport such persons notwithstanding the fact that 
they are parents of Irish citizens. 
… The State has an inherent right and duty to control the access of aliens to the State. 
The State, in particular, has an inherent right to expel or deport aliens not lawfully 
resident in Ireland. These rights are an aspect of the State’s sovereignty, and are 
exercised on its behalf by the Executive. 739 
 
Cubie and Ryan pointed out that the decision deferred significantly to the 
government in making and enforcing Irish immigration policy.740 This move provoked 
much criticism. One independent legal expert, William Binchy, felt that the Supreme 
Court had ‘surrendered to the Government and civil servants a vast acreage of 
discretion’. He surmised that ‘children born in Ireland whose parents are asylum-seekers 
or illegal immigrants are not as entitled to the protection of the family provisions in the 
Constitution as other children of more conventional social profile.’741 One of the two 
dissenting Supreme Court judges, Justice McGuinness agreed. She stated that: 
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… given the repeated emphasis by this Court in its decisions over the years on the 
nature, weight and importance of the rights of the family of the family set out in Articles 
41 and 42 of the Constitution – rights which the Minister accepts are rights possessed by 
these children and these families – I am not satisfied that respect for the maintenance of 
the immigration and asylum system is sufficiently grave and substantial a reason or so 
predominant and overwhelming a reason in the circumstances of the cases and in the 
context of the common good to justify the denial of the constitutional rights of these 
children and their families.742 
 
As a form of compromise, the Supreme Court ruled that in determining the cases of 
family members the minister had to take into account the ‘the length of time that the 
family had residence in the State, the integrity and effectiveness of the immigration laws 
of the State and the provisions of the Dublin Convention’. Consequently all 11,000 
applicants awaiting a decision on their right to remain in Ireland required individual 
consideration.743 
In 2004 the Irish government announced its determination to counter the legal 
loophole contained in the Irish Constitution by proposing a citizenship referendum for 
June 2004. This responded to the Supreme Court’s ruling, which failed to adequately 
rectify the problem of asylum seekers applying for leave to remain on the basis of 
parentage of an Irish child because of its affirmation that all 11,000 required individual 
processing. Furthermore, it closed off an avenue for migrants to attain residency in 
another EU country. Ireland (and the UK) became aware of this loophole when the Chen 
case reached the European Court of Justice.  
In the summer of 2000, two Chinese migrants, temporarily residing in mainland 
UK, travelled to Belfast to give birth to their daughter, Catherine Chen. Under Irish law, 
which gave all persons born in Northern Ireland the right to claim Irish citizenship, 
Chen’s parents applied for an Irish passport for their daughter. When the parents of 
Catherin Chen moved back to Cardiff, they claimed that Catherine’s EU citizenship, 
gained via her Irish citizenship, gave them the right to remain with her in the UK. 
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Crucially, the European Court of Justice agreed.744 As a consequence, proposed changes 
to Ireland’s citizenship laws would not automatically confer on children born in Ireland 
the right to Irish citizenship, thereby disallowing the parents of Irish-born children 
automatic rights to remain in the country if not Irish themselves.745  
 The government, defending the proposed legislation argued that Ireland 
remained the only EU15 country that still practiced ius soli. Although actors 
sympathetic to asylum seekers challenged the referendum, the build up remained 
remarkably muted. Instead, most debate focused on European and local elections due to 
take place on the same day. While Labour, Sinn Féin and the Green Party all opposed 
the referendum, the largest opposition party, Fine Gael, supported it.746 The Catholic 
Church remained remarkably quiet on the issue until one week before the referendum, 
when Catholic Bishops issued a vague statement, which, although sympathetic to 
immigrants and asylum seekers, declined to encourage people to vote for or against the 
referendum.747 The referendum passed comfortably, with 79 per cent supporting the 
government’s proposed change and 21 per cent voting against it.748 The Irish Nationality 
and Citizenship Act 2004, enacted on 1 January 2005, stipulated that a person born on 
the island of Ireland to non-Irish nations is only entitled to citizenship if one of his 
parents has resided legally in the country for three of the previous four years.749 
Although a notable change from previous policy, Ireland’s ius soli citizenship policy 
still remained the most open of all EU countries.750 
 
Effects 
Following the referendum, the Irish Nationality and Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2004 
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came into force on 1 January 2005. As part of the legislation, the government decided to 
grant permission to remain to all the parents of children born in Ireland before 1 January 
2005. As a result, nearly 17,000 received leave to remain.751 Thereafter, asylum 
applications decreased. While over 11,500 applied for asylum in 2002, less than 4,000 
applied in 2008. The enormous drop in numbers mirrored what occurred in many other 
European countries; although this failed to stop government politicians claiming credit 
for the decrease.752 The neighbouring UK, for instance, received 103,000 applications in 
2002 but only 27,850 claims in 2006.753 
 
 
Figures: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner  
 
In the interim, a steady stream of criticism from NGOs, concentrating on the 
defects associated with direct provision, continued to pepper debate. The Free Legal 
Advice Centre (FLAC) sternly criticised the practice in its report entitled ‘Direct 
Discrimination’. It found that direct provision left ‘asylum seekers bored, isolated, 
socially excluded, impoverished, deprived of services, unaware of their entitlements, 
demoralised, deskilled and institutionalised.’ It concluded that direct provision was 
‘gravely detrimental to the human rights of a group of people lawfully present in the 
country and to whom the Government has moral and legal obligations under 
                                                
751See Department of Social and Family Affairs, ‘The Operation of the Conditional Residence Condition’, 
July 2006, p. 14 and Michael McDowell, Dáil Éireann, Vol. 622, 27 June, 2006. 
752
  
753
 Matthew Price, Rethinking Asylum, pp. 8-9. 
199 
 
international law.’754 According to Steve Loyal, asylum seekers placed in direct 
provision under the government dispersal programme constituted Ireland’s most 
disempowered social group, ‘since they lack[ed] the right to work and their access to 
education and training [wa]s severely limited. Their presence mark[ed] the nadir of the 
putative values of the Celtic Tiger: they [we]re marginalised, excluded, poor and, in 
many respects, they lack[ed] freedom.’755 More recently, Claire Breen wrote that 
Ireland’s practices contravened international and European law.756  
In 2006 doubt also began to cast over what McDowell had termed Ireland’s “fair 
but firm” asylum policy when two members of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal resigned 
because of dissatisfaction with its chairman.757 One opposition member, Ciarán Cuffe 
from the Green Party, raised doubts about the supposed independence of the tribunal 
when he raised the issue in parliament several months later: “The Minister appoints the 
members of the tribunal, there is no independent selection or interview and I have heard 
that at least one member has never granted leave to remain to any individual with whose 
case he has dealt.”758 A Supreme Court ruling in June 2006 to grant the High Court 
permission to examine the statistics of the Refugee Appeal Tribunal placed further 
scrutiny on the tribunal.759 Three asylum seekers brought the case to the courts in order 
to restrain a certain Refugee Appeals Tribunal member from hearing their case because 
of alleged bias.760 Just days before due to hand over the documents on the tribunal’s 
statistics to the High Court, however, the Refugee Appeals Tribunal settled the case out 
of court and agreed to allow the three asylum seekers to try their appeals under other 
members of the tribunal. 
Despite reservations over the even-handedness of the asylum system and the 
sustained criticism of dispersal, the effectiveness of sympathetic actors’ decreased 
during the 2000s as compassion appeared to fade among previously concerned sections 
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of the media, the parliament and the public in the face of rising numbers of rejected 
asylum seekers apparently remaining in the country courtesy of Ireland’s legal 
loopholes. Although the 2007 elections saw the demise of the PDs, with their leader and 
talisman, Michael McDowell, also losing his seat, Fianna Fáil continued to maintain its 
restrictive stance towards asylum policy, as the draft Immigration, Residence and 
Protection Bill published by the Irish government in January 2008 demonstrated. 
Opposition to parts of the bill dealing with the asylum process came from various 
opposition politicians, NGOs and the UNHCR, leading to the bill’s return to the drafting 
stage from where it failed to emerge once again in 2008.761  
 
Conclusion 
Ireland’s reaction in the 1990s and 2000s to rising numbers of asylum seekers appeared 
contradictory. A 2000 survey highlighted this trait when it found that although 74 per 
cent of people questioned wanted strict limits on the number of asylum seekers allowed 
into the country, 60 per cent agreed that Ireland should implement a more generous 
approach because of the country’s history of emigration and because of its then 
prosperity.762 This symbolised the Ireland of the Celtic Tiger: drawn to the future and 
their European neighbours but haunted by their poor, emigrant past. This explains why 
sympathetic actors continued to use Ireland’s history as a justification for treating 
asylum seekers more hospitably. These pleas affected people less as time progressed as 
more prescient matters, such as the threat of asylum seekers landing in their villages or 
towns, presented themselves. Although the Catholic Church consistently spoke out in 
favour of officially treating asylum seekers with great sympathy, that institution’s power 
had waned significantly by the 1990s and 2000s because of large-scale revelations of 
sexual abuse carried out by various Catholic religious orders. NGOs tried in vain to 
publicise the difficulties facing asylum seekers and the need for compassionate policies 
rather than restrictive ones. The 2004 referendum, however, clearly demonstrated the 
public position on the issue. Nevertheless, when compared with other countries, 
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Ireland’s treatment of asylum seekers remained quite liberal.  
The beginning of this chapter asked whether Ireland’s response to asylum 
seekers was symbolised by the enmity or empathy previously highlighted in the Irish 
character by Frederick Douglass during the nineteenth century. Since 1989, Ireland has 
shown a remarkable mix of these traits in its response to people seeking refugee status in 
its territory. Many asylum seekers, particularly black ones, experienced hostility on a 
regular basis from natives. The official reaction to asylum seekers, however, contrasted 
from the public one in many ways. Despite the majority of asylum seekers originating 
from countries not associated with widespread conflict or renowned troubles (Nigeria 
and Romania), the country’s generous ius soli citizenship laws and its inability to deport 
asylum seekers in substantial numbers – issues only addressed from 2003 onwards – 
allowed the vast majority of people who sought asylum in Ireland from the 1990s until 
the mid 2000s to attain some form of legal residence. Improved EU measures to restrict 
asylum seekers from ever entering Europe or passing from one European country to 
another has meant that Ireland has had to deal with decreasing asylum numbers in recent 
years, serving to place the issue on the back-burner. The main question now is how 
Ireland will adapt to its multicultural present and future. 
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Chapter 5 
International Trends and National Differences 
 
The small flow of Soviet defectors seeking asylum in Western Europe from the 
establishment of the Geneva Convention in 1951 to 1989 rarely tested western states’ 
post Second World War commitments to asylum. This changed after 1989, however. 
The end of the Cold War meant that liberal democratic governments gained limited 
political benefits from accepting the large numbers fleeing the fallout from the collapse 
of Europe’s communist regimes. Moreover, they acquired neither ideological nor 
economic advantages from assisting rising numbers of people fleeing from conflicts in 
the Developing World from the early 1990s onwards.  
This chapter will seek to unravel common and divergent processes in how liberal 
democratic states reacted to such a phenomenon after 1989 by comparing Australia, 
Italy and Ireland with each other, as well as with other western states. Comparison, Peter 
Kolchin writes, ‘can create an awareness of alternatives, showing developments to be 
significant that without a comparative perspective might not appear so.’ Furthermore, 
comparing cases can explain ‘differences or peculiarities, weighing and eventually 
isolating variables responsible for particular conditions’, as well as helping us to 
‘recognise common patterns and make historical generalisations’.763 Of course, the 
comparative method also creates certain problems. Unfortunately, studying three cases 
inevitably leads to certain national oversights and can lead to sweeping generalisations. 
Nonetheless, this chapter intends to show that despite these obstacles the positives of 
this comparative adventure outweigh the negatives. 
The individual nature of all three cases shines through. National histories, 
identities and geographies all combine to produce specific tendencies. Nonetheless, this 
chapter also finds parallels, some of which emerge when comparing pairs of the case 
studies to individual countries. For example, it contrasts the EU member states, Italy and 
Ireland, with non-European Australia; Catholic Ireland and Italy with the more secular 
Australia; sender societies Ireland and Italy with Australia’s settler society; how boat 
people became the focus of debate in Italy and Australia but not in Ireland; and how 
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common law Australia and Ireland diverged from civil law Italy. By opening up the 
scope to include other countries, certain international trends become apparent, such as 
the rise of restrictive rhetoric amongst politicians, the media and the public towards 
asylum seekers. In response actors sympathetic to asylum seekers, such as pro-asylum 
secular and religious NGOs, certain IGOs, various radical opposition political parties 
and empathetic media outlets, mounted a sizeable campaign to challenge the growth of 
sceptical rhetoric on asylum. To expound on some of these themes further, this chapter 
compares and contrasts asylum policymaking under the three rubrics used heretofore: 
policy formation, policy implementation and policy outcomes. In order to historicise 
asylum policymaking in liberal democratic states since 1989, and therefore set the time 
period against previous decades, analysis is split between the 1990s and the 2000s. 
 
5.1 The 1990s 
Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1990 to 2000, termed the 
1990s the 'turbulent decade' on account of the violence and instability that produced so 
many refugees from the Balkans, Kurdish Iraq and Kurdish Turkey, Afghanistan, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti and Central America 764 In addition to the 
flows these conflicts produced, poor unskilled labour migrants also used the asylum 
process as an avenue to circumnavigate immigration restrictions. Consequently, asylum 
application numbers remained high in liberal democratic states throughout the decade, 
even after the war in the former Yugoslavia abated. 
 
Formation 
Accordingly, the number of people seeking asylum in all three of my case studies 
increased in the 1990s compared to previous decades. Many refugee claimants came in 
the wake of the fall-out caused by the events of 1989. Cambodian boat people and a 
large number of Chinese students applied for asylum in Australia after communist-
democratic transition problems in the former and the violent break up of student protests 
in the latter. Similarly, thousands of Albanians and Yugoslavians fled to Italy 
throughout the 1990s. 
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Ireland received large numbers of asylum applications from former communist 
European countries, such as Romania, but this only occurred from the mid 1990s 
onwards. All three countries saw applications rise significantly towards the late 1990s.  
Italy and Ireland initially reacted to its first experiences with refugee claimants in 
the 1990s with marked empathy. After the murder of the South African refugee Jerry 
Masslo in Italy in 1989, a great outpouring of support for refugees took place amongst 
the Italian public, culminating in an anti-racism march of between 100,000 and 200,000 
people in Rome. Judging by the reaction of Italians to a Eurobarometer poll in 
December 1988 that asked whether to extend or restrict the rights of non-EU citizens, 
the public broadly supported the creation of the liberal 1990 Martelli Law. Sixty-eight 
per cent of Italians believed that non-EU citizen rights should be extended, compared to 
the EU12 average at the time of only thirty per cent.765 
Compared to their EU counterparts, the Irish public also appeared remarkably 
positive towards foreigners in the late 1980s, when sixty-nine per cent of those 
questioned in a Eurobarometer poll responded that the presence of non-EU citizens 
represented ‘a good thing’ or was ‘good to some extent’ for Ireland in the future. Only 
thirteen per cent remarked that non-EU citizens’ presence represented ‘a bad thing’ or 
was ‘bad to some extent’. The EU12 average told a different story, with forty-six per 
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cent responding positively and thirty-five per cent negatively.766 Irish politicians’ 
reaction to the first asylum debate in 1995 reflected this positivity towards foreigners. In 
contrast to the communitarian and religious reasoning behind Italian debates, however, 
the constant commemoration of Ireland’s painful past prompted calls for extensive and 
generous asylum policy reform. Irish politicians in government and in opposition 
frequently referenced Irish emigration history in 1995 to support the formation of the 
expansive 1996 Refugee Act.  
Italy and Ireland made their first telling forays in immigration and asylum policy 
since the Second World War from the late 1980s onwards. By then, NGOs had firmly 
established themselves as intrinsic ingredients of civil society in the West. The end of 
the Cold War opened up additional political space for NGOs, which the explosion in 
global communications facilitated and the major UN impetus to include civil society in 
the early 1990s developed.767 Moreover, networking between organisations ensured 
increased power.768 While the UN granted consultative status to forty-one NGOs in 
1946; by 1992 more than 700 NGOs had attained consultative status with the number 
steadily increasing ever since then to 3,052 organisations in mid 2009.769 This rise 
mirrored developments in the politics of asylum, as NGOs advocating for the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers grew enormously. The UNHCR listed 39 NGOs that 
worked on issues related to refugees in the early 1950s. A 1993 OECD report written in 
collaboration with the UNHCR discussed 1300 NGOs.770 Similarly, the number of 
implementing partners the UNHCR worked alongside went from 594 in 1994 to 852 in 
2008, with NGOs representing approximately three-quarters of these partners.771 
Secular and religious NGOs led many of the public demonstrations that took 
place around Italy in support of refugees and immigration after Jerry Masslo’s murder. 
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Many of the secular NGOs held links to the Italian Left more generally and the Italian 
Communist Party more particularly, which up until its breakup in 1991 remained 
remarkably strong in Italy. ARCI provided a good example of the left-leaning nature of 
many of the sympathetic secular NGOs. As Alana Lentin points out, however, the 
political attachment of some NGOs resulted in less pressure on certain governments than 
others.772 Most of the religious NGOs retained links with the Vatican, such as Caritas, 
and retained an ability to influence the Christian Democrat party until its demise in the 
corruption scandal that hit Italy in the early 1990s. Their strong presence and vocal 
support for expansive immigration and refugee policies led the Italian government at the 
time, and the Socialist minister responsible for migration, to consult with non-state 
actors extensively in the lead-up to the formation of the relatively expansive 1990 
Martelli law, which opened the way for non-Europeans to apply for asylum in Italy. 
Moreover, Catholic NGOs, as well as left-wing secular NGOs, greatly influenced the 
1998 Turco-Napolitano law.773 Similarly, in Ireland, politicians invited NGOs 
advocating for refugees and asylum seekers to help them create a liberal asylum policy, 
to which they duly obliged by playing a central role in the formation of the generous 
original version of the 1996 Refugee Act. Particularly prominent Irish NGOs included 
the Irish Refugee Council, the Irish Red Cross and Amnesty Ireland throughout this 
period. The UNHCR also played a decisive role in cajoling governments in both 
countries to adopt generous asylum policies. 
By contrast, many of Australia’s asylum and immigration policy changes in the 
early 1990s often represented variants of its Migration Act, drafted with little input from 
refugee NGOs in 1958. Correspondingly, Australian governments consulted much less 
with NGOs, when compared with what occurred in Italy and Ireland when forming new 
asylum legislation although protests regularly came from the Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) and the Refugee Council of Australia; 
as well as the UNHCR. Furthermore, because Australia successfully established a 
noticeable division between economic migrants and asylum seekers as far back as 1980, 
when Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal-National coalition government established Australia’s 
‘Special Humanitarian Programme’, NGOs representing labour and family migrants 
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remained largely absent from national asylum debates. The interrelated nature of 
immigration and asylum in new countries of immigration meant that NGOs and trade 
unions in Italy and Ireland, such as the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori 
and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, contributed to asylum-related debates.  
Sympathetic actors in Italy and Ireland fared better than in Australia also because 
of religious leaders and organisations’ contrasting influences. The Catholic Church 
wielded substantial power in both countries over the course of the twentieth century. In 
Ireland, this process began before the southern part of the country gained independence 
from the UK because of Catholic orders’ sizeable presence in the education system. The 
Church’s influence increased after independence, as the 1937 Irish Constitution 
acknowledged.774 Until the 1950s, the influence of the Catholic Church remained potent, 
as the consistent correspondence between Éamon De Valera, the then Irish Prime 
Minister, and the Archbishop of Dublin over important political decisions demonstrated. 
The political power of the Church only began to decrease in the 1960s and 1970s.775 
While the sexual and paedophile scandals that rocked the Church throughout the 1990s 
did much to downgrade the role of the Church in Irish society, the approval of the 
divorce referendum by a majority of less than one per cent in the mid 1990s and 
abortion’s continuing illegal status gives an insight into the power the Church still holds 
over Irish society.  
In Italy, the Christian Democrats' position as the most popular political party in 
the country from the late 1940s until the early 1990s meant that the Church also played 
an extremely influential role in Italian society throughout the twentieth century. The 
location of the Vatican in Rome further enhanced the Church’s input. Even in the wake 
of the Christian Democrat Party’ demise in the 1990s, the Economist suggested in 2007 
that ‘the church wields more direct influence in Italy than at any time in 40 years’ 
because of its success at stifling Italian politicians from legislating on fertility treatment 
and extending legal rights to civil couples, including gay ones.’776 Though not perhaps 
as successful on migrant-related issues, the Church still retained considerable power. 
Indeed, the presence of small political parties emanating from the Christian Democrats 
in Italian governments – on the left and right of the political spectrum – throughout the 
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1990s and much of the 2000s led to a persistent Catholic influence in Italian politics.  
 During the 1930s, Jewish organisations had dominated pro-refugee actions. But 
the marked decrease in European Jews because of Nazi extermination and post-war 
emigration meant these groups diminished somewhat. Various Christian NGOs stepped 
in to the vacuum, including various international Catholic organisations such as Caritas 
and Pax Romana. Specific national Christian NGOs also sprung up in increasing 
numbers. Often these groups referenced the new and old testaments’ various passages 
about helping foreigners to support their stance (as Jewish NGOs had done with the 
latter). Leviticus, for example, stated that ‘The alien who resides with you shall be to 
you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in 
the land of Egypt.’777 Pope Pius XII declared the Holy Family ‘the models and 
protectors of every migrant, alien and refugee of whatever kind who, whether compelled 
by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land, his beloved parents 
and relatives, his close friends, and to seek a foreign soil.’778 During discussions on the 
Refugee Convention in 1951, the Vatican implored the sanctity of the family upon states 
and ultimately ensured the insertion of the right for refugees to accommodate their 
families in their countries of asylum in the convention. More recently, John Paul II took 
up the call. In 1982, he wrote to the UNHCR that refugees represented ‘a shameful 
wound of our time’.779 The Vatican’s supportive stance on refugees continued, with 
various Catholic NGOs and leaders appealing for compassion and solidarity with asylum 
seekers in debates throughout the 1990s.  
When Catholic NGOs spoke on immigration and asylum in Ireland and Italy, 
politicians and the public often listened. Caritas in Italy, for example, produced an 
annual report on immigration that most political, government and media sources relied 
upon. Catholic organisations and leaders’ pleas for compassion for asylum seekers and 
immigrants had a powerful societal effect by bounding sceptical actors to use sensitive 
language when discussing asylum for fear of offending religious voters.780 
Contrastingly, religious groups and religious leaders – although they too criticised 
government asylum policies – did not exert such political authority in Australia. 
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Religion had a negligible effect on domestic Australian affairs, which consequently 
provided a very different dynamic to discussions. 
Australia originally reacted sympathetically to its first asylum debate sparked by 
the arrival of boat people from Indochina in the mid to late 1970s. Only twenty per cent 
of those polled in late 1977 wanted the government to stop boat people. When boat 
people began to arrive once more on Australian shores from late 1989 onwards, the 
reception they received proved remarkable different. These latter boat people met with a 
torrent of hostility and the state immediately began to detain them for the duration of 
their asylum applications. Reflecting the swing in public opinion, a 1993 poll showed 
that 44 per cent of those questioned wanted the government to send back all boat people 
compared to the 20 per cent of 1977.781  
What occurred in Italian and Irish asylum debates after the formation of the 
Italian Martelli Law and the Irish Refugee Act also demonstrated the remarkably short 
shelf life that a compassionate response to asylum crises has in liberal democratic states. 
Two waves of Albanian boat people in 1991 led to two strikingly divergent receptions: 
one hospitable and the other hostile. In Ireland political debate towards asylum seekers 
became noticeably more adverse by 1997. Unlike earlier debates, politicians and the 
media began to refer to these people in an overwhelmingly negative light. Despite 
NGOs and religious groups’ efforts to appeal to the public’s moral conscience in 
promoting the hospitable treatment of asylum seekers, references to the large use of 
taxpayer money and welfare funds often met with more receptive audiences than the 
former. Divergently, what happened to Kosovan refugees who arrived in all three 
countries via organised schemes under the patronage of the UNHCR in 1999 revealed 
that when politicians and the media represented refugees in a more positive manner, the 
public reception became markedly more compassionate.782 
The move from empathy to enmity in Australia, Italy and Ireland closely 
reflected the pattern of asylum debates recorded in Switzerland, Germany and the UK 
by Niklas Steiner. Politicians in the three latter countries frequently used the past – 
mostly in relation to the 1930s and 1940s – to promote more generous policies in early 
asylum debates. Nevertheless, these references repeatedly faded from later asylum 
debates as if, in the words of Steiner, ‘some kind of statute of limitations on moral guilt 
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had run out’.783 The same phenomenon occurred in Italy and Ireland: references to the 
past receded when they bore an uncomfortable relationship with the turn towards 
restrictive policies. This represented a worrying trend if one is to believe Kendal 
Phillips’s opinion that ‘[i]f the existence of a healthy and functioning public is 
intertwined with its capacity for remembrance, then the gradual erosion by forgetting 
must represent a grave danger.’784 Unlike the other countries mentioned, Australia's 
traditional national identity never required tampering; the notion that it selected its 
immigrants rather than merely accepted them had become established in the national 
consciousness decades before. Indeed, politicians consistently raised the point to defend 
the heavy-handed treatment meted out to boat people during the 1990s.  
Asylum seekers were seen to represent more legitimate targets for political 
criticism than economic migrants because they often required state aid, offered little by 
way of visible economic benefits to the host state, and arrived uninvited. Accordingly, 
sceptical actors increasingly dominated asylum policy debates throughout the 1990s. 
Critical actors in all three countries remained unconvinced that asylum seekers could 
integrate into the host societies. Furthermore, they frequently doubted the veracity of 
asylum seekers’ claims for protection. The growth in popularity of sceptical actors 
coincided with a rise in racism in the EU and Australia throughout the 1990s.785 People 
most likely to support xenophobic views appeared dissatisfied with their life 
circumstances, feared unemployment, remained insecure about their futures, and held 
little confidence in public authorities and the political establishment.786 Many of these 
factors affected asylum and immigration debates in Australia and Italy; albeit less so in 
Ireland. Unemployment reached almost eleven per cent in Australian in the early 1990s 
for the first time since the economic recession of the 1970s. Despite decreasing 
somewhat by the mid 1990s, it remained high into the late 1990s. In Italy, 
unemployment surpassed ten per cent in the early 1990s, where it remained for the rest 
of the decade. Ireland contradicted this trend as its unemployment rate fell substantially 
from 1993 onwards. Nonetheless, unemployment still measured almost ten per cent in 
Ireland in 1997. 
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Figures: OECD, OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, under 'Labour' 
 
Australia’s economic growth remained steady but low throughout the decade whilst Italy 
experienced serious economic stagnation. Ireland, by contrast, experienced consistent 
economic growth as the 1990s progressed.  
Poor economic conditions, allied to disgruntlement with traditional political 
parties, led many to seek new alternatives.787 Support for extreme right-wing and 
populist parties began to grow.788 Reflecting this trend, the anti-immigrant tone inherent 
in these parties’ rhetoric contrasted sharply with the established parties’ reluctance to 
debate issues related to immigration. Furthermore, the inability of governments to adapt 
to the challenges produced by immigration served to provide anti-immigrant political 
parties with a seemingly legitimate target to communicate their message.  
In Italy, the break-up of the country’s political system in the early 1990s because 
of corruption scandals and the collapse of communism in Soviet Europe left a political 
vacuum that the Movimento Sociale Italiano’s successor, Alleanza Nazionale, a 
previously isolated party linked to Fascism, and the freshly amalgamated leagues (Lega 
Nord) partly filled. The remarkable growth of these two parties, especially the latter, led 
to a considerable rise in discussions on immigration. Debate consequently became more 
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polarised in Italy. Hostility for immigrants derived partly from the fear that they could 
seriously affect state and regional public services relating to housing, the health system 
and education. Because Italian policy failed to differentiate between asylum seekers and 
economic migrants, various debates on asylum intermingled with those on migration 
more generally. The other major factor affecting immigration debates in Italy centred on 
the perceived cultural and physical threat immigrants might bring.  
Serious economic recession, the Mabo legal judgement on Aboriginal land rights 
and disgruntlement over government immigration policy meant that Pauline Hanson’s 
outspoken views on Aboriginal and immigration policies received a rapturous reception 
in some sections of Australian society when she broke onto the political scene in 1996. 
Opinion polls from the late 1980s onwards had suggested that large sections of the 
public remained critical of the country’s immigration policies. Nevertheless, no 
politician had managed to fully profit from the gulf that existed between public opinion 
and official policy until Hanson emerged. 
Both resource-based and identity-based opposition to asylum seekers figured in 
the lexicology used in Irish debates. Despite the country’s unparalleled economic 
development, politicians, the media and the public kept close watch over their guarded 
national social welfare schemes. When certain sceptical actors accused asylum seekers 
of unfairly taking advantage of the country’s social services, it created a rise in 
antagonism towards newcomers. Ireland’s previous isolation and perceived homogeneity 
meant that hostility to asylum seekers most manifestly different from Irish people 
increased in line with augmented asylum applications. Racist attacks on black asylum 
seekers rose as the decade proceeded. Nonetheless, Ireland’s relatively stable political 
system and economic viability meant that no anti-immigrant party successfully managed 
to achieve any meaningful foothold in Irish politics.  
The media occupied a particularly significant role in instigating hostility towards 
asylum seekers in the 1990s. In theory, the media’s role included monitoring and 
criticising the actions of those in power and reflecting public opinion for decision 
makers and for the general public. Yet, Margolis and Mauser concluded that the media 
reflected rather than monitored the actions of governments.789 Both sympathisers and 
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sceptics required the media to make their voices heard in asylum debates. But as Herbert 
Gans pointed out, ‘since journalists must often let sources come to them, the news is 
weighted toward sources that are eager to provide information’. Political parties, of 
whom those in government dominated, habitually provided these sources to journalists 
writing about asylum. As Chomsky and Herman noted, governments go to great lengths 
to oblige journalists by providing them with facilities, advance copies of speeches and 
scheduling press conferences at times that facilitate their inclusion in the next day’s 
news. Actors supporting asylum seekers often found it difficult to promote their views in 
the media.   
In contrast to mainstream politicians constricted to discussing asylum in a 
politically correct manner – at least in early debates – because of their duty to uphold 
anti-racist norms, the media often used much more explicit and hostile language. 790 The 
media recurrently communicated scare stories about biblical “floods,” “flows,” and 
“invasions” to the public, causing Michael Dummett to comment: 
 
[N]ewspapers, with only occasional partial lapses into decency, have acted upon a very 
simple principle: identify a fairly widespread prejudice, pander to it and inflame it, in 
the process misleading or actually lying to the readers as far as can be safely done. The 
objective aimed at in following this principle has of course been to increase the 
circulation of the newspapers and, likewise, the numbers of people listening to or 
watching the broadsheet programmes. 791 
 
 Nonetheless, not all media outlets contained inherently restrictionist musings on asylum 
seekers. Some contained both sympathetic and sceptical voices while some held 
explicitly expansive views, such as the Irish Times, Il Manifesto and the Melbourne Age. 
Nonetheless, these outspoken sources constituted a diminishing minority as the 1990s 
evolved. 
The empirical chapters demonstrated that mainstream political parties, public 
opinion and the media became generally more sceptical of asylum seekers as the 1990s 
progressed, leading many western governments to promote the formation of more 
restrictionist asylum policies. NGOs, small sections of the media, certain 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the UNHCR and the Council of Europe, and 
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certain minority opposition parties remained sympathetic to asylum seekers and strove 
to stem the turn towards restrictive asylum policies. Despite sceptics’ crucial advantages 
over sympathetic actors when shaping the formation of asylum policies, they had major 
difficulties executing these policy changes. 
 
Implementation 
In an attempt to reduce asylum numbers in the 1990s, liberal democratic governments 
discouraged potential asylum seekers from entering their territories by impeding their 
entry through carrier sanctions and visa requirements and by increasing border control. 
They also consciously made the lives of asylum seekers already present in their 
countries more difficult by detaining asylum seekers in some cases, dispersing them in 
others, and reducing the amount of benefits asylum seekers could receive. Stricter 
deportation measures also became a feature of many countries’ asylum policies. A 
question this thesis has sought to answer, and a question previous research on asylum 
policy has often neglected to ask, is whether these policies succeeded in achieving the 
goals behind their formation.   
The bureaucratic nature of the state meant that forming restrictive policies did 
not necessarily lead to the instigation of tougher policies. In an interrelated argument, 
James Hollifield’s “gap hypothesis” underlines the endurance of immigration in spite of 
the formation of restrictive immigration policies.792 This frequently held true for asylum 
policies, with people continuing to apply for asylum in Australia, Italy and Ireland in the 
late 1990s, despite the formation of perceptibly more restrictive asylum policies. State 
systems encountered enormous difficulties differentiating between which asylum 
seekers deserved their states’ protection and which did not. Economic asylum seekers’ 
efforts to pass themselves off as persecuted asylum seekers hindered this further. 
Hannah Arendt’s comment concerning the 1930s repeated itself over and over: ‘Once 
the government tried to use its right and repatriate a resident alien against his will, he 
would do his utmost to find refuge in statelessness.’793  
When western governments managed to distinguish between asylum claims, they 
still encountered enormous difficulty trying to deport people deemed undeserving of 
protection because of problems ascertaining the identity of asylum seekers with no 
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documentation. Furthermore, no international obligations existed that required origin 
countries to receive their returning nationals without evidence of nationality. The 
Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement principle meant that even if a state managed to 
positively identify rejected asylum seekers and their host states agreed to their return, 
deporting them remained a controversial issue. On issues relating to human rights and 
deportation, Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen rightly point out that public opinion 
can be ‘fickle and unstable'.794 Large sections of the public and the media might support 
the creation of restrictive asylum policies but might contrastingly turn around and 
support campaigns to halt the deportation of certain failed asylum seekers. They desire 
policies to halt the large faceless numbers of asylum seekers but often oppose 
deportation policies to remove real human people that they can relate to. By referencing 
countries’ migration histories and memories, humanitarian and religious traditions, and 
moral consciousnesses, actors sympathetic to people in search of protection managed to 
attract further empathy from actors often opposed to asylum seekers. In Ireland, for 
example, NGOs frequently associated asylum seekers with Irish emigrants in the public 
sphere, thereby tying natives’ harsh pasts with asylum seekers difficult present.795 In 
France, the sans papiers movement in 1996 emphasised the virtues of the country’s 
tradition of espousing human rights.796 Religious groups and leaders also cited 
countries’ moral duties when attempting to stifle governments’ turn towards more 
restrictive policies, as occurred in the Netherlands.797 Nevertheless, sympathetic actors 
also required more concrete methods to successfully dispute government moves to 
further restrict asylum. National courts provided such an avenue. 
The growth of inherently liberal principles in many western states throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century made it increasingly difficult for governments to 
exercise complete control over asylum seekers.798 Following the Second World War, 
certain European governments eager to distinguish themselves from their Fascist 
predecessors adopted liberal constitutions that placed a strong emphasis on rights. To 
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oversee the enforcement of these new constitutions, Germany and Italy established 
constitutional courts. France introduced a preamble to its 1958 Constitution that 
indirectly referenced a number of significant texts on rights and modified its 
constitutional practice to allow any sixty members of its senate or assembly to begin 
constitutional challenges if they saw fit in 1974.799 After the fall of Spain and Portugal’s 
dictator governments in the same decade, they too adopted liberal constitutions, 
followed by Greece in the 1980s. By then, the growing expanse of NGOs had identified 
constitutional courts as potential avenues to effect government policies, especially for 
rights issues, which began to dominate constitutional courts.800  
This reflected a practice already well advanced in North America and Australasia 
where civil actions became more common; a trend that later became apparent in 
European common law systems, such as in Ireland and England. The 1954 US Supreme 
Court case, Brown v Board of Education, which ruled that the segregation of Kansas 
schools represented a violation of the American Constitution, had already demonstrated 
the power of the courts in challenging policy. In Canada, the 1973 Calder v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General) case sparked an overhaul of national policies relating to 
indigenous land rights. Though Australian Aborigines failed to acquire land rights in 
their appeal to the Supreme Court in 1971, the Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd did lead to 
an intensification of indigenous campaigning for land rights in Australia.801  
Many countries’ constitutions extended right to nationals and non-nationals 
alike. This led to a noticeable increase in cases brought before courts by asylum seekers. 
In 1982, for instance, an American district court issued a preliminary injunction against 
the deportation of Salvadoran asylum seekers, a decision approved by the Federal 
District Court of Los Angeles in 1988.802 Similar developments began to also take place 
in Europe, where judges and advocates started to use domestic high courts more 
frequently to challenge regulatory changes.803 The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) played an expanded role in advancing this from the early 1980s onwards. In 
1983, amended rules for the court allowed individuals to take cases before the court, 
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thereby heralding in a new age of appeals to the ECtHR, brought by sympathetic actors 
assisting asylum seekers.804 Crucially, the bestowal of rights on “persons” rather than 
“citizens” in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)805 allowed the court to 
hear cases concerning Europeans and non-Europeans alike.806 The European 
Convention’s legal superiority over Belgian and Dutch domestic legislation – and more 
recently the United Kingdom and Ireland – meant that it served as a bill of rights for 
certain countries without liberal constitutions.807  
When governments introduced new asylum legislation in the 1990s, particularly 
relating to deportation, NGOs and human rights lawyers worked as agents, advisers and 
advocates for asylum seekers and repeatedly called upon judiciaries to decide upon the 
legality of asylum policy changes. Often, drawing on constitutional and legal 
precedents, judiciaries decided in favour of the asylum seekers in question, and in so 
doing challenged the validity of government policy changes, as occurred repeatedly in 
Australia and Ireland. Until 1998, legal aid enabled asylum seekers to appeal to the 
Australian High and Federal Courts.808 After 1998, various pro bono legal groups from 
Australia’s states provided asylum seekers with the complimentary legal assistance, in 
addition to the Immigration Advice and Assistance Scheme. In Ireland, the Free Legal 
Aid Centres (FLAC) and the state-financed but independent Legal Aid Board, which set 
up a special Refugee Legal Service in 1999 helped asylum seekers with their appeals. In 
Australia, the widespread use of the courts by rejected asylum seekers to appeal the 
decision to remove them from the state meant the government’s asylum and deportation 
policy remained constantly in flux. The Irish government’s policies experienced similar 
turmoil. The lack of a fixed Italian asylum policy meant this trend failed to extend to 
Italy in the same way. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Dagmar Soennecken’s recent 
study on the growth of judicial power in Germany and Australia, sympathetic actors 
found other avenues to successfully contest restrictive government initiatives.809 
 
Effects 
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Ultimately, the vast majority of people who applied for asylum in Australia, Ireland and 
Italy during the 1990s remained in Australia, Italy and Ireland despite only a small 
proportion obtaining refugee status. In Australia, this state of affairs derived largely 
from the elongated nature of deportation orders caused by numerous appeals to the 
relatively generous Federal and High Courts from asylum seekers. In Italy, many 
remained by moving into the ever-growing mass of irregular immigrants in the country. 
Some succeeded in regularising their status through government amnesties in 1990, 
1994 and 1998. From the 234,000 regularised in the 1990 amnesty, the 244,000 
regularised in the 1995 amnesty, and the 217,000 regularised in the 1998 amnesty, for 
instance, 71,191 came from Albania and 16,341 came from Sri Lanka; countries that  
produced asylum claims in Italy throughout the 1990s.810 People from these countries 
European countries throughout the 1990s continued to inhabit the submerged world of 
Italy’s undocumented population that the enormous national black labour market relied 
upon. Certain migrants who claimed asylum in Italy, with Kurds especially prominent, 
ventured further north to other EU countries, most notably Germany and France, where 
sizeable networks of their compatriots already lived. In Ireland the vast majority of 
rejected asylum seekers managed to stay because of the country’s inability to deport 
rejected asylum applications. The legal loophole that allowed asylum seekers with an 
Irish-born child to remain in the country facilitated the transition to permanent legal 
status for many of these people.  
Other liberal democratic states’ deportation policies in the 1990s remained 
similarly ineffective. Most rejected asylum seekers continued to reside in Western 
European countries in large numbers. Of the approximately 3.8 million who applied for 
asylum in the EU15 in the 1990s, only 21 per cent received refugee status.811  
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Figures: UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1999 Statistical Overview, p. 119. 
 
Of the 79 per cent of asylum seekers who failed to receive refugee status, some attained 
leave to remain on humanitarian grounds or temporary protection visas. Nonetheless, the 
majority obtained no secondary status. Unfortunately, it remains difficult to quote exact 
numbers of those deported from the EU because, as Liza Schuster acknowledges, 
‘[s]tatistics on deportation are not compiled systematically, are frequently incomplete 
and often it is difficult to work out exactly what or who is being counted’.812 Statistics 
available for Germany and the UK, however, do show the general inability of states to 
deport large numbers of its rejected asylum seekers.813 
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Figures: Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen, ‘Deportation and the liberal state: the forcible return of 
asylum seekers and unlawful migrants in Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom’, p. 3 & p. 5. 
 
 
Figures: Ibid. 
 
Of course, European governments’ inability to sometimes enforce policy changes 
because of uncompromising sender states, large costs and inefficient bureaucracy greatly 
complicated efforts to impose restrictive asylum policies. But one of the purposes of this 
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thesis is to identify and emphasise the underappreciated role of actors sympathetic to 
asylum seekers and refugees, hence my emphasis on internal factors rather than external 
ones. 
Policy changes brought in to make the asylum process more unattractive failed to 
lower the number of people applying for asylum but did manage to greatly affect the 
health, housing and welfare of asylum seekers. The detention of boat people in Australia 
for unlimited periods led to potentially serious psychological and physical effects, as 
noted in the Australian chapter. Detention in Italy, brought in from the late 1990s 
onwards, caused less harm because of its shorter duration. Nonetheless, the lack of 
welfare provisions in Italy led to asylum seekers sometimes living in squalid and unsafe 
environments whilst awaiting the processing of their applications. Indeed, it caused 
many asylum seekers to leave the asylum process and instead become undocumented 
migrants because of the paltry existence many had to endure throughout the asylum 
process. The state only guaranteed funding for the first forty-five days of the procedure, 
even though the process usually lasted much longer. Many worked irregularly, without 
any safeguards for their rights or safety, to subsidise themselves. In Ireland, a 
curtailment of entitlements, such as a decrease in language lessons and integration 
measures, led to the build up of a disconnected, disenfranchised minority. Asylum 
seekers became more ostracised as a group. The negative debates surrounding asylum 
seekers also saw an increase in racist and xenophobic incidents by natives on asylum 
seekers. 
During the 1990s, European governments funded NGOs to help refugees and 
asylum seekers adjust. Policy-makers consulted NGOs and the UNHCR (witness the 
1996 Irish Refugee Act and the 1990 Martelli and 1997 Turco-Napolitano laws in Italy). 
The media quoted NGOs and those seeking asylum relied on NGOs for assistance and 
advocacy.814 Australia remained a noticeable exception to this rule, as NGOs remained 
largely outside of policy debates. Nonetheless, they still managed to influence 
Australian asylum policies because of their involvement in the large rise of appeals 
placed before the courts. Accordingly, most asylum seekers successfully remained in the 
countries in which they sought asylum. Though they faced constant problems in their 
new countries relating to employment, accommodation and integration, they ultimately 
received the asylum they originally sought by continuing to reside outside their home 
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state.  
  
5.2 The 2000s 
Acknowledging the difficulty that governments faced when attempting to deport asylum 
seekers in the 1990s, governments made strident moves to close off sympathetic actors’ 
avenues to affect asylum policies in the 2000s. It became more difficult for asylum 
seekers to ever seek refuge in their countries in the first place by the increased 
externalisation of the asylum process. Asylum seekers that managed to make it to 
western destinations also faced a more difficult path than their 1990s’ predecessors as 
governments strove to impede asylum seekers’ access to national courts. Governments 
also improved their deportation arrangements by instigating agreements with sender 
states and began to process asylum claims more rapidly, thereby diminishing asylum 
seekers’ chances to integrate into host societies. These moves led to a noticeable 
decrease in asylum applications in most western countries. Italy proved the exception, 
however, as the EU’s improved externalisation measures meant that the EU’s border 
countries became predominantly countries of first asylum rather than states that asylum 
seekers passed through en route to somewhere more northerly. 
 
Formation  
The growth of anti-immigration parties caused an explosion of political discussion on 
asylum and immigration. Accordingly, it had a knock-on effect on the more established 
political system, with serious cleavages developing between mainstream political parties 
over these issues as voters from divergent political backgrounds decamped to anti-
immigrant parties. As Paul Sniderman et al. recorded, when issues relating to 
immigration moved to the centre of political argument, ‘the animating values of the right 
resonate[d] not only with its own adherents but also with a very large portion of the 
adherents of the left’.815 The success of anti-immigrant parties in Australia and Italy 
throughout the 1990s caused many mainstream political parties in the 2000s to adopt 
more hard-line attitudes to asylum and immigration to offset the loss of traditional 
supporters and to attract potentially new voters.  
By breaking down the previous bipartisan nature of Australian immigration 
debates, Pauline Hanson initiated a new dawn in Australian politics. Virginie Guiraudon 
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has written extensively about how debates on aliens’ rights in Europe grew increasingly 
volatile when they went from being discussed behind closed political doors to being the 
subject of public debate from the mid 1970s onwards.816 A similar phenomenon 
occurred in Australia after Pauline Hanson rose to prominence in the late 1990s. 
Nevertheless, mainstream political parties refused to question immigration more 
generally, as Hanson consistently did. Questioning Australia’s immigration policy 
would have provoked outrage from many powerful actors, as Gary Freeman has 
demonstrated.817 Instead, mainstream politicians in Australia confined their outspoken 
comments largely to boat people. By picking a small group of defenceless migrants, 
Australian politicians managed to appeal to sections of the public supportive of 
Hanson’s policies while at the same time maintaining the country’s expansive economic 
migration programme.  
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 
allowed the Liberal-National government to criticise boat people further, since most 
came from rogue Islamic countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. A smear campaign 
instigated by the government and supported by most of the media met with little or no 
meaningful political opposition from Labor. This signalled a notable change, with 
Muslims replacing Asians as the bogeymen of Australia thereby confirming Leo 
Lucassen’s contention that the geographic sources of apparent immigrant threats change 
over time as old groups become incorporated into society and contemporary critics 
overemphasize the threat of newcomers.818  
A remarkably similar occurrence transpired in Italy where Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia party began to criticise undocumented migrants more regularly in order to 
neutralise the anti-immigrant Lega Nord in northern Italy.819 Boat people again received 
much of this condemnation because of their very public arrival. Concurrently, 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party, and to a certain extent Fini’s Alleanza Nazionale party, 
continued to voice their support for documented labour migration in order to appease 
powerful actors and exude tolerance. Since many asylum seekers arrived in Italy by boat 
and without the requisite visa, those in search of protection often met with hostile 
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receptions from mainstream political parties and the media, as the response to the arrival 
of a large boatload of Kurds in mid 2002 revealed, with the leader of the Lega Nord 
calling for boats to be bombed. Mainstream political parties, the media and public 
opinion placed great emphasis on the physical threat that these irregular migrants 
allegedly brought with them. In addition to the security threat posed by irregular 
migrants, a supposed cultural threat also emerged in the growing opposition put forward 
towards Muslims in Italy, especially after September 2001. Oriana Fallaci’s 2002 book 
on Islam’s supposed attack on freedom and civilisation, for example, sold over one 
million copies.820 Berlusconi publicly supported Fallaci’s controversial stance; and 
while doing so he pointed out ‘the superiority of our civilisation for well-being and 
respect for human rights; things that are not found in Islamic countries’.821  
Minor, pro-asylum sympathetic political voices continued to oppose mainstream 
governing political parties’ turn towards more restrictive policies in the 2000s. 
Examples included the Greens in all three countries, the Refounded Communists in Italy 
and the Labour Party in Ireland. Nonetheless, dissenting figures in governing political 
parties that favoured forming more generous asylum policies appeared to hold more 
influence as the 2000s progressed. Petro Georgiou of the Australian Liberal Party stood 
out when, in mid 2005, he proposed a private member’s bill that led to a slight softening 
of government detention policy for boat people. A year later, Georgiou and two other 
Liberal backbenchers crossed the floor to vote against a migration amendment bill that 
would have led to all asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat having their 
applications processed abroad. The Prime Minster later withdrew the bill because of the 
threat further Liberal rebels would cross the Senate floor. In Italy, the presence of two 
small parties emanating from the defunct Christian Democrat party in the Berlusconi 
government between 2001 and 2006 stymied some of the proposed tough policies on 
asylum seekers and immigrants.822 
 In Ireland, no successful anti-immigrant party emerged. Perhaps as a 
consequence, political debate on asylum bore less emphasis on asylum seekers 
perceived differences and more stress on their economic costs. The debate about asylum 
seekers’ use of Dublin’s maternity hospitals represented a prime example of this. The 
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perceptible reduction in comparisons between asylum seekers and Irish emigrants 
symbolised Ireland’s hardening attitude. Previous images promoting empathy began to 
diminish as the country’s increasing Western- and European-isation meant that its poor 
past became less pertinent than its expected bright future. Contradicting Roddy Doyle’s 
comment from the 1980s, Irish people by the 2000s no longer symbolically considered 
themselves the blacks of Europe.  
The growth of compassion fatigue meant that NGOs and religious figures met 
with less backing than before from the public, politicians and the media despite the best 
efforts of the NGOs in all three countries.823 This occurred notwithstanding declining 
unemployment in the 2000s; before the 2008-09 economic crisis. 
 
 
OECD, OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, OECD: Paris, 2009, 
Labour section. 
 
In the 1990s, sympathisers relied on the courts to stymie governments’ attempts to 
implement harsher asylum policies. In the 2000s, this proved more difficult as 
governments attempted to close off appeals to national courts, amend legal loopholes 
and externalise the asylum process. 
 
Implementation 
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Recognising the difficulties produced by pro-asylum actors in implementing restrictive 
asylum policies throughout the 1990s, governments attempted to stave off their 
influence in the 2000s. They did so by circumnavigating many of the channels pro-
asylum actors relied upon in the 1990s to protect asylum seekers from the potential 
damages of restrictive asylum policy changes. In Australia, this took an extreme form 
after the Tampa standoff in autumn 2001. The incident allowed the government to 
successfully introduce a privative clause denying asylum seekers the right to seek 
judicial review of their asylum claim in all but the most exceptional of circumstances. 
The Labor opposition had opposed the clause for the previous two years but its fear of 
losing further votes over Tampa led to the collapse of its resistance. Despite the 
judiciary managing to thwart this clause one year later, the Pacific Solution’s 
externalisation of asylum still succeeded in restricting asylum to a degree sceptical 
European actors could only dream of. Out of all the EU countries, Italy perhaps came 
closest to replicating the Australian stance when, in 2004, it began to deport 
undocumented migrants to Libya, despite not processing asylum seekers’ claims for 
protection before deportation. Sympathetic actors did eventually manage to halt the 
Italian government’s practice.824 Nonetheless, the potential political benefits that can 
arise from taking a harsh public stance on irregular migration meant that international 
condemnation could be offset by considerable domestic gains, which perhaps explains 
Italy’s decision to resume the deportation of undocumented migrants to Libya in 2009.  
The Europeanisation of asylum policy in the 2000s also served to further restrict 
asylum policy in Italy and Ireland. Although intra-national discussions on migration in 
Europe began in the 1980s, the 2000s marked the reintegration of asylum policies into 
the domain of Brussels. The 1999 European Council meeting at Tampere signalled the 
beginning of the supra-nationalisation of asylum and the end of the differences between 
the Commission and the member states concerning asylum and migration policy.825 Up 
until then, member states came together via European trans-governmental working 
groups to consider these policy issues. Significantly, these groups excluded the 
European Commission. When the member states agreed to bring the issue back under 
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the competence of the Commission, it did so only after it became firmly established 
under the responsibility of the EU’s third pillar, which represented security and justice 
affairs. This reflected the influence of the Trevi, Ad Hoc Committee on Immigration 
(AHI) and Schengen groups, which the member states established in the 1980s.  
Previous discord between the Commission and the member states stemmed from 
a critical case in the European Court of Justice taken by Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK against the European Commission in the mid 1980s. 
The five countries argued that the Commission exceeded its mandate when it made 
efforts to implement a set of guidelines for a community policy on immigration. In their 
submissions to the European Court of Justice, the five contended that the Treaty of 
Rome made no provision for a common policy in the social field; the Commission’s 
role, they contented, was designated to exclusively deal with non-binding instruments.826 
At the oral procedure stage, the Commission communicated its past problems with the 
member states regarding a common migration policy. Its attempts to initiate discussions 
on a common policy had, it stated, met with total opposition from certain member 
states.827 The European Court of Justice annulled certain parts of the Commission’s 
policy initiative, with the overall effect of fudging the issue. It also displayed the intent 
of many member states to keep the Commission, which had heretofore proposed several 
inclusive initiatives on migration, away from an issue that they regarded as one 
inherently linked to that of sovereignty.  
In the 1990s, member states’ tendency to remove the possibility of Commission 
tinkering with national immigration and asylum policies for non-EU citizens continued, 
with asylum numbers remaining ‘too high’ and politically explosive for most countries’ 
governments to give up national competency.828 Instead, trans-governmental working 
groups, comprised of government ministers from various member states with 
responsibility for asylum, brought forward several asylum initiatives. The aim of the 
first inter-governmental Schengen Agreement, signed in June 1985 by the Benelux 
countries, France and Germany, aimed to gradually decrease controls on community 
citizens crossing internal borders; but the intention of the second Schengen Agreement, 
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signed in 1990, bore little resemblance. As Sandra Lavenex explained, ‘the biggest 
consensus among the contracting parties was manifested in questions relating to the 
fight against illegal immigration and the intake of asylum seekers, which was in fact 
where the most detailed and far-reaching provisions were adopted – although the 
question of asylum seekers and refugees was not even mentioned in Schengen I.’829 
With these changes, Schengen came to signify “Fortress Europe” due to the inclusion of 
a number of measures relating to the harmonisation of regulations concerning checks at 
external frontiers, the improvement of international co-operation at the level of the 
police and judiciary and the harmonization of visa and immigration policies.                     
830
 Nonetheless, various teething problems with these new restrictive practices meant 
they only bore fruition in the 2000s, however, as rising asylum claims in the late 1990s 
demonstrated. 
Similarly, member states set up the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (AHI) in 
1986 as an offshoot of the Trevi group, which consisted of officials from all European 
member states’ justice and interior ministries – but not the Commission. As Lavenex has 
pointed out, the presence of Schengen officials in the AHI meant that the ‘Schengen 
actors were able to engage in double-tracked activities, and thus, could pass on their 
ideas to other member states’.831 She records that the provisions of the second Schengen 
Agreement closely resembled those of the 1990 Dublin Convention, which attempted to 
regulate the in-flow of asylum seekers to the EU.832 Its objective?: to eradicate so-called 
“asylum-shopping” by ensuring that an asylum seeker could only make an application in 
his or her country of arrival. These kinds of intra-governmental initiatives continued 
throughout the 1990s. Virginie Guiraudon acutely surmised the idea behind these 
moves: 
 
Building upon pre-existing policy settings and developing new policy frames, 
governments have circumvented national constraints on migration control by creating 
transnational co-operation mechanisms dominated by law and order officials, with EU 
institutions playing a minor role. European trans-governmental working groups have 
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avoided judicial scrutiny, eliminating other national adversaries and enlisted the help of 
transnational actors such as transit countries and carriers.833  
 
The European dactylographic system, a biometric identification project known 
more commonly as Eurodac, represented one striking example of this development. In 
late 1991, inter-governmental discussions took place on the prospect of instigating a 
European finger-printing scheme for asylum seekers. In November 1992, the AHI 
established a progress report to establish the feasibility of such a project. Political 
dialogue over the system began one year after the report confirmed the viability of the 
project in 1995. The steep increase in asylum figures from mid-1997 onwards, caused 
mainly by political instability in Kurdish Iraq, caused states to expedite plans to 
implement the scheme. Inter-institutional problems arose between member states and the 
European Commission concerning which of them would hold responsibility for 
implementing the scheme. Again, the member states managed to ensure the operation of 
the scheme rested with them when the European Council adopted Eurodac in 2000 and 
put it into force in January 2003.834  
In Ireland, governments from 1997 onwards referenced other EU countries’ 
asylum policies, particularly British asylum policy, to defend the formation of more 
restrictive legislation and practices; a factor again evident in the debates leading up to 
the 2004 citizenship referendum. German government politicians notably did the same 
when controversially reforming its Basic Laws in 1993 to restrict asylum.835 The 
Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 demonstrated Ireland’s desire to 
integrate the EU Qualification Directive (European Council Directive 2004/83/EC) on 
minimum standards for the qualification on protection. It emphasised the role of 
‘subsidiary protection’, however, in a highly restrictive spirit, which caused widespread 
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unquiet amongst NGOs and opposition politicians and led to the bill returning to the 
drafting board once more. Successive Italian governments, by contrast, have consistently 
failed to implement EU measures relating to asylum; instead they have employed what 
Caponio and Zincone call a “sham Europeanisation” to supposedly incorporate EU 
asylum policies.836 This stems, once again, from the absence of organic domestic 
legislation covering the country’s asylum policy. In addition to aiding states’ to further 
restrict their asylum regimes, closer European ties also succeeded in stifling some 
member states’ restrictive desires. 
The ECHR, which all EU member states were obliged to sign, insured that 
detention of asylum seekers remained a controversial policy for European members to 
apply. The Council of Europe regularly reminded European states of their commitment 
to the ECHR. The ECtHR interpreted article 3 of the convention, which prohibited 
‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as applying to conditions of detention 
and as further reason to enforce the non-refoulement principle if potential deportees 
faced the possibility of experiencing maltreatment in their home country. The steady 
stream of asylum cases going to the ECtHR in the 2000s testifies to the ability of the 
Convention to challenge national asylum policies, as demonstrated most clearly by the 
2004 ECtHR case which ordered Italy to halt the deportation of migrants back to 
Libya.837 Although several states, including Italy, did choose to detain asylum seekers, 
they never managed to employ as strict a detention policy as Australia because of the 
influence of supranational organisations. Consequently, European states usually 
employed detention as a short-term measure. In contrast, Australia’s defiance during and 
after the Tampa incident candidly exhibited its ability to act alone. 
 
Effects 
States’ externalisation and securitisation of asylum led to significant decreases in 
applications after 2002. From 2006 onwards, Italy alone experienced a large rise in 
asylum applications. Several reasons explain Italy’s exceptionality. Increased European 
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cooperation meant asylum seekers no longer managed to travel through Mediterranean 
EU member states with the same ease as before. In the past, Italy allowed thousands of 
potential asylum seekers to pass through its northern borders. As Massimo D’Alema had 
suggested during his premiership in the late 1990s, if Italy had installed a coherent 
asylum policy, it would have meant an increase in asylum applications. Although Italy 
still lacked a proper asylum policy by 2006, northern states had managed to stem the 
flow of asylum seekers travelling north from EU Mediterranean countries, such as Italy.  
 
 
Figures: Numbers for 2000-2003 taken from previous tables used  in the thesis. Numbers for 2004-2008  
come from UNHCR, ‘Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2008: Statistical Overview of  
Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries’, 2009, p.13, 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf. 
 
The reaction of states to asylum seekers by the 2000s demonstrated the enduring 
nature of national asylum and immigration policies. Countries with traditionally 
officious immigration policies managed to retake control; countries without any 
applicable immigration policies reacted unwittingly. Australia always presided over a 
very ordered immigration system since its federation in 1901. When boat people in the 
1990s and 2000s threatened this, successive governments implemented a series of 
punitive measures in order to restore control. In so doing, Australia upheld its long-
standing policy of disallowing any unwanted arrivals from entering its society, even if it 
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meant becoming a temporary international pariah.838  
Ireland, although not as renowned as Australia for its strict immigration policies, 
contained similarly restrictive rules relating to entry and stay from its independence to 
the early 1990s. The state refused to let anybody believed to threaten the national 
identity and character of the country to enter the country. Asylum seekers from the 
1990s onwards, however, applied for protection from within Ireland rather than from 
without. Because of the enormous rise in applications that Ireland experienced, the state 
and successive governments reacted with hesitancy when dealing with asylum seekers. 
Yet, after 2002, and especially after the 2004 citizenship referendum, the Irish 
government succeeded in steadfastly negating these problems, as the reduction in 
applications confirmed. Of course, people still managed to apply for protection in 
Australia and Ireland after 2002 because they could not reintroduce measures as 
restrictive as those employed before the 1970s. Nonetheless, numbers decreased and 
with it the amount of debate and discussion over asylum in public and political debates 
more generally. 
Other states that had historically overseen immigration regimes low on 
efficiency and high on ineptitude, such as Italy, struggled to cope with the large increase 
in immigrants arriving in the latter decades of the twentieth century and beyond. Despite 
repeated policy changes that have avowed to tackle immigration over the last twenty 
years, Italy’s infamous bureaucratic inefficiency saw little change as large numbers of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers continued to enter annually. One might say that 
Italy’s failure to fashion a coherent asylum policy over half a century after it had ratified 
the UN Convention on Refugees exposed such impotence. This ignores the tendency of 
Italy to knowingly allow asylum seekers to pass through its country in the 1990s en 
route to its northern EU neighbours. By the late 2000s, however, northern EU states had 
arrested such a development and Italy consequently received a notable jump in asylum 
applications, especially when compared to other EU member states. In Italy’s defence, 
its geographic proximity to North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans and its 7000 
kilometres of coastline meant stemming this flow remained an incredibly difficult task 
to fulfil. Ireland and Australia, two isolated islands – one in the north, one in the very 
south – meant they never experienced the incessant flows that Italy regularly 
encountered.  
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Settler-societies, with their long histories of immigration, had extensive 
experience of dealing with migrants. Hence, when Australia put in place a number of 
measures to stem the flow of people seeking asylum in their country, it met with 
success. Sender societies, like Ireland and Italy had no modern history of dealing with 
people arriving in their country. Consequently, it took longer for these countries to 
develop adequate methods to lower the number of people seeking asylum. Ireland and 
Italy’s membership of the European Union and the Council of Europe – both founded in 
the hope of insuring that Europe became a more humanitarian continent than the Second 
World War suggested – meant that its approaches to halting the arrival of asylum 
seekers required more sophistication than those employed by settler-societies not 
answerable to strong supranational organisations. Countries could not, for instance, 
openly admit that their policies potentially deterred people fleeing persecution from 
applying for asylum – as Australia did – because it would have gone against the 
principle of the ECHR.  
Nonetheless asylum seekers who received visas to remain in Australia – some of 
them after an extended stay in one of country’s unpleasant detention camps – benefited 
from the country’s long history of immigration and its turn towards multiculturalism in 
the 1970s. Extensive measures had developed by the 1990s to facilitate foreigners’ 
efforts to adapt to life in Australia. Furthermore, considerable state and federal funding 
promoted diversity. In addition, access to citizenship remained available to all legal 
residents who spent two of the previous five years legally resident in the country before 
July 2007. After July 2007, in a move consistent with the Liberal-National coalition 
government’s tougher outward stance towards immigration, Australian legislation 
required migrants to have resided legally in the country for four years to acquire 
citizenship; and only then after passing a new written exam testing the candidate’s 
knowledge of Australian culture and history. Although changes in Australia’s 
requirements made attaining citizenship more taxing than before, conditions appeared 
remarkably flexible when compared to Italy. Migrants in Italy must have resided legally 
in the country for ten years to acquire citizenship; unless they could claim Italian 
ethnicity via ius sanguinis (available up to the third generation), which would mean the 
grant of citizenship after three years or unless they married an Italian, which would have 
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meant gaining citizenship in six months.839 Ireland, despite its 2004 citizenship reform, 
retained relatively open conditions for migrants to acquire citizenship. Migrants had to 
have resided in the country for five of the previous nine years to apply for citizenship. 
Children born in the country could claim citizenship if one of their parents had 
previously lived in Ireland for five of the previous nine years. In Australia, children had 
to wait ten years to attain citizenship if no parent held Australian nationality, while in 
Italy they had to legally reside in the country for their first eighteen years to gain 
citizenship. 
Conditions in Ireland and Italy for asylum seekers who arrived without the 
necessary documents remained better than in Australia – detention remained relatively 
rare and, when used, lasted for short periods – but the latter represented a more 
adaptable and open society for refugees to join. Ireland and Italy’s history of receiving 
shelter from other countries in times of need meant that it had to, initially at least, tread 
carefully for fear of appearing to forget its past. Therefore, when governments formed 
measures to stop asylum seekers arriving, politicians talked about restricting only 
“bogus” asylum seekers, not “genuine” refugees, who they promised to welcome – even 
if the reality suggested otherwise. Australia, by contrast, placed no emphasis on whether 
asylum seekers deserved protection or not; because they arrived uninvited they remained 
unwelcome, no matter what their circumstances.  
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Conclusion 
 
Many scholars are still coming to the field of migration studies from varying disciplines. 
When these disciplines gather, as one expert wrote, it can sometimes resemble when 
‘one sometimes arrives at a party and is … surprised to find out who else is there’.840 
Historians, more than others at the party, appear particularly uncomfortable and tend to 
linger unsociably in the corner because, according to Jan and Leo Lucassen, ‘[t]he 
migration landscape is full of canyons and fast running rivers’, and ‘[t]he deepest 
canyon separates social scientists from historians’.841 By using a comparative framework 
that borrows from Fritz Scharpf’s basic game theory from 1997, practicing a 
methodology that is largely associated with the historian, and using government, non-
government and legal sources, this study has attempted to utilise a wide variety of 
disciplines to present a comprehensive account of asylum policymaking trends in three 
countries from 1989 to 2008.  
The historical chapter provides the most salient developments in asylum policy 
throughout the twentieth century in order to set the context for later discussions. Before 
1989, states consistently endeavoured to shut the door on people who offered them little 
in return; a trend that has arisen frequently since the politicisation of asylum in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most generous asylum regimes since then derived 
from national self-interest. France’s neighbours welcomed Huguenots in the late 
seventeenth century predominantly because of the benefits they brought with them; not 
because of states’ compassion towards them. Similarly, the Poles seeking asylum in 
France in the 1830s received a welcome reception by French high society because the 
refugees came from predominantly wealthy and skilled backgrounds, as the young 
Chopin demonstrated. When thousands of poor, East European Jews fled pogroms in 
Tsarist Russia, countries reacted less amenably, as symbolised by Britain’s decision to 
close its doors to people obviously in dire need of protection at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This trend repeated itself in 1920s Europe when wealthy barons 
fleeing Russia after the Civil War received hospitable treatment whilst poor Russian 
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refugees faced serious challenges to survive – until their illegality threatened states’ 
authority.  
States begrudgingly accepted Jewish asylum seekers fleeing persecution in Nazi 
Germany at first. But most countries soon chose to turn their backs as numbers rose 
throughout the late 1930s, especially after the Nazi regime began to disallow Jews from 
taking their monetary possessions with them when fleeing. Even when the extent of the 
Nazi atrocities came to the world’s attention, states still remained reticent to rectify 
matters, as the failure of the 1943 Bermuda Conference attested. Only public 
dissatisfaction and the work of Jewish NGOs forced the Allies into action, mirroring 
what occurred in the early 1920s when private voluntary organisations compelled the 
League of Nations to take note of the plight of Russian refugees.  
Two types of people sought asylum from the end of the Second World War up 
until the 1980s in liberal democratic states: survivors of Nazi aggression, who had states 
resettled by the early 1950s; and escapees from the Soviet bloc. The first group served to 
allay the guilt from past inactions. The second group, made up of Soviet defectors, 
received a sympathetic welcome because of their small numbers, the ideological 
advantages they offered, their relatively similar cultural backgrounds and their 
significant labour skills at a time of economic rebuilding. In contrast, the majority of 
asylum seekers who applied to western countries for protection from the late 1980s 
onwards came from either the poorer South (and were hence of a different skin colour to 
past asylum seekers) or the by-then politically inconsequential East Europe. Asylum 
thus awakened debate on a broad range of issues throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
markedly different from before.  
Rather than aiming to provide a theoretical framework that would explain 
asylum policymaking by eliminating variables shown to have little impact on outcomes, 
this study focused on integrating contextual explanations into a general narrative that 
highlighted the characteristic features of each case by introducing two broad coalitions 
of actors. One featured actors sympathetic to asylum seekers’ plight while the other 
consisted of actors more sceptical of asylum seekers’ motives and impact. By analysing 
the formation, implementation and outcomes of new asylum policies, this study 
encapsulated political and public debates on asylum, the role of a wide range of actors in 
policymaking, and the effects policy changes have on asylum flows and asylum seekers 
themselves.  
Many peculiarities emerged in the comparison between Australia, Italy and 
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Ireland. Every country had, to a certain degree, a unique asylum system based on a 
particular contextual setting within which asylum policy was established and applied. 
History, identity and geography all contributed heavily to the shaping of national asylum 
policies from 1989 to 2008. In Ireland, for example, the continuing resonance of the 
country’s emigrant history and its past experience of colonial rule meant that asylum 
seekers received a relatively welcome reception in Ireland initially. The Catholic Church 
and NGOs ensured that some sympathy for asylum seekers remained ever present in 
debates after the early warm welcome became markedly cooler. Ireland’s northerly 
geographic position in Europe and the EU’s emphasis on returning asylum seekers to the 
first member state they entered meant that Ireland never had to face an enormous rise of 
people seeking asylum from neighbouring countries.  
Italy also had an extensive emigrant past but it rarely featured in more recent 
national migration debates because of the state’s reluctance to commemorate its migrant 
past – a phenomenon made worse by the breakup of Italy’s major political parties in the 
early 1990s. Italy remained reluctant to host uninvited people in need of shelter but its 
geographic position and its imperial past meant many asylum seekers from former 
Italian colonies continued to arrive in search of sanctuary. The continued absence of any 
national asylum policy meant that refugees and migrants on temporary humanitarian 
visas often lived an inhumane existence in abandoned buildings dotted around the 
peripheries of the country’s towns and cities. Although many of the people seeking 
asylum in Italy came from previous Italian colonies, such as Albania, Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and Somalia, the failure to remember the colonial campaigns meant that empathy for 
these newcomers remained in short supply. As occurred in Ireland, the powerful 
Catholic Church remained outspokenly pro-migrant, providing opposition to left- and 
right-wing government migrant initiatives that it disagreed with. Unlike Ireland, 
however, Italy’s geographic location in the Mediterranean, close to the war-ravaged 
Balkans, an unstable Middle East and a refugee-producing Africa meant that it received 
a constant ebb and flow of asylum seekers. Although its EU membership meant that 
many of these newcomers simply passed through Italy in the 1990s on their way to a 
more northerly location, the tightening of the EU’s Schengen area and the increased 
implementation of the Dublin Convention by EU member states meant that Italy and 
other southern Mediterranean EU member states began to bear the brunt of non-
European migrants seeking to enter the EU from the mid 2000s onwards.   
Australia, too, had its own unique asylum system. Unlike its EU counterparts, 
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Australia’s history of immigration intake meant that a clear delineation existed between 
economic migrants and asylum seekers. Nonetheless, the country still treated asylum 
seekers differently, depending on whether they entered the country on valid visas or 
whether they entered irregularly because of its historic fixation on border control. This 
trait stemmed from Australia’s long history of controlling immigration to its country, as 
well as the uncertainty that derived from living so far from its traditional population 
base and so close to its densely populated northern Asian neighbours. Although the 
Catholic Church and other religious organisations criticised successive government 
actions towards boat people, they failed to make the same impact as in Ireland and Italy 
because of their lesser role in domestic Australian politics. Boat people also came to 
Australia, but in much smaller numbers than to Italy because of Australia’s relative 
isolation and because of its tight policing of its northern coast. Because Australia was 
not a member of any supranational organisation on a par with the EU, the country could 
act as it saw fit to deter boat people; unlike in the EU where certain norms and 
institutions existed to stem overly restrictive measures. Despite Australia’s ability to 
implement more restrictive asylum policies than EU member states – which it did in the 
wake of the Tampa crisis in 2001 – it is notable that the country has reverted to a 
decidedly more liberal set-up since the return of Labor to government in late 2007.  
EU member states, with Italy to the fore, have since the late 2000s attempted to 
put in place an asylum system that replicates policies used by Australia in the early 
2000s by externalising asylum, making more use of detention and reducing the 
entitlements of asylum seekers deemed worthy of protection. Perhaps Australia’s more 
recent return to policies that emphasise humanitarian traditions suggests that, in contrast 
to what Steiner termed the existence of a statute of limitations on moral guilt, there may 
exist a limit to how restrictive countries can make their asylum policies before there is a 
marked return to more liberal principles. Anti-immigration parties’ demise appears less 
likely in Europe than in Australia, where Pauline Hanson’s anti-immigration party 
disappeared in five years, however,  
Despite the uniqueness of the case studies, however, notable trends from 1989 to 
2008 emerged, especially when compared and contrasted with asylum policymaking 
during the Cold War. From the end of the Second World War to 1989, governments 
defended their generous asylum policies by employing ethical arguments based on 
ideological principles, humanitarianism, moral values and the individual’s entitlement to 
human rights. While sympathisers continued to adhere to these principles in the 1990s, 
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governments began to fashion arguments based on principles relating to state 
sovereignty, public security and the integrity of welfare regimes to support restricting 
asylum. Rarely had governments raised such issues during the Cold War. For many 
European countries without recognisable refugee or asylum systems during the Cold 
War, such as Ireland and Italy, economic factors, such as unemployment rates and 
economic growth, also began to play important roles in asylum debates, largely due to 
the fusion of asylum and immigration issues. 
 
Asylum during the Cold War 
 
Asylum after the Cold War 
 
Small number of asylum applications Large number of asylum applications 
 
Ordered transport of asylum seekers 
from transit countries in Europe to 
resettlement countries (usually the 
USA, Canada, Australia, etc.) 
 
Disordered arrival of asylum seekers 
(sometimes interpreted as a loss of 
control/sovereignty) 
 
Belief that asylum seeker required 
protection 
 
Doubt that asylum seeker required 
protection 
 
Large ideological benefits associated 
with receiving Soviet 
defectors/escapees 
 
Little ideological benefits associated 
with receiving asylum seekers from 
the poor South or post-communist East 
Europe 
 
Considering the recent global economic downturn, the conclusion will finish 
with a comparison with the Inter-War period because of the obvious parallels with the 
1930s economic crisis. The arrival of communism in Russia in 1917 led to over one 
million refugees streaming into western states in the 1920s. Approximately seventy 
years later, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe again led to huge numbers of 
people seeking asylum in liberal democratic states. Both groups, while not generally 
welcomed, eventually managed to settle in the countries in which they applied for 
asylum. Despite a noticeable decrease in refugees in the 1930s, those seeking protection 
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in that crisis-hit decade received more hostile treatment from European governments 
than their 1920s counterparts, as governments strengthened enforcement mechanisms to 
restrict and expel refugees. Due to the increasing economic difficulties stemming from 
the economic crisis of 2008-09, governments are likely to do the same in forthcoming 
years.  
In the 1930s, national and international voluntary organisations sympathetic to 
the plight of people fleeing their home countries objected to governments’ increasingly 
strict asylum practices. But these voluntary organisations had no avenues to seriously 
challenge governments’ turn towards restrictionism and frequently campaigned for 
diverging goals (at Evian, for instance, private organisations sought four markedly 
different solutions). By contrast, NGOs during the 1990s took advantage of the 
expansion of national courts’ powers – a development Charles Epp termed the rights 
revolution – to dispute the imposition of more parsimonious asylum policies, as the 
Australian and Irish chapters confirmed.842 They also effectively joined forces; often 
making strange bedfellows in the process as the combination of the communist-linked 
ARCI and the Vatican-linked Caritas in the National Asylum Programme in Italy 
showed. In Australia, NGOs merged under the banner of the Refugee Council of 
Australia; in Italy in they came together under the Communal Action plan and the 
National Programme for Asylum (and its successors); and in Ireland under the rubric of 
Integrating Ireland. This teamwork also appeared on the European stage, with the 
European Council of Refugees and Exiles including the Irish Refugee Council and the 
Italian Refugee Council, along with 37 other national NGOs from Europe. 
Sympathisers’ propensity to affect political, media and public opinion – by alluding to 
certain national, moral and humanitarian principles – also managed to weaken 
governments’ efforts to impose more inhibitive asylum policies, as clearly displayed in 
the Australian, Italian and Irish chapters. Efforts by governments to externalise asylum 
and thwart the influence of sympathisers by bypassing national courts during the 2000s 
conveyed the success sympathisers had during the 1990s. By the late 2000s governments 
appeared to have substantially curbed the impact of sympathisers.  
Reaching western countries to apply for asylum became more difficult to achieve 
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in the 2000s, leading many potential asylum seekers to rely on human traffickers in 
order to enter western states. This often compelled asylum seekers to undergo perilous 
journeys across seas in rarely seaworthy boats or concealed travel in truck and ship 
cargoes. Though many governments defended these policy changes by saying they 
merely wanted to stem the number of “bogus asylum seekers” and “economic refugees” 
arriving, these changes affected all asylum seekers in equal measure. The NGO United 
against Racism estimated in July 2009 that over 13,250 people died trying to enter 
Europe since 1993; the majority of these deaths occurring in the 2000s.843 The challenge 
for sympathisers now is to adapt to offset such a development. The current economic 
crisis, unfortunately, makes this an even more arduous and difficult task to grapple with, 
as the 1930s demonstrated all too clearly. Indeed, when discussing that period, Hannah 
Arendt wrote:  
 
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on 
regarding as “inalienable” those human rights which are enjoyed only by citizens of the 
most prosperous and civilised countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves.844 
 
Despite the enduring veracity of the paradox Arendt outlines, this thesis has shown that 
the efforts of sympathisers, who Arendt terms ‘well-meaning idealists’, became more 
salient. As a consequence, people who managed to make asylum claims no longer 
remained ‘rightless’. By acting in unison and advocating for common goals actors 
sympathetic to asylum seekers can continue to make a real difference. 
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